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ABSTRACT 
The Internet was a catalyst for refiguring the previous models of media relationships. 
For many, the Internet is a medium that liberates individuals from the centralised and 
asymmetrical power structures of traditional mass media and other social institutions in 
particular, the boundaries set by the nation and the state. For other people, the Internet 
increases the capacity for surveillance and control. This dissertation argues for a fluid 
conception of the operations of power and resistance on the Internet that takes into 
account the various discourses which play a part in determining agency and subjectivity. 
It examines and balances the narratives of liberation and oppression against each other: 
for, just as the developments in Internet technology contribute to changes in discourse, 
so too existing or prior discursive limits and relations of power affect Internet culture 
and technology. 
In the process of analysing the interplay of different discourses on the Internet, 
this dissertation takes into account transnational and national cultural flows and the 
insights that conceptual work on globalisation, transnationalism, and cosmopolitanism 
can provide. The case studies are concerned with change and centre on the use of the 
Internet to effect this change; they include: the Singaporean Internet, a ‘thread’ about 
Asian culture and Australia, the representation of oppression and the formation of 
Chinese diasporic collectivities, and anti-capitalist networks. Through these case 
studies, the dissertation examines the degree to which the nation-state can regulate and 
affect the discourses at play on the Internet as well as the agency of participants in 
countering and maintaining these discourses. This dissertation also analyses activists’ 
use of the Internet to form transnational networks. It discusses the limitations of their 
work  including problems with representation.  ii 
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INTRODUCTION 
Discourse, Power, Resistance, and the Internet 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Getting Wired Up 
Internet technology, in its simplest forms, has been around since the nineteen-seventies, 
however, its use and deployment was confined to educational, research and military 
institutions. It was only in the nineteen-nineties that it became more of a household 
technology. In 1996, when I began this inquiry into the Internet and power, Australian 
people were using it in their homes. This was an optimistic time, and the Internet was 
viewed as an emerging industry that would offer new work opportunities, recreation 
possibilities, ‘information at your fingertips,’ and so forth. There was also a public 
sense of redundancy, that is, if you did not log on, you would be left behind. The main 
means of access, at least from home, was through a dial-up modem at what would seem 
like extremely sluggish speeds today. Then, just getting connected felt to me like an 
admission into some sort of global theme park. The Netscape icon spinning as I loaded 
up my first page was a sign of connectedness to a global network of information. My 
email address was a sign of membership and positioning in the socio-cultural sphere of 
the Internet. 
  The sense of novelty faded away, and there is now a generation of adults who 
have grown up with the Internet in existence in most, if not all, of their conscious 
recollection. This account of my experience of the Internet partly explains why this 
thesis is very much concerned with the introduction and development of the Internet and 
the extent to which this has changed things. Watching the introduction and   - 3 - 
popularisation of the Internet placed its newness in the foreground, highlighting the 
sense of ongoing historical development and change. This thesis is dedicated to 
examining the sorts of claims made about the possibilities of this media around the time 
of its introduction to mainstream society and the subsequent questioning, explicitly or 
implicitly, of these initial assumptions. The most interesting aspect of the Internet, to 
me, was the question of power and agency, especially whether and how this media 
would affect groups that hitherto had to struggle for a voice in the public arena, and the 
extent it challenged, reaffirmed, and, constructed existing or new hierarchical structures. 
1.2 Power and Dominant Discourses of the Internet 
Jordan’s book, Cyberpower: The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace and the Internet, 
explores and then critiques the Weberian concept of power as something possessed and 
wielded by individuals, a concept that underpins some of the perspectives which assume 
that cyberspace and the Internet provide an ideal democratic space for individuals to 
experiment with fluid and multiple identities (1999). These perspectives tend to see the 
Internet as a medium that escapes social hierarchies where power was something 
possessed by one group and exercised over another. It was supposed to make this power 
accessible to all participating in online interaction. If structures of power did exist (for 
instance, in text-based virtual environments), they were supposedly more fluid and 
open. Jordan moves away from this conception of power towards a more Foucauldian 
notion where power in cyberspace, rather than something possessed, is embedded in its 
technology, which is shaped by a corporate and technological elite. While the 
developments of cyberspace technology serve the interests and enhance the power of 
this elite, these developments also empower the grassroots. 
However, Jordan’s conclusion is a bleak one. He argues that: “creating greater 
complexity in the underlying technology of cyberspace distances individual users from   - 4 - 
cyberspace's fundamental fabric and transfers control of that fabric to an expertise-based 
elite” (Jordan 1999: 130). Nevertheless, Foucault asserts that: 
Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything but because it 
comes from everywhere … Power comes from below; that is there is no 
binary and all-encompassing opposition between ruler and ruled at the 
root of power relations, and serving as a general matrix—no such duality 
extending from the top down and reacting on more and more limited 
groups to the very depths of the social body (Foucault, 1979a: 93-4, cited 
in McHoul and Grace 1997: 39). 
Power, in this sense, is not something possessed and wielded by a group or individual 
but operates through social discourses, and the dominant discourses in society are those 
working through and on behalf of its institutions. I understand and use the word, 
‘discourses,’ not in its traditional linguistic sense describing utterances greater than a 
sentence, but as Foucault uses it, that is, “as bodies of knowledge … away from 
something to do with language … and closer towards the concept of discipline … 
scholarly disciplines … and disciplinary institutions of social control” (McHoul and 
Grace 1997: 26). These “bodies of knowledge” express and maintain the major truths 
within certain social contexts, and the more powerful, universal, or pervasive, 
discourses likewise govern the reigning truths in society. While I agree with Jordan’s 
view that the expertise-based elite control the direction of technological change 
somewhat, with major repercussions on the nature of power in cyberspace, his 
conclusion seems to negate a more fluid concept of power suggested by Foucault’s 
work and prematurely suggests a reification of the social relations of the Internet. 
This dissertation examines the dominant discourses that affect power, agency 
and resistance on the Internet within national and transnational contexts, and explores 
how the medium of the Internet, its habitus, have shaped these discourses. These 
discourses include: the liberal discourse of the Internet as a medium that will free 
humanity from past constraints; and the discourse of governance and regulation, where   - 5 - 
the Internet is seen as a technology in need of control. In addition, I also discuss the 
development and impact of the discourses of diaspora, globalisation, and 
cosmopolitanism. In my view, a critical analysis of these discourses that circumscribe 
the Internet will reveal a shifting terrain where it is just as likely that new structures of 
domination and control have and will develop, along with new methods of resistance. 
The aim of the analysis is to examine how discourses multiply and change with 
technology, specifically, of course, the technology of the Internet, and how this affects 
the structure(s) of power that implicate the subjects of Internet technology. In so doing, 
I want to avoid adopting a techno-deterministic position, which assumes that a change 
in technology (or introduction of a new technology) simply results in social change. By 
this, I mean that the reverse is also true: social and historical forces work on the 
technology and its development. Discourse interpellates people in society, and people 
possess frames of reference that affect their engagement with Internet technology. 
Discourses and the relations of power that accompany them limit and frame new 
technologies, in as much as the latter introduces discursive changes. 
In Section Two, I discuss the Internet as a technology with the potential to open 
up discourse, which will allow people to challenge dominant institutional discourses. 
This view reflects the desire for openness and transparency, while demonstrating that 
the institution and its controls do not go away simply because this medium has emerged. 
As Foucault points out, just because the obvious manifestations of control seem absent 
(though less so today than in early cyberculture), this does not equate with the absence 
of hierarchies, of structures of power: “In general terms, [Foucault] would say that the 
interdiction, the refusal, the prohibition, far from being essential forms of power, are 
only its limits, power in its frustrated or extreme forms” (1988: 105). I include a 
discussion of the more explicit forms of control, in this case, state regulation, and also   - 6 - 
explore the underlying discourses that affect subjectivity and agency, which influence 
the development of this medium and its socio-cultural formations. 
The media and other institutions (such as government and education) had a 
significant role in framing this technology and contributing to the construction and 
maintenance of its discursive formations. Politicians, journalists, scholars, and 
industrialists discussed the Internet as something that would bring in great changes and 
affect our social reality. The Internet was seen as having the potential to challenge 
traditional notions of control and governance. Debates surrounding crime and 
pornography, that is, the quality and type of information available on the Internet and 
who should have access to it, highlighted these changes and challenges. These 
contribute towards an archive of secondary discourses that “repeat, gloss, and 
comment,” that is, performing the function Foucault describes as “commentary” 
(Foucault 1981: 57). Commentary “limits the chance-element in discourse by the play 
of an identity which would take the form of repetition and sameness” (Foucault 1981: 
59). In this sense, the literature on the Internet helped frame the types of meaning, 
subjectivities, and practices, ensuring their reproduction and recycling with the entry of 
new participants, interactions, and texts. 
David Silver identifies three stages of cyberculture studies over the last decade. 
The first of these, popular cyberculture, began in the early 1990s, and “is marked by its 
journalistic origins and characterized by its descriptive nature, limited dualism, and use 
of the Internet-as-frontier metaphor” (Silver 2000). The other two stages described by 
Silver are cyberculture studies and critical cyberculture studies:  
The second stage, cyberculture studies, focuses largely on virtual 
communities and online identities and benefits from an influx of 
academic scholars. The third stage, critical cyberculture studies, expands 
the notion of cyberculture to include four areas of study – online 
interactions, digital discourses, access and denial to the Internet, and 
interface design of cyberspace – and explores the intersections and 
interdependencies between any and all four domains (Silver 2000).   - 7 - 
All of these stages play important roles in describing and repeating Internet discourses. 
The first of these, popular cyberculture studies, is arguably the most obviously 
influential in terms of the take-up and use of the technology by people outside academia 
by virtue of its accessibility and primacy. Newspaper articles, introductory instructional 
books on using the Internet, the speculative dystopian or utopian writing of Internet 
gurus such as John Perry Barlow, documentation of Frequently Asked Questions 
(FAQs), the comments of politicians and government figures, all form people’s 
introduction to the medium and its cultural formations. These texts formed a significant 
part of the discourse of cyberculture.  
The development of cyberculture studies, and the associated disciplines of 
computer-mediated communication (CMC), thus has repercussions for a study of the 
development of Internet discourses. Over the preceding decade, a canon of cyberculture 
studies has emerged, a canon expressed in anthologies (Bell and Kennedy 2000; Jones 
1997; Porter 1997; Sardar and Ravetz 1996; Vitanza 1999), in university course 
readings, and in bibliographic lists compiled by academics and non-academics alike. 
Such collections are a form of organizing the discourse, of establishing the basis for 
discussion and thinking about this medium and the emerging cultural patterns. Some of 
the texts included in the canon reinforce the theme that the Internet is a space which 
escapes traditional forms of power and control. However, as Silver points out, a dualism 
of utopian and dystopian perspectives of the Internet was developing even in the early 
popular cyberculture stage (2000). 
While “[s]uch dualism can be provisionally useful, to change the perspective 
from time to time and move from pro to contra” (Foucault 1988: 120), it can also lead 
to a repetitive recycling of positions that leads to stagnation. Foucault advocates “a 
reversal of values and truths … [that] does not stop with simple cheers (long live 
insanity, delinquency, sex) but allows for new strategies” (1988: 120). This involves a   - 8 - 
dismantling of binaries “by trying to turn off these mechanisms which cause the 
appearance of two separate sides, by dissolving the false unity, the illusory ‘nature’ of 
this other side which we have taken sides.” In a sense, this describes the aims of the 
current work, to explore and then move beyond the dualisms of techno- versus social-
determinism, of utopian celebrations of the Internet versus dystopian perspectives, in 
order to discover strategies and tactics for progressive social change. 
2. The View of the Internet as an Emancipatory Space 
2.1 The Possibility for a Democratic Public Sphere 
Amongst others, Kellner suggested in 1999 that it was possible for the Internet to assist 
in the revitalisation of politics, for a “technopolitics” that would reflect the interests of 
not just the elite in politics and business, but would also allow access and participation 
by the marginalised and oppressed. This would, in this perspective, lead to the type of 
ideal public sphere conceptualised by Habermas, one that allows participation of various 
groups and individuals and an electorate which would be informed, able to debate and 
make decisions based on reason.
1 Kellner does not suggest that media technology 
‘fixes’ communication patterns and structures,
2 or that the Internet would necessarily 
lead to the ideal political environment through inherent technological features. Against 
what he calls an essentialising and freezing of the media and its patterns, he reminds us 
that the “media can be reconstructed, refunctioned, and constantly changed” (Kellner 
1999: 110). 
The communication patterns of broadcast media and CMC, nevertheless, differ 
markedly, with broadcast media communication being ‘top-down,’ dominated by media 
                                                 
1 This is in contrast to the development of the mass media. Habermas is scathing of the mass media, 
which he regards as offering cultural consumption to the public, rather than debate, ‘The world fashioned 
by the mass media is a public sphere in appearance only. By the same token the integrity of the public 
sphere which they promise to their consumers is also an illusion’ (Habermas 1989: 171). 
2 For instance, Kellner discusses forms of broadcasting that work against the centralised ‘one to many’ 
model, for instance, community television and radio.   - 9 - 
corporations, the state, and major political parties, and, centralised in control (reflecting 
advertiser, state, and/or media corporation interests). This has worked against the 
creation of a genuine Habermasian public sphere: “[m]ainstream media on the whole 
has under informed the public by limiting the range of views, privileging establishment 
views, and more recently engaging in tabloidisation of politics and public discourse” 
(Kellner 1999: 105). 
In contrast to broadcast media, CMC is decentralised, involves a more pluralistic 
mode of access and a ‘many to many’ form of communication between producers and 
consumers. CMC communication can be synchronous (like broadcast media), but also is 
easily stored and accessed at different times. The overall effect, as Kellner says, is that 
CMC political communication is “more decentred and varied in its origins, scope, and 
effects” than broadcast media (Kellner 1999: 103): 
… computers are a potentially democratic technology. While broadcast 
communication tends to be one-way and unidirectional, computer 
communication is bi- or omni-directional. Where television-watching is 
often passive, computer involvement can be interactive and participatory. 
Individuals can use computers to send email to communicate with other 
individuals or can directly communicate via modems which use the 
telephone to link individuals with each other in interactive networks 
(Kellner 1999: 105). 
To Kellner, in the ‘overdeveloped’ world, cyberspace is decommodified, and within the 
reach of ethnic minorities, women, and so forth. Kellner sees cyberspace as a domain of 
contestation where it is possible to resist and advance the interests of the oppressed. He 
cites examples of the way resistance groups have used cyberspace, including the 
Zapatistas, anti-NAFTA struggle, and the McLibel campaign. The place of the 
intellectual, thus is to critique as well as to familiarise themselves with the possibilities 
and limits of this new technology: 
It is therefore the responsibility of the intellectual to engage creatively 
with these new technologies, as well as to analyse critically the diverse 
developments of the cyberculture. This requires dialectical thinking that   - 10 - 
discriminates between the costs and the benefits, the upsides and 
downsides, of new technologies, and devising ways that they can be used 
to promote positive values like education, democracy and Enlightenment 
(Kellner 1999: 110). 
The popular imagination regards the Internet as a technology that shifts power 
from the media institutions to its audiences, one that destabilises the boundaries 
between audience and producer of texts, and, in this way, threatens previous hierarchies, 
especially in circumstances where the state can be somewhat confident that the media 
institutions would not challenge its authority or policies. Other technologies, such as 
video-recorders, cable television, and satellite television, also placed some measure of 
control in the hands of audiences, however, this feature was not highlighted in as 
dramatic a fashion as the Internet. 
An example of the belief that the Internet transfers power from producers to 
audiences is in the document, Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Carta 
for the Knowledge Age (Progress and Freedom Foundation 1994). This document calls 
the process “demassification,” reflecting a general distrust and disillusionment with the 
traditional ‘mass’ media of broadcast television and radio. Well-known and influential 
in the discourse of the free Internet, this manifesto proclaims the onset of the “Third 
Wave,” that is, an economy based upon knowledge (Progress and Freedom Foundation 
1994). According to the authors of this document, this Third Wave economy will bring 
with it certain political, cultural, and social changes: 
The Third Wave has profound implications for the nature and meaning of 
property, of the marketplace, of community and of individual freedom. 
As it emerges, it shapes new codes of behavior that move each organism 
and institution – family, neighborhood, church group, company, 
government,  nation  – inexorably beyond standardisation and 
centralization, as well as beyond the materialist’s obsession with energy, 
money and control (Progress and Freedom Foundation 1994). 
Credited to Esther Dyson, George Gilder, George Keyworth and Alvin Toffler, the 
document is filled with clichés and buzzwords like “bioelectronic frontier” (again the   - 11 - 
frontier metaphor, invoking imperial conquest). Besides the obvious ethnocentric bias 
of this article, the document is indicative of the kinds of predictions people have been 
making about cyberspace and the Internet and how these technologies would affect 
everyday social and political life, that is, processes of decentralisation, dematerialisation 
and fragmentation. 
The notion that the Internet had a technological bias which displaced traditional 
boundaries between different types of communicative relationships was complemented 
by assumptions regarding the content and geographical distribution of the users of the 
Internet. James Boyle, in his work, Foucault in Cyberspace, neatly summarises and 
categorises these assumptions using three equally renowned phrases. He calls these 
assumptions the “trinity of digital libertarianism,” a trinity that would make it 
impossible to regulate the Internet because of the “technology of the medium, the 
geographical distribution of its users and the nature of its content” (1997). The 
religious (Christian) connotations of the word, ‘trinity,’ perhaps accurately reflects the 
degree to which these principles are held as fundamental to the Internet. 
The first of the trinity, “The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes 
around it,” refers to how the Internet emerged from the desire to develop a means of 
sharing computer resources and data in a reliable fashion.
3 The idea was to connect the 
computers in a seemingly redundant fashion so that if one link had a fault and went 
down, the data could travel a different route (Hauben 1993; Hafner and Lyon 1996). 
The Internet today is a distributed network system using packet switching
4 to transfer 
                                                 
3 This was one result of the launch of Sputnik by the Russians in 1957, the American government wanted 
to develop a system of command and control that would be reliable and the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (ARPA) was appointed to conduct research towards this goal. Joseph Carl Robnett Linklider 
shifted the emphasis from command and control systems to methods of information processing (Hauben 
1993; Hafner and Lyon 1996). 
4 Packet switching is a method of splitting data into ‘packets’ and sending them to their destination 
through the network.   - 12 - 
data, apparently a censor’s nightmare, because closing off one connection to a source of 
material does not prevent access to that data through a different connection. 
The second ‘truism,’ a little more American in orientation in keeping with the 
tendency of its author, John Perry Barlow, is this: “In Cyberspace, the First Amendment 
is a local ordinance.” Boyle uses this phrase to sum up how content on a server can be 
obtained a great geographical distance away. Barlow on his home page, says that Yahoo 
called him  “the Thomas Jefferson of Cyberspace” (Barlow 1996). The reference to the 
First Amendment may be specific to the United States, however, this idea can be 
applied to the Singapore case in the following sense: regulations protecting the primacy 
of certain discourses have a limited effect because of this disjuncture between the 
location of the content and access to it. 
The third of the trinity, “Information Wants to be Free,” was popularly adopted 
as a motto by open source software programmers,
5 hackers, and many online activists. 
Roger Clarke researched the genealogy of this aphorism, confirming that Stewart Brand 
most famously used it at the first Hacker’s Conference.
6 It is interesting to note that the 
phrase has been applied differently over time. In this instance, Brand used it to refer to 
information as intellectual property, as a good: 
On the one hand information wants to be expensive, because it's so 
valuable. The right information in the right place just changes your life. 
On the other hand, information wants to be free, because the cost of 
getting it out is getting lower and lower all the time. So you have these 
two fighting against each other (cited in Clarke 1999). 
While Brand occasionally used this phrase to refer to political freedom, John Perry 
Barlow, quoting Thomas Jefferson, combined the economic meanings of this phrase 
with libertarian ideals in a palpably ethnocentric manner. Boyle suggests that Barlow 
                                                 
5 Software provided in a form whereby the codes and scripts are readily accessible to fellow 
programmers. Because of this, they are easily copied, modified and shared with other programmers. 
6 ‘Hacker’ here refers to programmers who modify (bootstrap) software, not to today’s sense with its 
connotations of criminality.   - 13 - 
combines Enlightenment ideals with the spread of ideas. Also obvious, especially with 
the phrasing of the second of the ‘trinity,’ is the American roots of these phrases, which 
is not surprising as Americans were the pioneers in developing and using the 
technology. Equally palpable is the criticism that these assumptions reflect the culture 
and ideology of the United States and lend weight to fears of Americanisation through 
global media, fears that are exploited by the state through the pollution trope. 
Modernist ideals about consensual politics as a foundation for a public sphere 
form the basis of these approaches to the Internet. In turn, the goal of ‘consensus’ 
implies that it is possible to identify a universal reason which should underlie this 
consensus. Mark Poster argues that the Habermasian model cannot be applied usefully 
to analyse the political aspects of the Internet. This, according to Poster, is partly due to 
the general confusion of meanings associated with the terms, ‘public’ and ‘private’, and 
distinguishing the private from the public realm. The Internet adds to the confusion, as 
it is a medium where the private and the public overlap. He writes: 
Now the question of ‘talk,’ of meeting face-to-face, of ‘public’ discourse 
is confused and complicated by the electronic form of exchange of 
symbols. If ‘public’ discourse exists as pixels on screens generated at 
remote locations by individuals one has never and probably will never 
meet, as it is in the case of the Internet with its ‘virtual communities,’ 
‘electronic cafÈs,’ [sic] bulletin boards, e-mail, computer conferencing 
and even video conferencing, then how is it to be distinguished from 
‘private’ letters, printface and so forth. The age of the public sphere as 
face-to-face talk is clearly over: the question of democracy must 
henceforth take into account new forms of electronically mediated 
discourse (Poster 1995a: n.p.). 
Rather than applying the modernist Habermasian model, according to Poster, the 
Internet is a postmodern technology with a democratising potential in its capability to 
decentralise the control and production of communication: 
The "magic" of the Internet is that it is a technology that puts cultural 
acts, symbolizations in all forms, in the hands of all participants; it 
radically decentralizes the positions of speech, publishing, filmmaking,   - 14 - 
radio and television broadcasting, in short the apparatuses of cultural 
production (Poster 1995a: n.p.). 
In the next section, I discuss the views of others that, like Poster, emphasise the 
Internet’s liberatory potential, yet reflect a more postmodern epistemology, and are 
more concerned with the way the Internet allows the play of multiple subjectivities and 
realities. 
2.2 Postmodernism and Multiple Realities and Subjectivities 
Literature about the Internet is heavily influenced by postmodern and cyberspace 
theory,
7 wherein MUDs (multi-user domains), Usenet, email, and other elements of the 
Internet are hypothesised as different kinds of cyberspace. This is within the continuum 
of prior analyses of developments in the media, particularly in the rise of electronic 
media. For instance, in The Second Media Age, Mark Poster analysed the relationship 
between electronic media, in particular Virtual Reality systems and the Internet, and the 
emergence of a postmodern age (Poster 1995b). Such media technologies had profound 
implications for subjectivity, the role of the nation, approaches to reality, and to the 
metanarratives that constitute this reality; according to Poster, computer-mediated 
technology, along with the other new technologies of that time, had the potential to 
usher in a postmodern age. 
Others have also asserted the connection between the technologies of the 
Internet and postmodernity. Sherry Turkle asserts that cyberspace
8 lends itself to the 
postmodern imagination through the development of personal computing, decentred 
psychology, and the influence of emergent models of artificial intelligence where 
                                                 
7 I use this term to refer to the body of writing on cyberspace, tracing its genealogy back to William 
Gibson, distinguishing cyberspace theory from studies on CMC.  
8 The Electronic Frontiers Foundation, credited one of its co-founders, John Perry Barlow, as the first 
person to apply ‘cyberspace’ to the Internet (Barlow 1996). While it is important not to conflate or 
confuse cyberspace with the Internet, the print and broadcast media tend to use the terms synonymously: 
‘[s]ome use it as a synonym for virtual reality, others as a synonym for the World-Wide Web hypermedia 
network, or for the Internet as a whole (sometimes including the telephone, TV, and other communication 
networks)’ (Heylighen 1994).   - 15 - 
“[i]ntelligence did not reside in an isolated thinking subject, but in the interaction of 
multiple fragments of mind, figuratively speaking, in a society of mind” (Turkle 
1995:130). Returning to Turkle, computers, she argues, are “a second self,” particularly 
with the availability of operating systems based on simulation that encourage 
experimentation and reflect the multiple facets of the self. Turkle suggests that: 
in the daily practice of many computer users, windows have become a 
powerful metaphor for thinking about the self as a multiple, distributed 
system. …  The life practice of windows is that of a decentered self that 
exists in many worlds and plays many roles at the same time (Turkle 
1995:130). 
With the Internet, she continues, this personal connection with the computer has been 
expanded to include communication and interaction with other computers, and other 
selves in cyberspaces that allow the performance of whatever roles and selves the 
individual may choose. 
I have found Roseanne Stone’s work is particularly influential, wherein she 
states that most of us live in cyberspace in part, communicating through the network 
and “negotiating the tensions between individual subjects, virtual collectivities” (Stone 
1995: 35). As with much early work on the Internet, a strong ‘pioneer’ theme emerges 
in her work; she speaks of these new collectivities as risking themselves in a space apart 
from real life.
9 
Much has been made of the use of hypertext on the Web, how the distinctions 
between readers and writers, the producers and consumers of texts, have blurred. 
Likewise, in newsgroups, the institutional and commercial constraints of ‘one-to-many’ 
media like television and newspapers appear to disappear. The Usenet newsgroups are 
                                                 
9 This notion of the Internet as a space to be colonised is examined by Judith Tabron, who contrasts the 
Internet today with her experiences of it in its early days and concludes that the Internet has become less 
an area where identity is explored and contested and more one in which users accept the default options 
made available to them in a more and more restrictive fashion by web and software designers (Tabron 
1997).  To Tabron, the flood of new users unfamiliar with netiquette and the technology below the surface 
is like an invasion, a colonisation of an existing community by people unfamiliar with the culture of the 
original inhabitants.   - 16 - 
apparently open to anyone with access to online resources to post and read material. 
Lastly, in text-driven virtual reality ‘spaces’ like MUDs, users can construct identities 
through language, setting descriptions of themselves and relating to other participants 
without the constraints of physical ‘real-life’ presence.
10 The upshot of all these 
resources is that the discourse of cyberculture is infused with postmodernist notions of 
displacement of centres, boundary transgression, fluidity, and the like. 
How have people characterised Internet subjectivity? Postmodernist ideas of 
decentred self as opposed to the unitary and consistent subject of modernism are 
borrowed from various sources. Psychoanalysis is also used. For instance, Sherry 
Turkle compares the move away from ‘top-down’ approaches in computers and 
programming with changes in theories of the human mind (1995). Others apply Deleuze 
and Guattari’s notion of rhizomic subjectivity and relate Internet subjectivity to 
postmodernism and late capitalism (Everard 1996). 
  As in Turkle’s work, the motif of non-unitary identity recurs in Stone’s writing. 
She writes that: 
the identities that emerge from these interactions – fragmented, complex, 
diffracted through the lenses of technology, culture, and new 
technocultural formations – seem to me to be, for better or worse, more 
visible as the critters we ourselves are becoming, here at the close of the 
mechanical age (Stone 1995: 36). 
In the formation of these new identities, Stone uses the concepts of the “technosocial,” 
“location technology,” and “warranting.” The technosocial is an implosion of the 
categories of the technological and the natural. “Nature” is conceptualised as an active 
agent, resisting representation, and the idea is to look for nature in the technological. I 
make the point that the constitution of these subjectivities is through both machine code 
and language and therefore not transparent and free from representation. Stone defines 
                                                 
10 The subject of disembodiment is not without contention as it could be argued that, rather than being 
disembodied, what is happening is that the boundary between ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ bodies is less distinct.   - 17 - 
‘warranting’ as the production and renewal of the join between physical and discursive 
space. She uses the concept of warranting to connect the physical and discursive aspects 
of identity, and thus suggests that the discursive body is produced through texts.  Online 
subjectivity is partly made up of a textually-mediated physicality.
11 
The Internet, in this perspective, reflects the postmodern approach to knowledge, 
as something that is not autonomous from social reality, rather, that knowledge, indeed, 
is constituted by discourse. For instance, in her work on gender issues, pedagogy and 
the Internet, Dale Spender speaks of the Internet as ushering in a new age and new 
approach to knowledge. Spender argues: 
We assume that knowledge exists as an entity: that it is stable enough to 
be divided into disciplines; that it can be arranged in hierarchical order, 
and systematically taught … But this conceptualisation of knowledge is 
increasingly inadequate in an electronic age in which knowledge is also 
information which flows in cyberspace; it can be public, it resists 
boundaries, it is almost impossible to rank, and it is available 
twenty-four hours a day (Spender 1995). 
To sum up, much of the writing on the Internet claims it is highly suitable to a 
postmodern praxis, its sheer size and design allowing fluid, multiple and hybrid 
identities that challenge homogeneity and fixed binaries. Such claims are often 
accompanied by the assumption that the state and the transnational community have a 
relationship marked by tension, a tension between the state’s control of national identity 
and the Internet as a medium for unrestrained transcultural flows. The Internet, like 
other communication technologies, has the ability to compress distances, to refigure 
time and space, but to a much greater extent than before. The infrastructure of the 
Internet, by design, is fluid and modular, its inventors, after all, designed it so that the 
blocking or closure of one node on the network would not bring the whole system 
down. Thus, we see why so many people now speak of ‘virtual communities’ that 
                                                 
11 How much can the idea of warranting be applied and contested by theorists and related to the notion of 
identity as dependant on alterity (Bhabha 1994)?   - 18 - 
transcend national boundaries. However much these assumptions are actualised, they 
are a popular vision of virtual community that is part of a bundle of concepts associated 
with cyberspace and CMC, thus, these other concepts are, consciously or unconsciously, 
an important element in the libertarian discourse that pervades the Internet. 
2.3 Cyberspace and Virtual Community 
The notion of virtual community accompanies the idea that the Internet allows the 
expression of a more postmodern form of subjectivity; the virtual communities of 
cyberspace become the space for the performance of individual identities. The idea of 
virtual community is made up of influential concepts such as the notion of a ‘global 
village.’ The phrase, ‘global village,’ is, in turn, attributed to a line in Wyndham Lewis 
essay, ‘America and Cosmic Man,’ “now that the world has become one big village 
with telephones laid on from one end to the other and air transport both speedy and 
safe” (Lewis 1948: 21). Cultural theorists, including Marshall McLuhan follow suit, 
writing, “The new electronic interdependence recreates the world in the image of a 
global village” (McLuhan 1962: 31).
12 
  Alongside ‘global village’, the notion of a ‘virtual community’ has similarly 
emerged and is likewise in popular usage on web pages. Well-known writer and Internet 
enthusiast, Howard Rheingold, describes virtual community as formations arising out of 
the interaction of people via CMC. This idea of virtual community has spread to the 
extent that activist groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation refer to Internet users 
as “netizens” (Internet and citizen) and make appeals for action based on this sense of 
community and involvement. Denying the notion of a hegemonic discourse organising 
this community, reasoning the diversity of its participants prevents such uniformity 
from taking hold, Rheingold says of the community with which he aligns himself, “we 
                                                 
12 The origins of the phrase was pieced together over a couple of posts in the Computer Mediated Culture 
electronic mailing list (December, Wark et al. 1995).   - 19 - 
who populate cyberspace deliberately experiment with fracturing traditional notions of 
identity by living as multiple simultaneous personae in different virtual neighborhoods” 
(Rheingold 1992). 
Post-McLuhan, and before the writers of Cyberspace speak of a “Third Wave” 
economy and society, Stone traced the creation of virtual communities and the evolution 
of ways of thinking about presence and communality through four epochs, each with its 
associated mode of communication and community-formation: 
Epoch One: Texts [from the mid-1600s] 
Epoch Two: Electronic communication and entertainment media [1900+] 
Epoch Three: Information technology [1960+] 
Epoch Four: Virtual reality and cyberspace (Stone 1994: 85) 
This ‘periodisation’ is interesting in itself, in the implied (if not taken up or even agreed 
on by the various authors) evolutionary mode of approaching technology and social 
change. However, the main concern here is with her discussion of changes in the 
development of virtual communities, with a focus on the relationship between 
technology and the body.  
In her history, Stone describes how, with each new technology of 
communication, we have witnessed social changes culminating in the formations of 
today. In Epoch One, which she locates as starting in the mid-1600s, communities 
formed around written texts, for instance, novels, where “texts became ways of creating 
and later of controlling, new kinds of communities” (Stone 1994: 85). In Epoch Two, 
the notion of ‘presence’ was starting to change, the radio listener, for instance, “was in 
two places at once—the body at home, but the delegate, the ‘I’ that belonged to the 
body, in an imagined space with another person” (Stone 1994: 85). This was achieved 
via a technological interface, “that which mediate[s] between the human body (or 
bodies) and an associated ‘I’ (or ‘I’s’)”. Most significantly, she remarks that it is around 
this time that those in marketing began exploring the possibility of commercial use of   - 20 - 
this virtual community, where items were sold or given that identified fellow members 
of a community, for instance, Star Trek buttons. In this way, we can see how the growth 
of virtual communality was already accompanied in its earlier inception by 
commodification of community, a development that has now reached global 
proportions. 
Views of the Internet as a technology that offers potential for liberating people 
include those that emphasise the effects of technology on cultural practices and the 
social environment (see, for instance, Lévy 1997; Johnson 1997; Benedikt 1991). This 
is not to suggest that all views of the Internet as emancipatory tend towards 
technological determinism or that technology does not play a major role in underlying 
social transformations. Rather, some of these views, most particularly the earlier ones, 
in exploring the potential of the technology, understandably left relatively uncharted the 
question of how the discursive patterns, the social environment within which this 
technology and incipient culture was operating, would affect the development and 
utilisation of this medium. 
Within the field of Internet and CMC studies, researchers more guarded about the 
direction of the Internet have already dissected and critiqued the earlier perspectives of 
the Internet as a liberalising medium (see, for instance, Shapiro 1999; Porter 1997). 
Their points of criticisms have included the inevitable recurring issue of access to the 
technology and the skills, and the danger that participation in Internet culture could end 
up closing off individual exploration and political progress (Shapiro 1999; Kellner 
1999). Kellner, for instance, speaks of the possibility that “Internet democracy will 
become a closed world in itself in which individuals delude themselves that they are 
active politically merely through exchanging messages or circulating information” 
(Kellner 1999: 105).   - 21 - 
Vivian Sobchack critiques the idea of the Internet as a democratising medium. 
She argues the Internet repeats a fundamental contradiction in Western and capitalist 
societies, which she expresses in the phrase “democratic franchise”, that is, “franchise 
as individual freedom and political participation on the one hand, and exclusive 
corporate privilege on the other” (Sobchack 1996: 77). Addressing Mondo 2000, the 
influential hacker/cracker/cyperpunk magazine, she identifies a range of hacker maxims 
(of which ‘information wants to be free’ is one) that this magazine participates in 
popularising, saying: 
This bumper-sticker libertarianism is neither progressive nor democratic 
… Their [electronic guerrillas] ideolect is one that ‘winners’ in the 
modern world adopt and speaks to a belief in personal freedom and a 
faith in self-help that are grounded in privilege and the status quo: male 
privilege, white privilege (Sobchack 1996: 85). 
A particularly telling remark of hers, in the light of the previous discussion, relates to 
Mondo 2000’s conflation of commercialism, the ‘information wants to be free’ ethic, 
and democracy. She asserts that: 
Here, the dream of democratic enfranchisement is grounded not only in 
the desire for free access to information and free interactive 
communication and social participation, but also in the desire for the 
freedom to buy and the freedom to sell, for a freely interactive and 
capitalist commerce. There is no such thing, however, as ‘pure’ 
information and ‘free’ access on the electronic frontier. And there is no 
such ting as ‘free’ competition in capitalist commerce (Sobchack 1996: 
86). 
My discussion may appear to typecast all those who view the Internet as actually 
or potentially assisting in the creation of a more pluralistic, liberalised public sphere as 
unrealistic or, worse, naïve idealists. However, this description is not meant to 
characterise all such views, and, indeed, is aimed at uncritical popular representations of 
the Internet that usually face the first-time user of the Internet. These, along with the 
more negative views, for instance, of the Internet as introducing new forms of 
surveillance, crime, commercialisation, and so forth, are still relevant today. Turning to   - 22 - 
my next topic, this development of the Internet and its discourses occurs within the 
context of an arguably increasingly globalised world, where many of these ideas, that is, 
decentralised authority, deterritorialisation and so forth, have a significance that 
includes and goes beyond Internet culture and communication. 
3. Globalisation and the Nation State 
The phenomenon of globalisation is a significant aspect of assumptions and discussions 
about the types of power relations that the Internet engenders and which affect Internet 
culture and discourse. Many ideas about the Internet are also common elements in 
globalisation discourse, for instance, that the Internet disrupts the sovereignty of the 
nation-state and frees individuals and communities from being bound geographically, 
and in other senses, to local, regional or national limits. Globalisation, however, has 
many different meanings for different people. I will therefore clarify my understanding 
of it before discussing its relationship to the Internet. 
  Globalisation is “a process (or set of processes) which embodies a 
transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions – assessed 
in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact  generating transcontinental or 
interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power” 
(Held, McGrew et al. 1999: 16, italics removed). These “transcontinental or 
interregional flows” include the temporal and spatial movement of objects, people, 
signs, and information. 
This conceptualisation of globalisation moves away from spatial and temporal 
limits to avoid confining the phenomenon to specific historical epochs and processes 
that are spatially delimited, such as internationalisation, regionalisation, and 
localisation. This is not to suggest that these processes are in opposition to globalisation, 
rather, their relationship to globalisation is complex and changing; they can sometimes   - 23 - 
limit and sometimes promote globalisation. According to Held et al, the spatial and 
temporal dimensions of globalisation may vary in terms of: 
•  the extensity of global networks 
•  the intensity of global interconnectedness 
•  the velocity of global flows 
•  the impact propensity of global interconnectedness (1999: 17). 
This avoids the dichotomy of assuming either that globalisation is essentially new, 
hence ignoring the forms of globalisation that have gone on before,
13 or that the 
contemporary epoch features no new developments in the scale of globalisation. In this 
model, there are four other dimensions of globalisation: the infrastructures that support 
global networks; the institutions which develop to facilitate and maintain them; the 
forms of social stratification that reflect the way power is organised, distributed and 
exercised; and the dominant manner of interaction (e.g. coercive, competitive, etc). 
 Held  et al’s model provides the possibility to consider globalisation’s 
relationship to the Internet in a manner which takes into account the variety of meanings 
associated with globalisation without locating these as fundamental features of 
globalisation. In the dissertation that follows, I introduce different conceptualisations of 
globalisation, reflecting the views of participants. For instance, in Chapter Four, the 
online activists referred to as being ‘anti-globalisation,’ are actually not against all 
forms of globalisation, as they themselves form global networks. They are more 
                                                 
13 Tony Spybey (1992) discusses how globalisation, imperialism and the capitalist world economy are 
interconnected: although China, India, Japan and the Islamic countries developed long distance 
navigation long before Europe, the Europeans had a belief in the possibility of exploring the entire world 
combined with an interest in doing so which made it an ‘exploring civilisation’. This ‘interest’, according 
to Spybey, was reflected in the competitive endeavours of individuals in different European nations and 
states for military, political and economic success, with the end result that Europeans obtained a powerful 
knowledge of the world: ‘Europeans exploited naval and armaments technology in an age of sailing ships 
and cannon, and, as a result, gained ‘global knowledge’ … in organised human activity, knowledge and 
the ability to record it has proved crucial in the generation of power’ (Spybey 1992: 100). This knowledge 
about the world was institutionalised in the acquisition of colonies and their administration as European 
empires, leading to global power in the hands of the Europeans. The world economy was structured so 
that the core economy (Europe) produced ships, weapons and equipment whilst the peripheries produced 
and supplied foodstuffs, raw materials, and precious metals.  The foundations for the current asymmetries 
in wealth and knowledge were laid, and the symbiotic relationship between globalisation and colonialism 
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accurately against a certain mode of globalisation, against the economic, military, and 
political institutions, for instance, that they see as creating and maintaining an 
asymmetrical distribution of wealth between peoples. Meanings such as these are, in 
this framework, not completely constitutive of globalisation, simultaneously, they are 
not held here as being opposed to the understanding of globalisation that informs this 
dissertation. 
Jan Scholte (2000), identifies five different aspects of globalisation: 
internationalisation, liberalisation, universalisation, westernisation or modernisation, 
and deterritorialisation. While Scholte discusses these as different understandings of 
globalisation, they are borrowed here to illustrate the different ways in which actual 
theorists conceive of the Internet’s relationship with contemporary global processes. 
Within Held et al’s formulation of globalisation, these otherwise confusing and 
sometimes contradictory positions are contextualised as describing different 
interpretations of the Internet and globalisation that address specific domains and 
dimensions but, on their own, do not describe the entirety of the topic. Therefore, while 
they are, individually, not definitive, they are still useful for outlining the various 
meanings associated with the Internet and globalisation, that is, the variety of things that 
are going on within this media. 
Internationalisation refers to “growth of international exchange and 
interdependence” (Scholte 2000: 15) and the large scale movement of ideas, messages, 
and people between countries. From this perspective, the Internet comprises the media 
infrastructure that facilitates this increased exchange between countries. Some people 
see this growth in velocity, extensity, and intensity of interconnectedness, as discussed 
earlier, as leading to liberalisation. For instance, in economic terms, globalisation and 
the removal of government restrictions on movements between countries (for example, 
the relaxation of restrictions on trade, foreign exchange and visas) leads to the creation   - 25 - 
of “an ‘open’, ‘borderless’ world economy” (Scholte 2000: 16).  Examples of how the 
Internet contributes to this “international economic integration” include ‘e-commerce’, 
online trading, and the supposed immunity of the Internet to state regulation. 
In contrast to the understanding of globalisation as a positive social and material 
process, another view is that it perpetuates disproportionate cultural and economic 
flows, wherein the ‘First World’ continues to dominate the ‘Third World’ through the 
operations of global capital and culture. In this perspective, much of the asymmetrical 
global power relations today are, to some extent, a legacy of imperialism of the past and 
is observable in global economic and cultural flows (Ashcroft, Griffiths et al. 1998: 
110). Some writers see globalisation as: 
creating increased inequalities both within and across societies, spiralling 
processes of ecological degradation and crisis, and unviable relations 
between finance and manufacturing capital, as well as between goods and 
the wealth required to purchase them … economic globalization is today 
a runaway horse without a rider (Appadurai 2000: 16). 
 As Appadurai continues, the mobility of global capital works against individual 
agency and resistance: 
Global capital in its contemporary form is characterised by strategies of 
predatory mobility (across both time and space) that have vastly 
compromised the capacity of actors in single locations even to 
understand, much less anticipate or resist, these strategies. 
In this perspective, more recent information technologies like the Internet are 
interpreted by some as mainly benefiting transnational corporations. Global 
corporations can conduct their decisions and operate their funds almost instantaneously 
across great distances and regional and national boundaries. This is even more doable in 
the case of products that can be stored and transferred electronically. To some, this 
works against social equity, deepening chasms between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ 
(Schiller 1995).   - 26 - 
  Slightly different, universalisation is the process where various objects and 
experiences are spread to people all over the world, for instance, the globalisation of 
conveyor belt sushi restaurants, Zen furniture, Disneyland, and club culture. The 
language and meanings surrounding the Internet have been universalised in this sense 
(witness the familiarity with terms like ‘dot com’, ‘spam’, flaming, and so forth 
worldwide). Another example is the idea that the Internet may assist in the continuation 
and spread of traditionally marginalised cultures and their artefacts. On the other hand, 
it may also assist in the commodification of these same objects and cultures while 
detaching and emptying them of their ‘original’ significance. 
Some cultural critics also argue that the Internet leads to westernisation or 
modernisation, where “globalisation is a dynamic whereby the social structures of 
modernity (capitalism, rationalism, industrialism, bureaucratism, etc) are spread the 
world over, normally destroying pre-existent cultures and local self-determination in the 
process” (Scholte 2000: 16). Thus, the Internet globalises objects and experiences 
unevenly, that is, western/US social formations dominate worldwide. In a sense, the 
Internet’s status as a decentralised media is therefore compromised to a certain degree. 
Its technology was originally developed in the US, many of its administrative and other 
agencies are located in the US, and global network paths often ultimately flow through 
US-based servers.  
Deterritorialisation is another aspect of globalisation that finds common 
expression in relation to the Internet. Deterritorialisation is the dislocation of social and 
cultural formations from geographical space, that is “social space is no longer wholly 
mapped in terms of territorial places, territorial distances and territorial borders” (2000: 
16). This understanding is manifested, as indicated earlier, in the notions of virtual 
community and experimentation with identity that many associate with the Internet. It   - 27 - 
can also be seen in the development or enhancement of diasporic communities through 
online and other media technologies. 
I will refer to the different meanings or aspects of globalisation outlined above. I 
also argue that just as globalisation and the Internet extend the power of forces of 
oppression and control, there are interstices through which socially progressive and/or 
resistive forces can operate. Nederveen Pieterse’s analysis is useful and applicable to 
my argument. Pieterse writes that: “Critical globalism refers to the critical engagement 
with globalization processes, neither blocking them out nor celebrating globalisation” 
(1995: 13, cited in Ashcroft, Griffiths et al. 1998: 111). This form of “critical 
engagement” permits me to problematise the use of the Internet to address local issues 
on a global scale, yet also allows the identification of ways in which this technology can 
be deployed for resistance. This point of view also acknowledges that globalisation 
processes are often not neutral. Globalisation, for instance, can often enact power 
structures that support Western imperialism; these shape access to global 
communication and culture – particularly in extending the power of modernity and 
capitalism: 
[g]lobal culture is a continuation of an imperial dynamic of influence, 
control, dissemination and hegemony that operates according to an 
already initiated structure of power that emerges in the sixteenth century 
in the great confluence of imperialism, capitalism and modernity 
(Ashcroft, Griffiths et al. 1998: 113). 
The discourse of the Internet uses terms like ‘global village’ and the challenge to 
and transgression of national boundaries, for instance, traditional demarcations of 
identity and regulatory structures. Hence, I attempt to relate this discourse to the 
literature on the phenomena of globalisation of culture and transnationalism and how 
identity politics are affected. Some academics in the humanities and social sciences feel 
an ennui with nationalism, firstly, with its association with state ideologies justifying   - 28 - 
the oppression of ethnic and religious minorities, Islamic fundamentalism, and so forth. 
As Cheah writes: 
Many argue that the accelerated pace of economic globalisation … in 
‘advanced post-Fordist’ or ‘late capitalism,’ the transnationalization of 
military command structures through NATO, and the rise of global 
hybrid cultures from modern mass migration, consumerism and mass 
communications in the past two decades have combined to create an 
interdependent world in which the nation-state faces imminent 
obsolescence as a viable economic unit, a politically sovereign territory, 
and a bounded cultural sphere  (Cheah 1998: 20). 
Globalisation is not a new phenomenon of this century. What has changed is the 
recognition that distinctions between the self and other, local and global, centre and 
periphery, national and international are breaking down and need recontextualising. For 
progressive social action, globalisation needs to be accounted for in discussing 
asymmetries of power relations. Here, the processes of deterritorialisation and 
reterritorialisation, homogenisation and heterogenisation of culture,
14 the impact upon 
nationalism and the legitimisation of the state, global capitalism, and the fetishisation 
and commodification of culture are germane. 
  Several theorists acknowledge the close relationship between colonialism and 
globalisation, and, to some extent, one could not exist without the other. Colonialism 
introduced a range of new communication technologies which transformed 
communities, including the telegraph and wireless, and required the building of road 
                                                 
14 Appadurai uses these terms to describe the phenomena that are said to accompany globalisation. 
Addressing fears of cultural homogenisation, particularly Americanisation, he points out that the picture 
may be more complex. For instance, there is the possibility that cultural influences from another society 
can be ‘indigenised,’ or that, rather than Americanisation, other fears of cultural absorption (for example, 
fears of Japanisation in Korea) may be more relevant. Nation-states can also exploit these fears in order to 
disguise their own hegemonic policies. Appadurai developed a framework to discuss the wide range of 
globalisation processes; he writes that there are ‘five dimensions of global cultural flow’: ethnoscapes, 
mediascapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, and ideoscapes. These describe formations in different fields, for 
instance, ‘ethnoscapes’ describes ‘the landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we 
live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guestworkers …’ This model expresses his argument that there 
discontinuities, ‘disjunctures,’ between and within these different ‘scapes’. Thus, ‘deterritorialisation’, in 
this context, describes exiles, migrants, and other people who are ‘culturally dislocated,’ and 
‘reterritorialisation,’ the process of reattachment to the home culture or to a new culture. These concepts 
can apply to finances, technology, in fact, any of the other dimensions of cultural flow (Appadurai 1990: 
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and rail networks and shipyards for the movement of goods and people. With the 
decline of colonialism in its more traditional forms, the contemporary form of 
colonialism finds its expression in globalisation (Miyoshi 1993). Global culture creates 
(or is it vice versa) the demand for commodities, images and sounds that supports 
transnational corporations, which in turn take advantage of and build much of the 
infrastructure necessary for marketing, production, distribution, and sales, world-wide. 
To the transnational corporations, the Internet is a marketing, sales, and distribution 
network. 
There is also the view that much of what we understand as a postmodern, 
informational and global village may be more new modernities; capitalism’s next 
mutation which serves to celebrate yet another universalism (Featherstone, Lash et al. 
1995). Global culture and the exhibition of diversity often reflects the commodification 
of culture for easy consumption by world-wide audiences.  If the implosion of signifieds 
(Baudrillard 1993), shallowness of meaning, and accelerated speed of communication, 
result in a bewildering world, one constant remains: repression and the unequal 
distribution of materiality still takes place. Accordingly, we need to discuss new 
methods of resistance in order to address the development of new methods and forms of 
repression.  
4. Transnational Communal Formations 
Globalisation influences the degree to which forms of community identification, partly 
facilitated by globalisation, have changed and what these developments imply for power 
relations and social hierarchies. These forms of identification include virtual 
communities, transnational cultural formations (for instance, diasporic ethnic 
communities, communities formed around certain spheres of interests), and 
cosmopolitanism. The types of identification these imply affect the relationships of   - 30 - 
power and forms of marginal politics that can and do take place: for instance, to some 
extent, they transgress national boundaries, complicate the nation-state’s management 
of the national culture, as well as other forms of regulation, and, in a similar way, have a 
shifting relationship with transnational corporations. 
Increasingly, cosmopolitanism has been seen as an alternative to nation-based 
forms of identification, according to Cheah: “cosmopolitanism is the obvious choice as 
an intellectual ethic or political project that can better express or embody genuine 
universalism” (1998: 21).
15 However, this is usually accompanied by a 
re-conceptualisation of the meaning of the term to take into account forms of 
cosmopolitanism that already exist and also to move the concept away from the more 
negative or limited associations of the past (Cheah and Robbins 1998). Traditionally, 
cosmopolitanism meant a freedom from the imperatives of everyday life confined in the 
nation and claims of universality via an interest in the welfare of humanity as a whole. 
Accordingly, the customary reaction to such claims was (quite naturally) cynicism and 
suspicion, whereby cosmopolitanism was tainted by privilege and distance. 
Cosmopolitans are viewed as fortunate strangers, unaffected by the problems of their 
host countries, sometimes, dabbling in local affairs with disastrous results, but more 
often, the “cosmopolitan is held to be incapable of participating in the making of 
history, doomed to the mere aesthetic spectatorship that he or she is also held secretly to 
prefer” (4). 
  As Bruce Robbins points out, a host of writers
16 identified forms of 
cosmopolitanism that were neither privileged nor ‘free-floating’. He suggests that: 
Like nations, cosmopolitanisms are now plural and particular. Like 
nations, they are both European and non-European, and they are weak 
                                                 
15 Cheah himself, in the same text, declares this as an ‘open question’, citing Benedict Anderson and 
Aihwa Ong. 
16 He cites the following as examples of those who embrace meanings of cosmopolitanism beyond 
universalism: Rabinow, Appadurai, Benita Parry, David Hollinger, Mitchell Cohen, Arnold Krupat,  
Bhabha, Aihwa Ong, Louisa Schein, Kwame Anthony Appiah, and Scott Malcomson.   - 31 - 
and underdeveloped as well as strong and privileged. And again like the 
nation, cosmopolitanism is there – not merely an abstract ideal, like 
loving one’s neighbor as oneself, but habits of thought and feeling that 
have already shaped and been shaped by particular collectivities, that are 
socially and geographically situated, hence both limited and empowered 
(Robbins 1998). 
Robbins takes cosmopolitanism beyond the utopian abstraction of Kant’s vision to 
describe something already in existence and reflected in ways of being and acting rather 
different from traditional notions of dislocatedness/distance, naïve or cynical meddling, 
or non-commitment long associated with the term. In addition, it is extended to include 
groups and individuals situated in the margins within their local/national communities 
and/or internationally. This is a reversal of past patterns, where critics of 
cosmopolitanism situated it, whilst its proponents found an advantage in keeping it free 
floating. In the late 1990s, the renewed support for universalism was accompanied by a 
mode of understanding cosmopolitanism as “located and embodied” (Robbins 1998: 2). 
It became imperative to examine what was left of its analytical capacity, whereby, 
“instead of an ideal of detachment, actually existing cosmopolitanism is a reality of 
(re)attachment, multiple attachment or attachment at a distance” (Robbins 1998: 3). 
  On the possibility of this engagement beyond the nation, of feelings extending 
beyond one’s immediate location or nationality, Robbins points to global religious 
solidarity, for instance, “pan-Islamic cosmopolitanism that came to the aid of the 
Bosnians when the Christian or secular West turned its back and went about its 
business” (Robbins 1998: 5). Concerning the topic of the Internet and its impact on such 
sensibilities, Robbins writes: 
If people can get as emotional as Anderson says they do about relations 
with fellow nationals they never see face-to-face, then now that print-
capitalism has become electronic-and digital-capitalism, and now that 
this system is so clearly transnational, it would be strange if people did 
not get emotional in much the same way, if not necessarily to the same 
degree, about others who are not fellow nationals, people bound to them 
by some sort of transnational sort of fellowship (Robbins 1998: 7, 
emphases in original).   - 32 - 
However, feelings of solidarity beyond the nation, like nationalism, are neither 
pre-existing nor impossible. They are constructed through combinations of history, 
technology, and shared emotions and interests. As Robbins suggests: 
They have to be built up laboriously out of the imperfect historical 
materials—churches and mosques, commercial interests and immigrant 
diasporas, sentimentality about hungry children and technorapture over 
digitalized communication—that are already at hand. They do not stand 
outside history like an ultimate court of appeal (Robbins 1998: 6). 
Robbins appears to assume that this sense of engagement with the world at large is 
attainable, but there needs to be intervention and effort, whether the basis for solidarity 
is religion, commerce, shared experience, altruism, enthusiasm over new 
communication technologies and so forth. 
However, as Robbins points out, we need to question the accountability and 
desirability of the cosmopolitan situation: 
Clearly, there is no inherent virtue in transnationality. Is there then, as 
Anderson suggests, inherent vice: the dangerous license to meddle that 
comes of feeling passionately engaged in a given state’s affairs without 
accepting the duties of a citizen or being physically present on its 
territory? Is it distance itself that produces effects like Ayodhya, or does 
the distance of the supporters merely exaggerate our own sense of 
powerlessness before ethnic and religious violence that is more often 
produced entirely within the state, violence that citizenship itself is 
equally incapable of handling (Robbins 1998: 11-12)? 
Both Benedict Anderson and Khachig Tölölyan also prompt readers to question “long 
distance nationalists,” that is, diasporic people engaging in local struggles at a distance. 
As I argue in Chapter Three, the Internet provides another avenue for individuals and 
groups to enact ‘long distance nationalism’ in ways that reiterate and reaffirm bipolar 
identity formations as well as, in the process of representation, performing discursive 
violence on the body and experiences of the ‘victims’ being represented.  In the same 
chapter, I analyse cosmopolitanism and the rape of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia as a 
form of appropriation in which the complexity of local issues were subsumed under the   - 33 - 
need to consolidate Chinese activism globally and, in the process, form a global 
collective Chinese identity and response. The ‘cosmopolitans’ in this case were 
dispersed ethnic Chinese, predominantly US-based, constructing a form of global 
diasporic identification that pitted ‘us Chinese’ against a variety of oppressors world-
wide, using the Internet through web sites, email forwards and newsgroup messages to 
spread the message. Rather than taking part in an imagined national community, these 
ethnic Chinese constructed a transnational imaginary community using web sites, email 
forwarding, and news groups. 
 In  Chapter Three, I also identify difficulties with the use of the Internet for 
global activism.  These difficulties include the misappropriation and objectification of 
an oppressed minority to represent a global oppression of a transnational diaspora. 
Hence, activists used the May 1998 violence against Chinese in Indonesia to represent 
the historical and current subjugation of ethnic Chinese all over the world. In the 
process, local differences were ignored in favour of the maintenance and construction of 
homogeneity in history and character of ethnic Chinese. There was also the burial of a 
different oppression in a different locality and time. Photographs depicting the alleged 
torture and rape of East Timorese women by Indonesian army soldiers were 
appropriated to represent the violence toward ethnic Chinese women during the May 
1998 riots, with the plight of the East Timorese left neglected by the diasporic activists.   
  Yet, without the concern and activism of groups outside Indonesia, regardless of 
whether they were Chinese or human rights organizations, the issue of the rapes and 
justice for its victims are unlikely to have been addressed by the Habibie state. This may 
seem contradictory, on the one hand, I argue that the activists complicated the 
investigation, on the other, I also claim that investigation may not have even proceeded 
to the extent it did without the worldwide anger surrounding not just the rapes but the 
violence and killings during the riots. This is, however, the point that Pheng Cheah and   - 34 - 
Bruce Robbins make in their work. They say that, rather than a singular uniform 
phenomenon that is easily slotted into the category of good or bad, there are multiple 
cosmopolitanisms, a range of different forms. According to Robbins: 
 … cosmopolitanism offers something other than a gallery of virtuous 
eligible identities.  It points instead to a domain of contested politics—
hence our title [‘Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the 
Nation’]. Thinking of cosmopolitics not as universal reason in disguise, 
but as one on a series of scales, as an area both within and beyond the 
nation (and yet falling short of ‘humanity’) that is inhabited by a variety 
of cosmopolitanisms, we will not perhaps be tempted to offer the final 
word … (Robbins 1998: 12). 
Pheng Cheah discusses the viability of cosmopolitanism as an alternative to 
nationalism’s particularism. In the process, he dismantles and critiques the oppositional 
delineation of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, providing a valuable survey of the 
variety of positions on the topic (1998). In this dissertation, I use cosmopolitanism to 
evoke the traditional definition, that is, as liberation from the everyday life of the nation 
coupled with an interest in the welfare of humanity. However, I mainly use it in the 
broader sense of the type of cosmopolitans that not only display interest but also are 
intimately familiar with local conditions—either as one of the ‘locals’ or having strong 
affiliations with them (the former being preferred). For this, I rely on Robbins’ 
understanding of cosmopolitanism as instances of “(re)attachment, multiple attachment 
or attachment at a distance”, where more than one of these processes can be occurring 
together with another (Robbins 1998: 3). 
  The international developments since attacks on US targets on 11 September 
2001 have made explicit the extent to which the transnational has now become a 
battleground for different competing forces, as well as a space for cooperation and 
networking. The trends have been diverse and often not easily universalised. For 
instance, the nation-state has seen a reinvigoration amongst some countries (like the US) 
as playing a major role in issues exacerbated by globalisation, for instance, international   - 35 - 
terrorist networks, pornography and forms of criminal activity. At the same time, there 
are increasing calls to move beyond the nation and the state, for instance, to address 
social problems on a transnational basis, as some of their causes have their roots in 
globalisation. For instance, Appadurai argues that: 
It may be time to rethink monopatriotism, patriotism directed exclusively 
to the hyphen between nation and state, and to allow the material 
problems we face—the deficit, the environment, abortion, race, drugs, 
and jobs—to define those social groups and ideas for which we would be 
willing to live, and die … Some of us may still want to live—and die—
for the United States. But many of these new sovereignties are inherently 
postnational (Appadurai 1996: 176). 
The Internet is a form of communication that can be both located and local, and yet 
global at the same time. It blurs the distinctions between producers and consumers of 
knowledge and cultural content, yet it is always under threat of colonisation by 
transnational corporations, of regulation and surveillance by state and other agencies. 
The Internet, it seems, can be both a source and tool of empowerment and oppression 
for the marginalised and oppressed in society. 
5. The Dissertation Ahead 
This dissertation explores the interrelationship of power and control with resistance and 
social activism, attempting to navigate between an overly optimistic assessment of the 
liberatory potential of the Internet, and a pessimistic, dystopian view. I use a cultural 
studies approach to address the dialectic between the production of dominant cultural 
practices and structures and the resistance that accompanies them. It is particularly 
suitable as I am mainly interested in the interrelationship between the culture(s), the 
organisational, technological, and political aspects, of the Internet and the ‘wider’ 
cultures affecting, and that are affected, by it. Cultural studies, being concerned with 
cultural practices, the production and circulation of meaning, and cultural events and 
change, is thereby useful for studying the Internet culturally, to examine how it is   - 36 - 
constrained, is implicated by, and contributes towards, power relations, and also how it 
offers scope for resistance and change. The latter is particularly pertinent, as the Internet 
has been the object of much speculation in terms how it would affect society, and how it 
would itself change.  
This analysis of discourse, power, and resistance on the Internet deals with 
selected sites that underscore change; they are sites of both celebration and anxiety over 
the changes that accompany the development of Internet technology and culture. As 
Foucault reminds us, “as soon as there is a power relation, there is a possibility of 
resistance. We can never be ensnared by power: we can always modify its grip in 
determinate conditions and according to a precise strategy” (Foucault 1988: 123). My 
approach recognises that we make, and are made by, culture. We have agency, but this 
agency is constrained by structures that constrain this agency (and can be affected by it). 
Thus, this dissertation is also a historical account of the Internet’s potential for bringing 
people together and for social activism and change, though it does not claim to be 
comprehensive. The case studies I have selected illustrate how power relations can shift, 
how certain Internet sites can become the centre of power contestations, they illustrate, 
variously, the interplay between transnational cultural formations, nation-states, and 
individuals; and the structures of the Internet. 
5.1 Chapter One: Singapore: Regulation and Dissent 
I begin the dissertation by addressing the issue of the nation-state, its capacity to 
regulate this technology, its role in constructions of national identity and defining the 
boundaries of behaviour and thought, and possible limits upon this control, using the 
case of the Singapore Internet. During the accelerated adoption of the Internet by 
businesses, institutions, individuals and households in the mid-nineteen-nineties, the 
Singapore state introduced codes of practice for Internet Service Providers, and a proxy   - 37 - 
server. I use this case to explore the ripples in Internet discourse caused by the 
suggestion that the Internet was not, as previously assumed, invulnerable to censorship. 
Since the initial introduction of regulations, developments in the approach of the state 
and its institutions to Internet regulation, and the strategies adopted by Singaporean 
nationals (at home and abroad) illustrate how the relationship between the nation-state, 
Internet culture, and technology can be sometimes oppositional, sometimes 
complementary. The chapter also delves into the spaces of resistance to the state’s hold 
and management of national culture and the dominant public discourses in Singapore. 
5.2 Chapter Two: Look! A Racist: Fanon and the Racial Politics of 
Flaming 
While Chapter One discusses the state, that is, the Singapore state’s ability to affect 
(and be affected by) Internet discourses, Chapter Two moves on to the interactions of 
Internet participants and the notion that the Internet frees people from the constrictions 
of visual and verbal markers of identity. Through an examination of a lengthy and 
heated subject ‘thread’ on race and culture, this chapter illustrates the degree to which 
dominant discourses circumscribe the interactions of Internet participants in an 
Australian newsgroup, society-wide discourses as well as those more specific to Usenet. 
I also address a number of significant identity issues, especially the differentiation of 
self from other, and culture from body. This chapter, therefore, still deals with power 
operating through national cultural formations, however, it shifts its focus to consider 
the transnational spaces that permit interaction between participants from different 
locations, ethnicities and nationalities. 
5.3 Chapter Three: Diasporic Formations, the Internet, and Gender: The 
Chinese Diaspora and the Riots in Indonesia (May 1998) 
In  Chapter Three, the political and cultural implications of transnational communal 
formations is explored through an analysis of the handling of the Indonesian riots of   - 38 - 
May 1998 by ethnic Chinese on the Internet, specifically, those wishing to create and 
consolidate a global alliance between ethnic Chinese around the world. The latter 
involves, at least for the case in question, the deployment of the idea of ‘diaspora,’ 
particularly the way the term connotes an oppressed minority displaced from an 
‘original’ culture and place. This expressed itself in emails, forum messages, and web 
sites distributing images and written text centred on the violence afflicted upon ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia during the riots. This chapter is concerned with one aspect: the 
representation of ethnic Chinese women raped during these riots, particularly the 
relabelling and dissemination of images from other sites and events to represent these 
women. In the analysis of these developments, the chapter highlights the potential for 
transnational cultural formations, even those formed out of a sense of oppression and 
marginalisation, to enact more forms of oppression, objectification, and mythologising, 
and how the Internet can assist in these processes. 
5.4 Chapter Four: Online Activism: The Anti-Capitalist Network 
In contrast to some of the Chinese diasporic activists discussed in Chapter Three,
17 in 
Chapter Four, I discuss an anti-capitalist network, which, is informed by intellectual 
traditions that deal with the problems of representation, objectification, and the creation 
of new hegemonies in counter-discursive activities. These networks strive to retain 
close ties with the local and the particular, and the individual agendas and identities of 
the various organisations and activists that participate. At the same time, they take 
advantage of Internet technology to form powerful collectives for protest and action 
spanning countries and regions. Finally, this chapter also critiques the limitations and 
problems faced by these networks. 
                                                 
17 My recent discussions with members of one of these groups, Huaren, indicate some of them are aware 
of the problems of representation.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Singapore: Regulation and Dissent 
1. Introduction 
As I began researching the Internet, the Singapore government announced that it was 
going to introduce, what was at that time considered impossible, a method of censoring 
the entire Internet for the whole country. A Singaporean emigrant to Australia, my 
research and discussion of this issue is inflected by a personal engagement with some of 
these issues of government control and dissent.  I found this case intriguing because the 
Singapore state’s desire for control appeared to challenge aspects of the Internet’s 
dominant discourse outlined in my Introduction. The Singaporean government 
contested the ‘truth’ that it would be impossible to regulate the Internet, and, 
correspondingly, the practices of self-regulation. As such, this case highlights how 
Internet practices and truths are subject to challenge and change. 
A view circulating in popular culture is that the Internet liberates the individual 
and builds community across greater distances. Other, perhaps equally popular, 
perspectives view the Internet in negative terms. In this latter dystopian view, the 
Internet’s anarchic possibilities lead to abuse, for example, child pornography, 
aggression, and hostility to other communities and individuals rather than 
understanding, and so forth. This is of concern to the Singaporean state, because the 
national discourse closely links the development and continuance of Singapore’s 
capitalist economy to the maintenance of a state-prescribed national identity and culture. 
The values, perhaps even the entire discourse, of a free Internet, might challenge this - 41 - 
construct of shared national values and identity.
1 The state’s Internet strategy does not 
radically depart from its previous practices and strategies for earlier media technologies, 
including the press, radio, and television. However, the Internet policy indicates an 
adjustment in thinking by this nation-state in recognition of the difficulty of applying 
their traditional regulatory models in the face of the seeming inevitability of 
transnational cultural flows. 
The Internet introduces modes of communication that may challenge previous 
discursive formations, which underlie centrally-constructed
2 national imaginaries. It is 
vital to bear in mind that the reverse is also true. The modes of communication on the 
Internet are affected by state regulation and, in other respects, are not totally determined 
by the initial biases of the technology. According to the Singaporean government, the 
perceived threat to existing national discourses make changes in state strategies vital. 
These strategies need to integrate new modes of communication and define the limits of 
acceptability within which communication is to take place. This revised ordering of the 
discourse operates on different levels: in concrete form, for instance, in the state’s 
setting up of a legal and technical environment which regulates access and behaviour. 
More significantly, it operates on a symbolic level, whereby the regulatory body sets the 
limits of acceptability in place. While ‘unacceptable’ behaviour and perspectives may 
be difficult to totally eradicate, they are firmly established as marginal and ‘deviant’ 
from the ‘normal’. The technology of the Internet can be harnessed by the state in an 
                                                 
1 Whether these discourses were actually so completely incommensurable is a debatable point that I 
explore later, however, on the surface, the Singaporean state did perceive the Internet discourse of that 
time as a threat. 
2 There is a danger here of perceiving state-sanctioned discourses as the only ones dominant within 
Singaporean society. A certain ambiguity over this is to some extent encouraged by the PAP government: 
on the one hand, the view of the PAP government as having a great degree of control over the 
imagination of the Singaporean populace strengthens the dominant perspective/s. On the other hand, in 
order to recover some sort of legitimacy, this has been tempered by claims that the practices and values 
encouraged have a grassroots base and are not totally top-down directed. - 42 - 
effort to bolster the (marginalising) dominant discourse of national identity and shared 
values. 
  However, the legal mechanism is just one aspect of control, the other significant 
means of regulation is exercised through disciplinary power. As Foucault tells us: 
Modern society … from the nineteenth century up to our own day, has 
been characterised on the one hand, by a legislation, a discourse, an 
organisation based on public right, whose principle of articulation is the 
social body and the delegative status of each citizen; and, on the other 
hand, by a closely linked grid of disciplinary coercions whose purpose is 
in fact to assure the cohesion of this same social body (Foucault 1980: 
106). 
The power exercised by the state, through changes in licensing and legislation, 
expresses the first form of control through “a legislation, a discourse, an organisation 
based on public right.” The second equally important aspect of control is the “grid of 
disciplinary coercions” that ensures social cohesion. 
  How do regulatory moves like these modify Internet discourses and practices? I 
am particularly interested in their impact on the discourses that, until the mid-nineties, 
dominated the Internet, and, to a lesser extent, still run through its technologies (Usenet, 
the web, etc) and cultures today. These discourses incorporated liberal and democratic
3 
themes, self-regulation, notions of liminality and flux, and virtual community. They 
greatly influenced the development of regulations, norms and cultures of the Internet, 
for instance, of MUDs, Usenet communities, and website authoring. I shall describe these 
themes briefly to show how they impact upon the Singaporean case, in particular, at the 
level of the Singaporean users of the Internet. 
These Internet discourses sometimes oppose, and sometimes, contrary to popular 
expectation, work with the national discourse. For instance, after having introduced 
Internet regulation in Singapore, in subsequent years, the national discourse 
                                                 
3 As the Internet, in its early days, was a technology mainly originating from and developed by US 
interests, and was dominated by the US as users, these were US notions of democracy. - 43 - 
incorporated some of the terms, and, as the regulatory body argues, the practices, of 
Internet discourse.
4 Both these discourses provide different meanings, and also 
constrain and limit communication on the Internet. The latter is a significant point, 
because it is often assumed that the contrast is between a discourse that liberates 
(Internet libertarian discourses) and one that limits (national discourses aka Singapore). 
All discourses constrain, the question is, what do they limit and on what basis and truth-
knowledge? 
Finally, I am wary of over-emphasising the power of the state, especially in 
Singapore. To credit the state with the power of complete control is to deny individual 
Internet users their agency. Rather, I want to understand the scope for resisting and 
questioning state control while appreciating that it is necessary to be mindful of claims 
about the Internet’s libertarian potential. 
My own positioning as an insider-outsider researcher plays a role in discussing 
Singapore, its political and social climate, and the Internet. Growing up in Singapore 
provides me with an intimate knowledge of the impact of dominant discourses and the 
strictures of the state. However, I have to balance this intimacy or experience of 
Singapore with the awareness that my experience, like those of any one subject, is both 
subjective and interlaced with social positioning within this society. In addition, the 
stages of migration and settlement have made me aware of the traps of comparison, that 
is, weighing the relative merits of the political and cultural systems of Australia and 
Singapore from a migrant’s perspective. There are also the dangers of popular, easy and 
clichéd responses to the culture and citizens of Singapore, even (or perhaps especially) 
for emigrants like myself, because of overseas media reports of events and policies. 
                                                 
4 For example, I describe later how the regulatory bodies recruit the term, ‘self-regulation,’ into their 
documentation. - 44 - 
2. Clash of Discourse: The Imagined Nation Vs the Virtual 
Community? 
In the early 1990s, the Singaporean government began a process of linking up the public 
and private households, offices and libraries via a computer network by 2000. In 1992, 
the National Computer Board published IT 2000: A Vision of an Intelligent Island, with 
details on how it would install the infrastructure stage by stage in all households. At that 
time, the emphasis was on Teletext, and it was in the latter half of the 1990s that the 
shift was made to promoting the Internet (Rodan 1996). With the increasing popularity 
of the Internet, the government argued that Singaporeans will need to be familiar with 
the medium in order to compete globally in the ‘information age’. In 2002, roughly one 
in five Singaporeans are active Internet users, and one in two have access to the Internet 
(Central Intelligence Agency 2001; Nielsen//NetRatings 2002).
5  While this may seem a 
far cry from the target to have every Singaporean linked up, this Internet penetration 
rate compares favourably with Japan and South Korea and is more or less on par with 
Hong Kong and the United States
6 (Cyberatlas 2002). 
In the early stages of the introduction of the Internet into Singaporean homes, 
bemused writers speculated over this and wondered how the state would negotiate the 
exposure of Singaporeans to the ‘free flow’
7 of information available through this 
network. They believed the ‘Information Superhighway’ meant you ‘by-passed’ the 
nation-state. A journalist for HotWired declared that the “Singaporean way of life will 
be radically transformed”
  (Sandfort 1996). This was in an environment where 
                                                 
5 According the CIA, as of July 2001, there were around 4.3 million Singaporeans. According to 
Nielsen//NetRatings, 928,192 Singaporeans were active Internet users, and 2,280,806 had access to the 
Internet in March 2002. 
6 Although at 36.7 percent, the proportion of active users in the United States surpasses Singapore’s. 
7 It is disputable whether or not this flow is ‘free’ in the first place. Referring to a centre-periphery model 
of globalisation, cultural globalisation entails asymmetry in the production and consumption of meanings 
and not so much decentralisation as unstable relations between centre and peripheries. Ulf Hannerz, for 
instance, argues that certain cultural forms are more defined by flows from the centre than others, and that 
the periphery is more a consumer than a producer of meanings; (Hannerz 1991)  That being said, I would 
tend towards avoiding the use of the terms ‘centre-periphery’, as they tend to imply a fixed and 
permanent relationship, rather than the kinds of ebbs and flows and ambiguities that we are seeing 
nowadays. - 45 - 
McLuhan’s declaration that “the medium is the message” was cited regularly in web 
sites. People believed in the impossibility of regulating the Internet, and imagined the 
kinds of electronic communities that would spring up, challenging dictatorships all 
across the world and facilitating a new form of electronic democracy and grassroots 
activism.
8 
2.1 Internet Libertarian Discourse 
The speculation by journalists on how Singapore would take to the Internet was, of 
course, anchored in the primary discourse(s) of the Internet during that time, which I 
have called libertarian discourse. Many journalists saw this discourse as antithetical to 
the way the Singaporean government operated, indeed, to the hegemony that they saw 
as prevalent in Singapore. 
As I discussed in the Introduction, certain constructs form the basis of Internet 
libertarian discourse, most of which manifest themselves in very recognisable phrases 
and buzzwords. These include the trinity identified by James Boyle (Boyle 1997), that 
is, “Information wants to be free,” “In Cyberspace, the First Amendment is a local 
ordinance,” and, “The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.” This 
trinity signifies the assumptions that it is impossible to regulate the Internet, that the 
technology prevents censorship and control by nation-states. Along with this trinity, the 
Progress and Freedom Foundation makes similar claims, based on their belief that we 
have entered a ‘Third Wave’ knowledge-based economy (Progress and Freedom 
Foundation 1994). They predict an age of decentralisation and ‘demassification,’ one 
that would see the decline of the traditional power and role of the nation-state. These 
claims appeared to suggest that the Internet would be a threat to the then-current 
hegemony in Singapore, a country infamous in world media for its totalitarian state. 
                                                 
8 An offshoot of this perspective is discussed in Chapter Four. - 46 - 
Another development was the notion of virtual communities and the attendant 
possibility of amorphous and fluid identity. I have discussed the genesis of the phrase, 
‘virtual community,’ in my Introduction, and focus now on the idea of liminal identity. 
Phil Morle, using the model of cyberspace as encompassing different media, including 
telephones and MUDs, describes cyberspace as an arena of liminality. He writes: 
When inhabiting the cyberspaces I experience a parallel universe with 
different potential which I have, until now, struggled to ignore - ‘reality’ 
as I knew it is a lie. Time and space are liquid; identity and worlds are 
multiple; we are always in-between, in transcience, incomplete and in-
process. Partiality is relished and the divine reached for (Morle 1996). 
These words, “in-between”, “in-process”, and “liquid”, resonate in the postcolonial 
sphere, where cultural identity has been displaced by shared histories of spatial and 
cultural dislocation and subjectivity is ‘split’ amongst a number of identifications 
(Bhabha 1994; Grossberg 1996). 
I suggest we can consider the Usenet newsgroup, soc.culture.singapore, as a 
liminal space. It allows interaction and mingling of subjectivities and resistance to the 
narrow constrictions of the web content guidelines put down by the state. A newsgroup 
like this permits the participation in a public sphere of people in diaspora, perhaps 
articulation of hybrid identifications by overseas students, visitors, expatriates, 
immigrants, and emigrants. The accessibility of the newsgroup within and outside 
Singapore allows the transcultural exchanges to take place in a public space. Wherever a 
user posts from, their message appears between a few seconds to the next day. They can 
hide their real name behind anonymous remailers, a move that one remail service 
provider describes as assuming a ‘pseudonymous’ identity.
9 The sheer number of 
messages, more than five hundred per day, makes it extremely difficult to monitor. 
                                                 
9 The word, pseudonymous, was coined by Johan Helsingius to describe that peculiar cross between a 
pseudonym and anonymity provided by remailers (Helsingius 1995). Helsingius was a famous figure in 
Internet culture and the maintainer of anon.penet.fi, a remailer of notoriety and celebration that was 
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These may account for why there are so many messages discussing sensitive topics 
usually reserved for private conversations and rarely seen in broadcast or print media. 
Some may conceive of the development of deterritorialised identity and virtual 
community via the Internet as a threat to the imagined community of the nation, yet 
another possible challenge ushered in by the forces of globalisation.
10 However, 
globalisation is by no means a new phenomenon, and the earlier forms of globalisation 
that accompanied colonialisation ushered in the world market and deterritorialisation of 
cultural identities (Hall 1991). A former English colony like Singapore has to contend 
with the effects of colonisation and globalisation of the past, that is, the spatial and 
cultural displacement of the descendants of migrants in diaspora and the Malay 
population, the establishment of England as the centre, and the marginalisation of the 
culture and people of Singapore and other peripheries. Postcolonials and diasporic 
individuals are thus often not in the position to identify with a unified, traditional 
culture. The choice is often between using that political space of being in between 
cultures, preferred by Homi Bhabha and many postcolonial critics, or invoking and 
recovering a pre-colonial, traditional culture. More so than before, the Internet placed 
such issues of national and cultural identity into the foreground, opening for questioning 
what constituted the Singaporean national identity and whether and how it should be 
maintained in the light of the deterritorialised identifications and communities that 
might be introduced by the Internet. 
2.1.1 Reconfiguration of assumptions 
The dominant discourses of the Internet, which I collectively refer to as libertarian, are 
by no means totally aligned and cohesive. However, most of them tend to assume that 
the Internet as a media technology was not as subject to national regulation as 
                                                 
10 The belief that globalisation would witness the decline of the nation-state is disputed, for instance, by 
Ulf Hannerz (1996). The context for the statement above is more about the perception of the effects of 
globalisation. - 48 - 
traditional mass media, that is, state-based control and jurisdiction was hapless in the 
face of technologies designed for decentered access and storage of information. 
Relatedly, these discourses all emphasise the impact of technology upon human 
communication, identity, and culture. Such a perspective neglects how the application 
and development of technology is not autonomous and is subject to social, political, and 
economic forces. This fetishisation of technology is usually accompanied by a 
fetishisation of the present. We may regard the past ten to fifty years as a new stage of 
political, economic, human, technological and/or social development, or a precursor to 
impending cataclysm or decay, all by no means new claims.  
James Boyle points out something that is often neglected in the debates over 
regulation: that is how power, as I have indicated earlier, operates by and through 
discourse, working through the way subjects are named and formed, subject relations, 
terminologies, rules, objects, and other elements specific to the area (Foucault 1972). It 
is not only exercised and controlled through the legal system, or similar formal and 
concrete structures. I will therefore be discussing, firstly, the state and the Internet 
regulatory environment of Singapore, and, secondly, the agency of Internet users and 
producers within this environment, specifically, the counter-discursive practices. 
2.2 State and Capital 
Libertarian perspectives of the Internet are apt to sometimes simplify the ways in which, 
in the development of Internet regulations, the interests of state and capital can 
sometimes converge or clash. While this may not be a focal point of this discussion, it is 
important to acknowledge the influence, and limits, of transnational and national 
economic interests. This is particularly so  because the role and impact of commerce in 
the development of the technologies and cultures of the Internet was often a source of 
anxiety for ‘cyber-utopians.’ Andrew Calcutt draws attention to the contradiction in the - 49 - 
historical development of the Internet: on the one hand, its military-industrial roots, on 
the other, its subsequent expansion by left-wing counter-culture members wanting an 
escape from the triumphs of the right during the nineteen eighties (1999). Added to this 
is the political elite’s (and the Singapore state is no exception) desire to validate itself 
by attempting to become the architect of the ‘information superhighway.’ This mix of 
desires suggests that governments and capitalists have converging interests in taming 
the seeming bohemia of the Internet, and, to a large extent, this is true. Examples of the 
interests of the state and capital marrying can be seen in copyright protection, for 
instance, the recent prosecution of file-sharing programs and networks proprietors like 
Napster and Kazaa, and moves to develop and enforce laws within and across nations. 
Early on, the cooperation between state and capital was accompanied by an 
oppositional stance from the counter-culture cyberspace/Internet enthusiasts, who saw 
the interest of governments and commerce in the Internet as potentially destructive of 
the promise they saw in the medium. Yet, seemingly oppositional terms in cyberculture 
can not only coexist, they have a way of shifting and sometimes merging. Calcutt points 
out that, in many cases, these same early left-wing pioneers in the virtual frontier 
resigned themselves to the inevitability of commercialisation and put their skills and 
knowledge to use, becoming, as Calcutt puts it, “suits with ponytails” (1999: 44). Not 
that all such idealists have been absorbed into the corporate culture, for instance, in 
Chapter Four, I discuss present day global action against transnational corporations 
organised through the Internet. Nevertheless, the point needs to be made that members 
of the counter-culture, the state, and capital are not always opposed and distinguishable.  
Sometimes, the state and capital find themselves defending free speech and the 
like on behalf of groups to which they are normally opposed, or have their ideals 
recruited in defence of corporate interests working against legal restrictions. For 
instance, a proposal to limit hate speech on the Internet as part of the international treaty - 50 - 
on cyber-crime met opposition from United States business and civil liberties groups, 
who viewed it as an infringement on the rights of (US) citizens and a nuisance to 
Internet providers (Bowman 2001; Sullivan 2002). Notably, this was not too long after a 
saga which began when a French court ordered Yahoo to block French citizens from 
accessing online auctions of Nazi memorabilia in November 2000. 
  After the attack on the New York twin towers and the Pentagon on eleventh 
September 2001, however, security has eclipsed privacy amongst governments and 
Internet service providers (Abreu 2001). The living icon of big business and computing 
himself, Bill Gates, sent an email on 15 January 2002 declaring security to be the top 
priority of Microsoft (Coursey 2002). Not surprisingly, governments wishing to endorse 
moves to establish or reinstate their central policing and regulatory roles have seized on 
this heightened sensitivity to security concerns. In the face of what seems to be 
diminished support for the traditional ideals of individual freedom, privacy, choice, and 
anti-corporatism, a critical appraisal of the impact of regulation is even more vital than 
before. Such an appraisal should recognise that the interests of state and capital, and 
even the ‘cyber-libertarians,’ are not as opposed or aligned as it would seem. 
2.3 The Imagined Nation: Singaporean Nation-Building and Community 
‘Chat,’ ‘electronic mail’, ‘bulletin boards’ and ‘Internet phone,’ these words and phrases 
illustrate the continuities between the past and present, the old and the new in 
descriptions of the various technologies that comprise the Internet. It seems especially 
apt that someone in the government of Singapore should use metaphors of 
neighbourhood and community to describe their proposed architecture for the 
Singaporean Internet: 
To use the metaphor of the city, our collective objective as Singaporeans 
is to stake out a place for ourselves [sic] in Internet, a Singapore 
neighbourhood as it were, with both the public and private sectors - 51 - 
represented, and developing in co-operation and in competition with 
others (Yeo 1995). 
In this passage, a collective goal, to recreate the imagined nation online, is declared on 
behalf of all Singaporeans. While this is a reassuring image invoking a sense of 
familiarity and unity, it is also timely to remember that imagined communities such as 
this require enclosure, homogeneity, and exclusion for their establishment and 
continuance. The phrase, ‘staking out of a place’ brings to mind Rheingold’s metaphor 
of the Internet as a new “electronic frontier” (Rheingold 1992) and associations with 
colonial invasion and postcolonial nationalism. At the same time, it marks the 
recognition of a developing discursive space to negotiate and control, requiring a 
change in tack on the part of the state, its political leaders and organs of government. 
Quite obviously, the state appropriated the discourse of the Internet, with its 
metaphors of older forms of community, in an attempt to enlist these meanings to 
support its early engagements with Internet policy, no doubt already acknowledging the 
need to implement forms of control. Terence Lee and David Birch’s article, “Internet 
Regulation in Singapore,” establishes that the Singaporean government’s approach to 
the Internet amounts to censorship of the Internet, within the context of an autocratic 
government seeking to limit dissent and maintain control of the public sphere (2000). 
They liken the effects of the so-called ‘soft touch’ policy of the government to a 
Foucauldian panopticon, with “auto-regulation” practised by institutions, Internet 
service providers, Internet content producers, and users. 
2.3.1 National discourses 
The Singapore government’s desire to maintain and extend its control to newer media 
products and technologies runs parallel to Singapore’s then-burgeoning economy and 
massive material progress since independence from British colonial rule.
11 This 
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progress was accompanied by a discourse that consistently ties the regulation of values 
and behaviours with material wealth (Clammer 1998). This linking in turn allows the 
state to legitimise itself as the manager of this control; successful control is bound to the 
dominance and health of the state. Wong Kokkeong’s analysis of the linkages between 
media, economy and culture in Singapore introduces the concept of “controlled 
commodification” to describe the state of affairs in Singapore and the relationship 
between the Singaporean state, global capital and the media. Singapore’s political 
economy is defined as ‘peripheral capitalism’ whereby the (PAP) state acts as a 
‘manager’ for global capital. This managerial role depends on the state’s dominance and 
hold over the nature of Singaporean society, hence “the state is the most determinative 
force/influence over media operating as a commercial organization within a market-
oriented economy” (Wong 1991 viii). 
From a broadly postcolonial viewpoint, such a model replaces the colonial with 
the nation-state as the central source of domination and coercion. Not surprisingly, 
functionalist modes of analysis and reasoning prevail in this climate and are hard to 
avoid when discussing the Singaporean state and its modes of operation. As John 
Clammer suggests: 
[t]he result has been a state of remarkably Durkheimian characteristics—
organised around a core of (state generated) values enshrined in the 
recent attempt to encapsulate and institutionalise them in a ‘national 
ideology’ (see chapter eleven below) and deriving its legitimacy from a 
self-referential system of supportive mechanisms (Clammer 1998: 222). 
In fact, often, the newly independent nation builds upon the economic, political and 
educational institutions and structures laid down by the colonisers, adopting and 
adapting the latter’s laws and values to suit the postcolonial state. In this, the 
postcolonial state enacts the ambivalence of the postcolonial subject, on the one hand - 53 - 
attempting to erase the traces of colonial domination, on the other, unable to break away 
from the residual traces of this domination on its psyche (Bhabha 1994). 
  Colonial residue is evident in the continued resistance of ex-colonies like 
Singapore against foreign domination in support of cultural and political autonomy. 
This, perhaps partially, explains Singapore’s response in replicating the binaries 
introduced by the British colonials, predominantly, between East and West: 
The logic of Orientalism reappears, paradoxically in the Orient itself: 
East and West are fundamentally divided from each other and the line of 
division proves again to be an eroticised one, generated this time not out 
of a clash between western colonialism and the indigenous societies of 
the East, but between a deeply modernist view and an emerging post-
modernism, or between the pressures of globalism upon bounded 
localisms (Clammer 1998: 229). 
Thus, the modernist perspective of the Singaporean government, confronted by 
postmodernism and globalisation, attempts to affirm an East Asian local identity. 
The reason for the PAP governments’ obsession with ‘pollution’ in speeches and 
policy announcements in Singapore is clear if we consider how the regulation of values 
and behaviours entail the regulation of boundaries, between internal and external, local 
and foreign, national and transnational. These boundaries are, of course, defined and 
naturalised through discourse, and the socially acceptable is bordered by, paradoxically, 
liminal areas that blur the dimensions of what defines national culture and identity. 
This pollution trope is part of a “discourse of crisis” (Birch 1993: 2), “a strategy 
to keep ‘the silent majority’ (Baudrillard 1983a) constantly aware of the Singapore 
citizen habitus” ( 81). Birch describes a state practice of “staging crises”, effected 
through the media, wherein questions of Singaporean citizenship and identity are 
manufactured and highlighted, with the answers at the end residing in the policies and 
definitions of the state itself. The pollution theme is therefore accompanied often by a 
renewed emphasis on the need to define and/or maintain a political and cultural identity - 54 - 
and common values. This, in turn, often leads to arguments in support of exclusion, 
whether through marginalisation or self-incision, of the ideas, practices and so forth that 
do not fit into this model of Singaporean identity, and state-driven policies and 
initiatives to reaffirm the model. 
These affirmations of identity that centre on community, again in functionalist 
terms, is described by both Clammer and Chua Beng Huat as legitimising the state’s 
actions, drawing attention away from increasing social stratification and the impact of 
industrialisation and commodification. The latter describes how, in 1991, a 
communitarian ideology was announced by the PAP government and, from a 
Gramscian perspective, assesses the extent to which the values and goals implied by 
these terms were actually addressed and met (Chua 1995). When Chua first published 
Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore in 1995, in his own words, “the 
book ended with cautious optimism towards further democratization in the Singapore 
polity” (Chua 1995), and it located this hope in growing social pluralism in Singapore. 
In his paperback edition in 1997, Chua identified further changes in the public 
discourse due to continued social pluralisation. However, instead of communitarianism 
and ‘shared values’, a new term, ‘social cohesion’, appeared which Chua identified as  
indicating a shift of emphasis to a more pluralistic electorate. It is in this context of 
‘social cohesion’ and the social and cultural boundaries imposed by the Singapore 
government that I now address the development and implications of Internet regulation 
for nationalism and community identity in Singapore and abroad. - 55 - 
3. Singaporean Internet Regulation: State, Nation and the 
Negotiation of Global Capital  
3.1 The Class License Scheme and the Proxy Server 
After the assertions of a new milieu launched by the growth of the Internet, Internet 
users interpreted the Singapore government’s actions as a betrayal of the celebrated 
ability of the Internet to bypass local governments and centralised authority. The first 
outcry began when, in 1996, the government put into place a number of measures to 
control the use of the Internet in Singapore, in sum, compulsory licensing and proxy 
servers. The Class Licence Scheme requires Internet service providers to register for a 
licence, and this is awarded subject to certain conditions, including adherence to a 
‘Code of Practice.’ Internet service and content providers are now responsible for 
content management, and the filtering of access to the Internet via a proxy server is 
mandatory.
12 This content management and filtering, like the license, has to match the 
guidelines set up by the Singapore Broadcasting Authority (SBA). 
  Besides Internet service providers and resellers, political parties, groups, 
organisations and individuals dealing with Singaporean political religious issues, and 
online newspaper providers charging for access have to register for a class license. Such 
licensees are held responsible for any content on their site that contravenes the 
guidelines, with prosecution, fines and the loss of the licence as the penalty. Some 
Internet users regarded the original form of the Code of Practice and the Guidelines as 
too vague and broad in wording. For instance, clause 2 in the Internet Code of Practice, 
states “A licensee shall use his best efforts to ensure that prohibited material is not 
broadcast via the Internet to users in Singapore” (Singapore Broadcasting Authority 
1996b). The use of phrases such as “prohibited material” and “best efforts,” coupled 
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with other instances of vagueness confirmed the suspicions of many that the regulations, 
rather than the explicit purpose of ‘safeguarding the national interest,’ were a form of 
censorship that discouraged criticism against the state and/or the social and political 
order of the day. Critics argued that the ambiguity of some aspects of the documentation 
encouraged Internet users, service and content providers to err on the side of caution 
(Lee and Birch 2000; Rodan 1996). 
The SBA has since made amendments to the Code of Practice and the Industry 
Guidelines
13 to take into account the feedback provided by the National Internet 
Advisory Committee (NIAC). While the new documents are more detailed about the role 
of holders of Internet class licenses, and the kinds of material prohibited, similar 
problems of ambiguity still exist. The definition of prohibited material, for instance, 
tends to refer to terms which are open to question. For instance, sub-clause 4 (1) states: 
“Prohibited material is material that is objectionable on the grounds of public interest, 
public morality, public order, public security, national harmony, or is otherwise 
prohibited by applicable Singapore laws” (Singapore Broadcasting Authority 1997: 
n.p.). This is followed by sub-clause (2) which lists the types of material defined as 
prohibited, including “nudity or genitalia in a manner calculated to titillate,” “sexual 
violence or sexual activity involving coercion or non-consent of any kind.” While sub-
clause (3) adds that “[a] further consideration is whether the material has intrinsic 
medical, scientific, artistic or educational value,” a licensed service or content provider 
may still be left wondering if his or her understanding of these terms meet those of the 
regulator, with the understanding that it is ultimately the latter which will make the final 
judgement. 
As an example of the adverse reactions of some Internet users to the introduction 
of the regulations, and the underlying beliefs and assumptions beneath these reactions, 
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the Human Rights Watch (HRW) group write, in a letter of protest to Singapore 
ministers: 
By prohibiting connections between its citizens and various Web sites 
outside its borders, Singapore is in essence removing itself from the 
global Internet. If, as will surely happen, its example is followed in other 
countries, the Internet, which held such promise as the world’s first truly 
global medium, will be nothing more than a set of country-specific 
networks where local prejudices and fears are reinforced by technology 
(Human Rights Watch 1996). 
The assumption of groups such as HRW is that the information passed on the 
Internet is naturally free flowing, a free flow that government intervention jams or 
permits admittance. These phrases, “removing itself from the global Internet”, “global 
medium”, “country-specific networks” are symptomatic of the global-local binary so 
often used in reference to this medium. According to this letter, Singapore will be an 
island in cyberspace, able to cut itself off from global flows of information, and setting 
an example to other nations governed by authoritarian states. Others, like opposition 
politician Chee Soon Juan of the Singapore Democratic Party, point out that the flow is 
being restrained within the country as well, that “[i]t’s just another way that the 
government is trying to control the free flow of information in this country” (Reuters 
1996). 
This is a perspective that employs a binary relationship between the imagined 
community of the Singaporean nation and that of the touted mobile and fluid identity of 
the Internet, a model that follows a chain of signification along the mythic lines 
indicated in this table (see overleaf): - 58 - 
[SINGAPORE] [INTERNET] 
NATIONAL COMMUNITY  TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
Whole  Fragmented (Stone 1995) 
Homogenous Heterogenous 
Fixed, Clear  Fluid, Indeterminable 
Media-directed User-directed 
Located physically and culturally  Dislocated, relocated 
Centrifugal Centripetal 
Multicultural Hybrid 
Top down  Bottom Up 
Consensus Individual 
This table describes the semiotic process by which various meanings are attached to the 
myths of imagined community, as pertaining to Singapore, and the opposing trope of 
mobile and fluid identity on the Internet. Hence, the word, ‘Singapore’, is tied to a 
series of meanings, some of which were for a long time unfashionably deterministic and 
structural. In contrast, as I have already described, ‘the Internet’ becomes tied to an 
oppositional set of terms that suggest an antidote to the kinds of communicative and 
relational patterns permitted by ‘traditional’, ‘top-down’, and mass communication 
technologies of television and print. 
  This is not to say that the Singapore government was alone and the first to come 
under such an attack. In July 1994, James Exon, a Nebraskan Senator, called for 
regulations on the Internet and the Communications Decency Act (CDA) was passed by 
the US Senate about a year later, and signed by Clinton in February, 1996 (National 
Computer Board (Singapore) 1996). This act made Internet service providers 
responsible for illegal posts by their subscribers, and was followed by a Bill making the 
transmission of ‘indecent’ materials over the Internet (knowingly) a crime. Although the 
US Supreme Court ruled the CDA as unconstitutional, a number of states have drafted 
legislation (CNN Interactive 1996). In Germany, December 1995, in response to - 59 - 
objections by German authorities, Compuserve temporarily blocked access to more than 
200 Usenet newsgroups (National Computer Board (Singapore) 1996).
14   
  With these developments, including the Singaporean case, some Internet users 
and ‘cyber-activists’ realised that the medium was not the message, that is, whatever the 
potential of the technology, how it eventually developed was subject to forces outside 
the inherent characteristics of the medium. The regulations imposed by governments 
can constrain the development of the technology and redirect its course. As summed up 
by one writer: 
It will be fatal if we underestimate the intentions of corporate and 
governmental interests for control over and access to new media, simply 
because others are overestimating what is frequently seen as the media’s 
inherently democratic capabilities. The “myths” that are leading the 
cornerstone legal decisions currently being debated... will become 
tomorrow’s unchallenged precedent as to how electronic sociality will 
function (Bratton 1997). 
3.2 Mutual Dependency and Mixed Strategies 
The binary of national and transnational community, and a technologically deterministic 
understanding of Internet development, obscure how the Singapore state has adapted to 
the new exigencies posed by the Internet, leading to new legitimisations and strategies. 
The Singaporean government has found two aspects of the Internet particularly useful: 
that the Internet does not exclude imagined communal formations, and the technology is 
not fixed and is in the process of development. Imagined community formations and 
postmodernistic identity are, after all, not mutually exclusive. 
The Singapore government’s Internet strategy reflects the complex relationship 
between the state and transnational forces in its pragmatism and fluidity, in particular, 
the recognition that the state cannot totally fence off global flows. The policy 
incorporates resignation to such flows with a desire for continued state dominance over 
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the range of meanings ‘broadcast’ in Singapore. The state recognises that the past types 
of regulations on print and broadcast technology are untenable. George Yeo, for 
instance, says, “The choice is: we master the technology or it will master us” (Yeo 
1995)—this is the rationale behind the ‘Singapore neighbourhood’ notion. 
Simultaneously, the government, perhaps in an innovative fashion, was quick to see 
that, in certain aspects of the Internet, it could still apply prior forms of control. 
3.3 Cultural Preservation 
The Singapore government have given a number of reasons for introducing these 
regulations on the provision and use of the Internet. The justification for the 1996 
legislation is reminiscent of that given with regard to the broadcast and print media, that 
is, to protect the existing socio-political environment in Singapore. In a statement 
released on 3 March 1996, the Singapore Broadcasting Authority (SBA), while noting its 
utility as a “powerful communication and information tool”, stated, “we must also try to 
keep in check abuses in cyberspace like pornography, hate literature sowing social and 
religious discords, and criminal activities” (1996a: n.p.). The SBA said, “[t]hese efforts 
will help to keep the parts of the information highway which pass through Singapore 
relatively clean”, a clear example of the pollution trope carried over from general 
discourse in Singapore. 
According to the SBA, the regulatory framework of 1996 was introduced to 
“encourage minimum standards in the parts of cyberspace which affect Singapore… 
[and] enhance the Internet’s potential for Singapore while safeguarding the values we 
hold as a local community” (Singapore Broadcasting Authority 1996a: n.p.). Putting 
aside for the moment possible motives, this notion of community values alone is not as 
easily identifiable as such a statement suggests. Considering Singapore’s increasing 
social pluralism and the attempts by the PAP government to impose ‘social cohesion,’ - 61 - 
whose definition of community values is being used? In the case of Internet regulation, 
it is the SBA and thus the state that are determining community values. 
I also find it necessary to ask: against what or whom are these safeguards 
defending? The government’s statements about the introduction of the regulations 
suggest that the measures they put in place are to preserve the national culture against 
external contamination, invoking fears of globalisation-as-Westernisation-or-
Americanisation. Yet, the state is not simply a buttress against global flows. It also 
actively plays a part in exploiting and furthering the interests of transnational 
corporations. The continued existence of the state, in certain contexts, relied on the 
maintenance of imagined community of the nation (Anderson 1991) but, as Hannerz has 
argued, it is now possible for the state to exist despite the “withering of the nation” 
(1996).  
The Singapore Internet, does not, however, spell the decline of the state, rather, 
it is the close link between nation and state that is falling away. We are not observing 
the decreased power of the state in the face of transnationalism but the adoption of new 
forms of governance. This is a governance wherein transnational corporate interests and 
the state find points of convergence, where the existence of stable, small and apparently 
homogenous collectivities in conjunction with stable political administration and 
leadership enable an economically-responsive, and cohesive environment suiting 
transnational corporatism. 
  Popular thinking about globalisation often assumes an asymmetrical power 
relationship exists between small countries, such as Singapore, an island-state, and 
larger ones like the United States of America, which have the internal markets to 
support conglomerates and their worldwide industries. However, Anderson points out - 62 - 
that this asymmetrical relationship is a fallacy, especially in the case of “homogenous”
15 
countries like Singapore, where: 
the sense of national solidarity is especially strong, making it easier for 
political leaders to ask for sacrifices without expensive coercion, to 
develop smoother industrial relations, and effectively to seek specialized 
niches in the international division of labour (Anderson 1992: 6). 
My reading of Anderson suggests that the state can use this interdependency between 
homogenous cultures, the state, and the economic advantages for transnational 
capitalism, in favour of preserving a homogenous dominant culture. As Anderson 
(above) and Ulf Hannerz insist, transnational corporatism does not make the state 
obsolete. The Singaporean state has had its skirmishes with transnational media 
corporations. However, as recent history has indicated, the latter can be learning that 
there is more to profit from cooperating with ‘peripheral’ states like Singapore. 
  For the state itself, one possible motive for keeping such a strong control over 
the dominant culture, and preserving its homogeneity, is self-preservation. This is a 
defence against global pressures that would otherwise weaken its role as a central 
authority (for instance, economic, social and political developments) and arbitrator of 
public discourse and culture. In the case of Singapore, this is particularly significant. 
Since independence, this small country has had a strong discourse that places the state 
squarely in the driver’s seat in regards to developments in the public as well as private 
sphere. Hence, discussions of discursive order and the elements of public discourse 
inevitably return to the state, even in instances where its role is peripheral. Added to this 
general need to retain its central position in defining and maintaining public discourses, 
there is also the anxiety of those who have a stake in ensuring that the political 
configuration remains the same as it has always been, more specifically, keeping the 
PAP, the party that has ruled Singapore since the nineteen-sixties, in government. 
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An illustration of this impetus can be found in efforts to tighten up on the 
Internet, including the gazetting of two websites, Sintercom and the Think Centre, and 
the introduction of amendments to the Parliamentary Elections Act (Rodan 2002), in 25 
July 2001, less than three months before the date of the next elections were announced 
on 18 October.
16 Sintercom and the Think Centre were required to register as political 
organisations, significantly, the former, although not centred on political issues, was 
involved in political activism (including campaigning against the Internet regulations 
when they were first introduced), whilst the latter was more explicitly political and 
activist in scope. Both are hosted locally, and, during the previous elections, commented 
on issues and events as well as provided space for the views of opposition party 
candidates. The election law amendments banned all websites, except those of 
registered political parties, from promoting political candidates and parties. Any 
material promoting parties and candidates had to name the publisher, printer and person 
behind them, and the results of opinion polls and voters’ exit polls could not be 
published until after the elections and voting. Appeals for funds are also not allowed, 
and whilst chat rooms run by political parties and candidates are permitted, they are 
required to keep logs of the chat messages. The penalties for violation of these rules are 
a maximum jail term of twelve months and a fine of up to one thousand Singapore 
dollars (Associated Press 2002; Wong 2001). 
As Garry Rodan concludes, Singapore’s Internet regulations, coupled with other 
regulations and practices, prevents the formation and organisation of independent 
interest groups which influence the political process: 
Although the Internet has been successfully used to criticize and spread 
information, there is a big distinction between this and its use to foster 
organized, collective political action. The Singapore government’s 
strategy to limit the political impact of the Internet is based on this 
                                                 
16 Additionally, these were early elections as the deadline for holding the next elections was August 2002. - 64 - 
distinction and aims to prevent the Internet being harnessed to foster a 
civil society—an essential ingredient for democracy (Rodan 2002: n.p.). 
Rodan’s definition of ‘civil society’ and the failure of Singapore to realise this model is 
useful as a backdrop for the next section of this chapter: 
By civil society, I mean groups pursuing their interests and ideas through 
political action, either independently of political parties or in concert with 
them. In Singapore, this is illegal. Under the Societies Act, only groups 
registered with the Registrar of Societies as political associations can be 
involved in political activities. 
This is, in my view, an accurate summation of the political situation in Singapore, and 
describes the boundaries of political expression and action in this country, and it is an 
important thing to keep in mind during the following discussion on resistance via the 
Internet. 
4. Dissent and Alternative Media 
While in the previous sections I discussed the power and control exercised on the 
Singaporean Internet community through libertarian and national discourses, in this 
section, I aim to demonstrate how this same power also allows or produces avenues and 
tactics for resistance. When discussing Singapore, it is common and reasonable to assert 
the dominance of the state over all areas of Singaporean everyday life, and it would be 
inaccurate of me to claim otherwise. There is an overwhelming amount of material on 
this aspect of Singaporean life in academic as well as non-academic, journalistic, or 
fictional (especially satire) writing. 
Foucault’s conception of power, which informs the account above, as well as 
Lee and Birch’s (2000), was not merely one of power as repression and negation,
17 but 
was conceived positively as something that produced the cultural formations and social 
                                                 
17 In an interview with Pierre Boncenne, Foucault said of his studies of madness and the prison:  
FOUCAULT   … the question at the center of everything was: what is power? … 
[P]ower, it was said [during the 1960s], is what prohibits, what prevents people doing 
something. It seemed to me that power was something more complex than that. 
P.B. In order to analyze power, one must not link it a priori to repression… 
FOUCAULT Exactly… (Foucault 1988: 102). - 65 - 
gradations of the society and epoch under study (McHoul and Grace 1997), including 
areas of resistance. This is also true of Singaporean society but it has been difficult for 
researchers to analyse this in a positive way. Firstly, in the public domain, overt and 
explicitly counter-discursive statements and actions are quashed in ways that reinforce 
the dominance of the national discourses they are working against. Secondly, the 
boundary between private and public is relatively indistinct in a country where there is a 
constant refrain that, because of the economic and political ‘vulnerability’ of Singapore, 
the personal choices of its citizens are critical to its survival and continued success. 
Therefore, Singaporeans have a minute range within which they can express 
disaffection and opposition. This account of areas of resistance on the Singapore 
Internet is accompanied, therefore, with emphatic qualifications as to its scope and 
tangible achievements.  
Saying Singaporeans have a limited range of resistance, however, is different 
from saying that there is no scope at all. The latter, in ruling out resistance, is not only 
inaccurate, but works against progressive politics on a micro level, that is, one is asked 
to assume that the only option is to change the political structure and composition in 
Singapore,
18 a task that is daunting in the least. Such an approach needs to be balanced 
with an analysis of existing and potential resistance within the current political and 
discursive environment. I recognise that the following forms of resistance can only go 
so far without a corresponding change in the social, regulatory, and political 
environment. However, resistance and the potential for resistance do exist. Power is not 
something merely ‘held’ by the state, but is distributed and enacted at different levels in 
society, and, resistance is not something ruled out, even in an authoritarian society, but 
                                                 
18 Other avenues to press for deregulation and liberation, that is, participation in politics, as voters and 
campaigners, interest groups, media, and activism, are severely limited by strict regulation and policies 
introduced by the government, which, as mentioned earlier, has been dominated by the same political 
party since independence in 1965. - 66 - 
is created (at least in its forms and expression) by the operations of power. As Foucault 
has explained, the scope for resistance is built into power relations, using “precise 
strategies”, we have the ability to ‘modify the grip’ of power in certain conditions, using 
clear strategies (Foucault 1988). 
The Internet may not have altered the fundamental power relations in Singapore 
drastically, that is, making the form of government in Singapore much less paternalistic 
or more liberal democratic, which some of its citizens might like to see (and some 
others not). However, it has introduced new pockets of resistance and engagement that 
have persisted to this day. 
The change in the political environment, as mild as it is, is evident when we 
compare the past with the present. In the past, dissent was expressed privately or 
covertly. This was because of a cautious conservative media environment and because 
public expressions of opinions and values running counter to the dominant discourse 
tended to be crushed firmly and just as publicly. It was also because it was possible to 
do all these things with the type of media structure and culture that was in place at that 
time. Singapore’s laws also rule out publicly speaking with more than five people at one 
time without a license.
19 One of the most obvious changes since the advent of the 
Internet is the existence of spaces where people can discuss and critique with people 
outside their immediate familial, social, and other networks. It does this partly because 
its various applications straddle or slide between mass and private communication, able 
to form different kinds of communities simultaneously. For instance, email can be used 
for broadcasting to a large number of subscribers or for private communication between 
two persons. 
                                                 
19 Speakers’ Corner, introduced in September 2000, is an exception in that one can simply register in 
advance. However, even this space is restricted: for instance, the topics of race and religion are not 
allowed. A local politician from an opposition party, Dr. Chee Soon Juan, ran foul of this rule and was 
arrested when he spoke on the banning of the tundun (headscarf) for females attending public schools and 
argued that, following the September 11 attack on American targets in 2001, Muslims in Singapore were 
being unfairly persecuted. - 67 - 
With the Internet, criticism of public figures and policies, political lampoons and 
jokes, and attacks on dominant values can leap from coffee shops, dinner tables and 
lunch time conversations between friends, to a wider audience of (usually anonymous) 
strangers. In the context of Singapore’s political and social history, this is significant. 
There, on display in newsgroups and websites, are the assumptions, concerns, and views 
of one’s immediate social circle shared (or questioned) by other members of society. 
Via the Internet, there are public forums and avenues of expression outside the 
technologically and politically-restricted traditional media of broadcast and print. This 
freedom of expression was not something Singaporeans had before (at least without 
quick and efficient reining in). Outside the conservative mass media and the skirmishes 
with opposition politicians, the most ‘dissent’ that one encountered in everyday life was 
through humour shared amongst friends or satire (especially in live comedic 
performances and theatre). Although an analysis of the psychological and social impact 
of these changes is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I at least should introduce this 
as an area needing future research. 
The discussions and complaints generated in the websites and 
soc.culture.singapore paint a different picture of the stereotyped passive and 
unpoliticised Singaporean citizen to Internet users outside and within Singapore. That 
there is not much writing on this type of resistance is easy to understand: it is less 
‘externalised,’ less quantifiable and more difficult to observe and analyse than the 
actions of the various social institutions (such as the state and the media organisations). 
Also interesting is the way the rhetoric of the state and the media institutions 
have had to shift to adjust to this change, including talk of a more participatory ‘civil 
society’ model, and the implementation of feedback channels. As most commentators 
have rightly pointed out, this change may be merely cosmetic and does not signify 
fundamental changes in the conduct of politics and the way decisions are made in - 68 - 
Singapore. However, that the political (and other) institutions have had to change their 
language is in itself already a significant shift in the discourse. 
4.1 Responses to Internet Regulation 
An immediate example of resistant behaviour is the ways the SBA regulations were 
received in 1996. On Usenet news, for instance, in soc.culture.singapore, the 
newsgroups were flooded with complaints and speculation about the introduction of 
Internet regulation. Posters speculated about ways of getting around the requirements
20 
and urged each other to complain to their Internet service providers or petition the 
government. In many of these posts, the libertarian discourse intersected with the 
discourse of regulation; those against the then-new regulatory framework cited familiar 
clichés about the Internet medium as a non-interventionist medium and tended to 
examine the state discourse with a great deal of scepticism.
21 
The margins of what is acceptable to say within this discourse is evident in 
statements like these: 
According to government pronouncement [sic], they accept that it is 
futile to try to block all pornographic sites but they must at least make an 
effort to block access to the more obvious sites. My sources say that it is 
a symbolic gesture to appease the more conservative segment of the 
population. That way, the easily disturbed can try to complain to the 
authorities to `ban' access to some obvious sites like playboy etc ('Thong 
Wei' 1998: n.p.). 
Well, SBA's got an impossible job to do. They were tasked [sic] in 95 to 
regulate the Internet and only came up with this hokey solution now. It's 
an election year with "concerned parents" ignorant of the Internet 
forming substantial numbers of the electorate. The government must 
appear to be DOING something. Hence Proxy [sic] servers with much 
media coverage. It doesn't actually HAVE to work … as long as people 
THINK it does ('chern ann' 1996: n.p.). 
                                                 
20 For instance, they discussed using alternative proxy servers outside Singapore. 
21 These observations are based upon my collection of material from the newsgroup during the 6 months 
after the introduction of the regulations. - 69 - 
In other words, Internet users like these recognise that the regulations have an 
ideological function: they do not actually prevent people from looking up ‘undesirable’ 
sites, as it is not possible to track, charge, and prosecute every single instance. Indeed, 
while some have rightly said that concerns over children’s access to porn was used as a 
Trojan horse through which the introduction of regulations could be justified, the other 
side of the picture is that Singapore’s standards regarding pornography and sexual codes 
of conduct are not directed by the state alone. Power and control is not something 
merely exercised by the state in this regard; rather it runs through the dominant 
discourse of Singapore and is reflected in the values of mainstream Singaporean society. 
The responses that attribute, rightly or wrongly, a surveillance and control intent 
to regulatory policies can reinforce the power of surveillance, creating an atmosphere 
where subjects err on the side of caution rather than face possible punitive reprisals. 
These examples support the policies in that they repeat the logic that the censorship is 
more symbolic than actual. On the other hand, such responses in a way signify a 
rejection of the values and ideology of the state discourse, even if this rejection did not 
result in a drastic change in government Internet policy (much less a change in the 
make-up of the Singaporean parliament). They, paradoxically, voice something that 
most Internet users in Singapore already know—that is, that they can access most of the 
material (except the ‘obvious’ sites) and that, despite the increase in restrictions, there 
remains a gap in control which the hitherto all-powerful state is unable to close. 
The Internet regulations and policy are liberal compared to regulations and 
policies governing other aspects of Singaporean life, for instance, education, transport, 
and so forth. In a country where unwanted behaviour and choices are unapologetically 
severely penalised, the Internet is comparatively open, taking into account the limits 
already discussed. The use of phrases like ‘light touch,’ the fact that people can still 
access ‘undesirable’ sites and newsgroups like soc.culture.singapore still feature, on a - 70 - 
daily basis, many messages that are highly critical of the dominant discourse and of the 
state, these indicate the extent to which the government recognises that traditional 
methods of controlling dissent are ineffectual. Government has had to shift and adjust 
its methods of operation to include this new dynamic. In the process of this reordering 
of the discourse, the environment has changed slightly. One poster to 
soc.culture.singapore remarks, in response to George Yeo’s public acknowledgement of 
the difficulty of regulating the Internet: 
Alamak. Georgie? How? Took ya [sic]
22 a real long time to realise that 
ya crappy SBA plan cannot control Internet hor? Last time talk kok so 
much that even ya YPAP I'net team had piles typing thoz crappy replies 
here in SCS trying to juztify ya crappy plan …  
… Now What? Trying to cover ya own backside again by accepting what 
all of us I'net oldbies and thoze at SIGNOC'S been recommending in 
practicing self-regulation hor ('SBAGLK' 1998)?
23 
Beyond the obvious ridiculing of George Yeo and the SBA’s Internet policy, this 
resistant discourse is accentuated in the use of ‘Singlish,’ the uniquely Singaporean 
vernacular, which the state is attempting to discourage, especially in public 
communication (specifically in television and film content). 
This may not be satisfactory to people who would like to see a more liberal 
Singapore, myself included, but I want to stress that, in a place like Singapore, it is rare 
to see anything more large-scale (in terms of liberalisation) than these kinds of minute 
transformations. Strategically, it would be an oversight not to work for, and recognise 
the significance of, such micro revolutions, especially as it seems that these are the most 
enduring and attainable in the short term. I include the following survey, therefore, to 
highlight similar ‘minor’ changes and to give them their due. 
                                                 
22 As this post is riddled with non-standard English spelling, vocabulary and grammar, I have not marked 
subsequent instances. 
23 As with some of the other posters, this is an adopted pseudonym, and the email address supplied in this 
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4.2 Escaping from the Gaze 
In Singapore, the phrase, ‘island-nation’ is often used in a range of materials including 
tourist brochures, historical texts, and political speeches. There has always been a high 
degree of consciousness of the porous nature of its boundaries, and a redoubled effort to 
strengthen them. This is applicable both to the movement of people in and out of 
Singapore (residency, citizenship and so forth), as well as the flow of values and ideas. 
The Internet has become an important staging ground in which anxieties surrounding 
these flows of people and ideas are played out. 
Singaporean laws controlling citizenship and immigration are governed by a 
discourse of pragmatism, for instance, economic needs. Dual citizenship is not allowed, 
and people are required to renounce citizenship in other countries to obtain or retain 
their Singaporean citizenship. For example, children born in England to Singaporean 
parents may obtain Singaporean citizenship, but to keep this, they must give up their 
British citizenship by the age of twenty-one and swear allegiance to Singapore. Strict 
policies surrounding foreign workers regulate who can and cannot remain in Singapore 
and take up permanent residency or citizenship. While residency abroad is tolerated 
because it is important for the conduct of business overseas, or the acquisition of 
significant skills, qualifications and experience, and, hence, the well-being of the 
Singaporean economy, there is, at the same time, a sense of betrayal and anxiety 
surrounding more permanent emigration, especially with references to the ‘brain drain.’ 
Since Lee Kuan Yew raised this problem (with a great deal of emotion), the 
predominant strategy has been to persuade Singaporeans to return, especially graduates. 
The argument goes, ‘why be a second-class citizen overseas when you can be a first 
class citizen here?’ In other words, emigrants would never, according to this discourse, 
be accepted and treated equally overseas, especially in countries where they would be 
racial minorities, so why emigrate? There is also the concern that, whether potential - 72 - 
emigrants or returned Singaporeans, people exposed to foreign ideas contaminate the 
country, and need to be reintegrated into the local sensibilities and practices. Since they 
were once outside the local discursive environment, they can (and have) potentially 
disrupt its meanings and practices, that is, the carefully maintained and buttressed 
discursive order. 
The Internet, therefore, challenges the control of movement into as well as out of 
the country by facilitating more direct and immediate participation and interaction 
between Singaporeans in the country, with those living overseas, as well as non-
Singaporeans. Of course, this was available through more traditional means. However, 
it is the combination of the Internet’s speed, the way its various technologies can 
straddle and veer between public and private, mass, group, and individual, and, as 
pointed out above, how it can reroute around regulation that make it more powerful. 
Through forums like newsgroups, web bulletin boards, and email distribution lists, 
Singaporeans residing locally or based abroad, and non-Singaporeans likewise in 
Singapore or overseas, interact and exchange views on local as well as more 
international matters. 
4.3 Increased Access to Overseas Media in General 
One impact of the Internet on Singapore’s media environment is the abundance of 
available overseas information sources. Singaporeans could always access newspapers 
and magazines, listen to the BBC and so forth, but the myth of ‘the fragile island nation’ 
and fear of contamination tempered this access with an awareness that these media 
could be taken away should they disrupt what was allowable in the public discourse. In 
the 1980s, for instance, the Far Eastern Economic Review was penalised for publishing 
unfavourable articles on the Singapore government. It was gazetted, that is, it was still 
allowed to circulate in Singapore, but only if all advertising content was omitted. This - 73 - 
restriction has since been lifted, but with the understanding that the response of 
members of the Singapore government must be printed in the news magazine. Another 
example, more to do with cultural policing and gender, was Cosmopolitan magazine. 
The authorities banned this magazine for women because it featured an article extolling 
the ways in which women could cheat on their partners. 
  In contrast, the censorship of the Internet in Singapore has been mainly symbolic 
and restrained to ‘obvious’ sites like Playboy and Penthouse. There are plenty of 
examples of content the SBA would normally define as a threat to the values, internal 
stability and culture of Singapore (also as defined by the prevailing discourse). The 
range of material that would normally be suppressed is immeasurable: alternative, and 
what mainstream Singapore would consider promiscuous and deviant, sexual practices 
and lifestyles, drugs, ‘snuff,’
24 extremists, and so forth ad nauseum. With the broadband 
connections that are now widely available throughout the island, Singaporeans can 
download news items and other information, as well as television and films not usually 
available locally. Regulatory policies have delineated the boundaries of acceptability, 
however, the impracticality of monitoring what every user is downloading makes things 
difficult. A study by the Internet measurement firm, NetValue, reveals that Singaporean 
executives and professionals, along with South Korean students, made the most visits to 
pornographic websites in March 2001. More generally, Singapore, together with 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and other Asian countries, were relatively well represented as 
visitors to pornographic websites and spent the most time at these sites (Reuters 2002). 
The Internet allows exploration outside the boundaries of prevailing truths 
surrounding the culture, politics, and values of everyday Singaporean reality. The 
                                                 
24 The slang, ‘snuff,’ refers to photos, videos, and other material depicting people dying usually violent 
deaths. Previously often used to refer to video material, and specialty video shops have a ‘snuff’ section, 
but has since been broadened to include a wider range of material. When the late Diana Spencer, formerly 
the Princess of Wales, died, the photos of the accident and her body were available on many of these 
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examples I provide may not adequately depict the full range of ways in which 
communication, relationships, and behaviours escape the confines of acceptability in the 
Singaporean context. They do illustrate the need for research and analysis that goes 
beyond the ‘top down’ actions of the state and its stakeholders, and instead, critically 
appraise the interaction and negotiations that are occurring at the level of the subjects of 
the discourse. 
4.4 The Contestation of National Discourses 
One transformation has been in the newsgroups, as I have mentioned, and related 
technologies, such as web bulletin boards and email lists. These allow some measure of 
anonymity and freedom from the normal constraints placed on public speech in 
Singapore.
25 It is not surprising, therefore, that the ‘truths’ of Singaporean discourse are 
frequently examined in these areas. The posts do have varying degrees of coherence and 
sometimes do not come close to the democratic forum for rational debate idealised by 
liberal discourse. As is quite common in Usenet and other forums, ‘flame wars’ often 
break out where arguments descend into personal insults and depart markedly from the 
subject under discussion. The posters’ viewpoints may be so polarised as to admit little 
conciliation. However, one interpretation of these patterns is that the very vitriol and 
antagonism of these posts demonstrate the underbelly of the national discourse, that is, 
the places where the truths are wearing thin. 
Usenet seems to be the repository for posts that deconstruct the myths of racial 
equality and multiculturalism, the dominant version of national history, competent 
governance (by the PAP) in general and its associated tropes: meritocracy, the fragility 
of the country, the need to guard against social and cultural pollution, the legacy of Lee 
Kuan Yew and so forth. It is not hard to find posts exposing the tenet of ‘racial equality’ 
                                                 
25 A recent example is the arrest of Dr Chee Soon Juan, the leader of the Singapore Democratic Party (an 
opposition party), when he spoke in support of workers’ rights outside the Istana on Labour Day after 
having been refused a permit to do so (1 May 2002). - 75 - 
as a myth that is not realised in everyday Singaporean life, nor of posts that question the 
near-deity status of the first Prime Minister (and current Senior Minister), Lee Kuan 
Yew. Sometimes, multiple assaults are conducted, witness this exchange: 
[‘ckchow’]  He [Lee Kuan Yew] once said Dhanabalan was capable of 
being Prime Minister, but that Singapore was not ready for an Indian 
Prime Minister. What happened to racial equality? How do you achieve 
that when the founding father of the nation can make a comment like 
that? 
[‘Vincent’] Singapore happens to have about 75% Chinese to 5% 
Indians. 
[‘ckchow’]  I am one of the 75% Chinese, and still I fail to see why that 
should make a difference. Doesn't the Constitution say that there shall be 
no discrimination against citizens of Singapore in the appointment to any 
office, regardless of race? ('Lky a fool of his own mindless vindictiveness 
2' 2001). 
Here, the posters not only examine the myths of racial equality and Lee Kuan Yew’s 
infallibility, but also begin to challenge the notion of meritocracy as an overriding 
principle in Singaporean politics and everyday life.
26 
  While the newsgroup makes an interesting and lively study, other technologies 
are more popular amongst the general Internet community. In Singapore, surfing the 
Web, makes up about forty percent of time online in contrast to one percent on news 
groups. The next most popular activities are instant messaging (twenty-two percent) and 
email (nineteen percent), and Singapore is unique amongst the Asian countries surveyed 
in its fondness for chatting (eight percent as opposed to one percent for China, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and two percent for Korea). These other means of communication and 
exchange play a significant role in Internet life in Singapore, as the following examples 
will illustrate. 
                                                 
26 This aspect of the newsgroup was noticed, and members of the youth wing of the party in government, 
the Young PAP (YPAP), played an active role posting messages that defended the policies of the 
government. Some posters found it sinister that the YPAP stopped posting shortly before introduction of 
the SBA regulations and returned to defend them. These Internet users set up a webpage calling for a 
boycott of the YPAP website and postings ('Bluesky' 1996). - 76 - 
  Foremost because they address the subdued political opposition in Singapore, 
there are the websites of opposition party members and other people disenchanted with 
the party in government; one of these is Tang Liang Hong. During the 1997 election, 
members of the ruling party called him an “anti-Christian, anti-English-educated, 
Chinese-language chauvinist.” After the election, he left Singapore, citing death threats 
as his reason. In the meantime, thirteen defamation actions against him were filed by 
Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and nine PAP members 
of parliament, based upon his responses to the above characterisation. The court granted 
damages totalling 9.58 million Singapore dollars (5.65 million United States dollars at 
that time). He was subsequently charged with several counts of tax evasion. 
  In the past, the public account of this episode would have been left solely at the 
mercy of the conservative pro-government press and other media. As with other 
candidates in non-PAP parties like JB Jeyaratnam and Chiam See Thong (though less so 
in the latter case), there has been a steady assault on his character and little attempt to 
present his version of the events. Tang would have faded into obscurity, his name only 
to be fished out to remind dissenters of what could happen to them if they went too far 
and threatened the presiding configuration of Singapore society and politics. Aside from 
rumour, gossip, and a great deal of reading between the lines, it used to be extremely 
difficult to obtain information outside the official version. 
At this point, it is pertinent to compare Tang’s situation with Chia Thye Poh, a 
member of Parliament (Barisan Sosialia party) jailed indefinitely in October 1966 
without trial under the Internal Security Act. An explanation for his arrest was given 
almost twenty years later in 1985 (Hamilton 1998; Porter 1998) when the then-Minister 
for Home Affairs and Law, Jayakumar, accused him of being a communist. Chia has 
consistently denied these accusations, no doubt one reason for his lengthy detention. 
After Nelson Mandela, Chia is the second longest (known) political prisoner having - 77 - 
served more than twenty-two years, mostly in solitary confinement. Twenty-five years 
old when he was detained, he was forty-nine when he was ‘released,’ that is, he was 
lodged in Sentosa (a resort island near Singapore) in a government house. Aside from 
being allowed to make day trips to the mainland and receive visitors, he was still under 
severe restraint, for instance, he was not allowed to make public statements, participate 
in organisations or get involved in political activities. In 1992, he was allowed to move 
to the city, and in 1997, to accept a fellowship in Germany. The remaining restraints 
were removed in November 1998, thirty-two years after his arrest. 
Although the paths of their descent were different, that is, Chia was detained and 
not living overseas like Tang, they did share a similarity in that the outcome was a gulf 
in communication between them and the Singaporean public. Throughout that time, 
older Singaporeans knew about Chia, but younger Singaporeans had relatively less first-
hand engagement with the person or the story. This situation allowed a monopolistic 
control over this history, that is, complete governance over the truths of the discourse 
pertaining to this issue and to the wider context of Singaporean history and its political 
and legal environment. 
The change here is that Tang still has a voice and access that Chia did not have 
after he was detained and until he was released. The Internet has opened a window of 
opportunity: Tang had a website set up and his supporters have used email and the 
soc.culture.singapore newsgroup to provide a different account of current affairs and 
history. This website, last updated in November 1998, presents the legal documents, 
media reports and interviews surrounding these events (Tang 1998). At the time of 
writing, there is a more permanent website in English and Chinese that is kept up to 
date, with his own domain name, that is, www.tangtalk.com. These websites, as long as 
they remain available, make it less easy for people in power to exploit the erosive forces 
of time and memory, along with the dearth of information. As much as control over at - 78 - 
least the dominant narrative is maintained, the websites ensure this narrative is not the 
only one circulating in the public sphere. 
In fact, Chia’s story too is now available through the same means. When all 
limitations on his activities were removed, he was finally in a position to issue a public 
statement: 
… Under the Internal Security Act, the government is given the power to 
detain a person for as long as it pleases. There is no real safeguard 
against abuse of power. The Advisory Board under the Act has no power, 
and no court can question the subjective judgement of the minister. I was 
told that the only way out was to sign a statement prepared by the 
Internal Security department, otherwise I would have to remain in prison 
for long long years, but how could I sign a statement that is not true.  
During detention, the detainees can be subjected to all sorts of pressure 
and even torture. Though I was not physically assaulted, I had been put in 
dark cell and solitary confinement; and some of my fellow detainees
27 
were abused, stripped or rinsed with cold water in chilled air-conditioned 
rooms. The Internal Security Act is a law that tramples on human dignity 
and strikes fear into the mind of the people … (Chia 1998: n.p.).
28 
This statement and other material on his history is available on the Internet, after over 
thirty years of muddiness and general silence from the local media and absence in the 
narrative of the nation’s history. As I have said, I am cautious of declarations about the 
Internet as a liberalising force, but this example illustrates my point that it is important 
to acknowledge the potential of this medium for change, even small ones. 
  The material on Chia is archived at a website called Singaporeans for 
Democracy ( SFD), www.sfdonline.org. This website, together with other ones like 
                                                 
27 In 1987, the Singapore government arrested sixteen people, saying they were Marxist conspirators. 
These included catholic priests, members of student unions, theatre producers and the criteria by which 
they were defined as ‘Marxist conspirators’ were arbitrary and seemed to be based on activities and views 
that were critical of the government and its policies. Some of the people released said they were given the 
treatment that Chia refers to in this statement, and that their release was dependant on their confessing to 
the charges. 
28 Because of the length of his imposed silence, the reader would please excuse me for including this 
lengthy quote. On a personal note, Chia was jailed even before my birth, and a hazy figure all through my 
life in Singapore. Therefore, his release and his finally being allowed to voice his own view of the events 
is a highly significant moment for me. It is also relevant, too, that this person with this history still has the 
will to push for reform immediately after more than twenty years of detention; a potent reminder that 
Foucault’s model of power allowed for the possibility of resistance - 79 - 
Singapore Window, www.singapore-window.org, and Sintercom, 
forums.delphiforums.com/sintercom/start (formerly at www.sintercom.com), are 
attempts by Singaporean nationals stationed overseas and locally to address the paucity 
of political debate, vociferous activism, and independent local media in Singapore. 
  The self-declared aims of SFD are: 
•  To promote democracy in Singapore 
•  To present an alternative point of view to the propaganda churned 
out by the PAP 
•  To provide Singaporeans everywhere an avenue to express their 
opinion without fear of repercussion through a certain amount of 
Net anonymity (Singaporeans for Democracy 2002: n.p., as in 
original). 
As is already clear in the above quote, SFD draws from liberal discourses and illustrates 
the relationship between the national and liberal discourses in generating resistance. In 
its introduction, it says that the site was set up because Singapore is not a democracy, 
and introduces a range of issues that go beyond the everyday gripes of locals about 
censorship, bloated bureaucracy, the rising cost of living, and political tyranny. The 
issues covered include criticism of the government’s support of repressive regimes like 
that of apartheid South Africa and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. The site also 
mentions the lack of transparency in the government’s use of the country’s cash 
reserves. It provides a robust collection of links to articles on current and past issues, 
including material on human rights abuses, corruption, media and law, as well as 
readers’ contributions. 
To varying degrees, these sites take advantage of Internet technologies to 
circumvent Singapore’s normal cultural and political parameters. Firstly, there is the use 
of non-Singaporean hosts and domains. Running a network trace
29 on the address for 
                                                 
29 I used ‘NeoTrace’, a software application that traces the network path of a target node and retrieves 
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SFD, www.sfdonline.com, reveals that this site is hosted in Southwark, England, on a 
server provided by GreenNet. This organisation is a member of the Association for 
Progressive Communications (APC): 
The Association for Progressive Communications (APC) is an 
international network of civil society organisations dedicated to 
empowering and supporting groups and individuals working for peace, 
human rights, development and protection of the environment, through 
the strategic use of information and communication technologies (ICTs), 
including the Internet (Association for Progressive Communications 
2002: n.p.). 
The APC actively utilises the libertarian discourse of the Internet. SFD’s reliance on this 
network illustrates the ways in which it employs the potential of this technology for 
transnational flows for social activism that would normally be difficult within the 
borders of a country like Singapore. 
  Sintercom, which I mentioned earlier, has had a rougher time then the SFD since 
the introduction of the regulations. In 1994, Tan Chong Kee, then a Singaporean PhD 
student in Taiwanese literature attached to Stanford University, set up Sintercom, an 
acronym for “Singapore Internet community.” The site, like SFD, was originally hosted 
off-shore on multiple servers, for instance, on a Stanford University web server, as well 
as other locations (George 2000; 'Speaking your mind online without fear' 2001). The 
site included selective archives of soc.culture.singapore discussions,
30 analyses of state 
affairs and issues, interviews, as well as Singaporean jokes, recipes and so forth 
(George 2000). Other significant sections were added later. For instance, there was the 
section, ‘Not the Local News,’ which archived foreign media articles on Singapore, 
often critical, that the editors deemed noteworthy. There was also ‘Not the Forum,’ an 
ironical intertextual reference. The phrase, ‘the Forum,’ refers to the letters page of the 
Singapore newspaper, The Strait Times. This section displayed submissions to the 
                                                 
30 This was when massive newsgroup archives like Google and Dejanews were not available. As 
newsgroup postings were ephemeral as they were removed off servers worldwide as new posts came in, 
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Straits Times Forum that the editor either rejected or, if published, censored the author’s 
text.
31 Besides the website, this material as also available via email subscription. 
  Sintercom became famous amongst Singaporeans, and groups that hailed this as 
an example of the potential of the new media to free people from national boundaries 
and regulations. Sintercom was founded on ideals of civil society and Tan, along with 
other volunteers, used their real names to show that it was possible to openly comment 
and debate national issues. In 1995, he was contacted by Philip Yeo, the head of 
Sembawang Corp, the group that had just started Pacific Internet (George 2000; 
'Speaking your mind online without fear' 2001). Yeo offered him free web hosting on a 
Singaporean server and Tan moved his files to the Singapore server, registered the 
domain name of sintercom.org, and, for a time, Sintercom enjoyed a unique privilege as 
a kind of semi-official yet open Singaporean community forum and alternative news 
resource. It was held up by government ministers as an example of what they claimed 
was the Singapore government’s loosening of restrictions on its citizens and climate of 
open debate.  Further, a prominent link to this site was placed on the InfoMap, a 
government directory of Singaporean Internet sites (George 2000; 'Speaking your mind 
online without fear' 2001).
32 
  For a while, it seemed that the status quo would remain the same. This was even 
after Sintercom members led the way in criticising the draft Internet Code of Conduct 
and Guidelines in 1996, leading to large numbers of Singaporean Internet users writing 
in and expressing their dissatisfaction. As mentioned earlier, the new code made the 
producers of websites responsible for content posted to the site. This would adversely 
                                                 
31 The open invitation on the website requested information on dates of submission, copies of rejection 
letters, if any, and, if letters were published but were substantially edited, copies of the original 
submission with the changes highlighted. 
32 It is quite telling that the link to the old Sintercom site still remains at the time of writing despite 
developments in 2001. Is this because it has not yet been updated or could it be a failure somewhere in the 
bureaucracy to come to a decision as to how to handle the demise and rebirth on foreign soil of an entity 
that served a useful function as an example of the government’s liberalisation? - 82 - 
affect Sintercom’s operations. Although the regulations were introduced in spite of their 
objections, Sintercom’s status as a lobby group was indicated in its involvement in 
NIAC’s process of industry consultation. This process led to the redrafting of the Code of 
Practice and Guidelines and the adoption of the so-called ‘light touch’ policy. 
Sintercom was able to avoid having to register as a political site for a time, partly 
because of the range of material available, but perhaps also to avoid the ensuing 
negative public relations, as well as the difficulty of enforcement. Tan says that it was 
mainly because he told the SBA that he could always move the site to Yale or Stanford 
University, which would be embarrassing for the authorities, not least because of how 
they would look if they blocked his servers (George 2000; 'Speaking your mind online 
without fear' 2001). This state of affairs was to change in 2001, though, when the SBA 
sent a letter demanding that Sintercom register. Sintercom publicised this request online 
and wrote to the SBA. In the ensuing exchange, available through archives of the old 
Sintercom kept on the free server, Geocities, Tan sends the urls to the website, asking 
for the SBA to judge whether the past content complied with the regulation (Sintercom 
2001). The response from the SBA is to quote the rules, that is, that website producers 
exercise their own judgement on whether their content complied with the guidelines. 
After considering his options and submitting the forms to the SBA, Tan announced that 
he would close down the site, inviting interested parties to contact him should they wish 
to take over. Along with the other volunteers, Tan felt that the situation might result in 
self-censorship as people, with the changed status of Sintercom, might be more careful 
about what they posted. Additionally, registration meant that the editors of Sintercom 
were exposed to legal prosecution should the government regard the site to be 
endangering the national interest. Tan said, when he outlined their options on receiving  
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the SBA request: 
Sintercom started overseas at Stanford University anyway, and moving it 
back to Silicon Valley where it started is very easy. The only problem is 
that going overseas will [sic] contradicts our belief that it is possible for 
openness to exist in Singapore, and that frank and open discussion of 
issues is good for the future of our country (Sintercom 2001: n.p.). 
In this same text, Tan says closure would allow him more free time. In interviews and 
statements since the decision to close the site, he speaks of being tired and wanting to 
concentrate on his career and making money. However, the realisation that the 
movement of Sintercom out of Singapore would negate the editors’ beliefs in the 
possibility of civil society in Singapore might have played a part in the final decision. 
The SBA’s move on Sintercom illustrates the workings of power surrounding the 
Internet in Singapore. It is significant that Tan lists, amongst the achievements he was 
most proud of, Sintercom’s involvement in reporting the 1997 election (Sintercom 
2001); conspiracy-minded watchers may find it interesting that the SBA’s request was 
made the year before the next elections. Should Sintercom have gone ahead with the 
registration as a political site, it would find it difficult to function the way it did during 
the previous elections. For instance, the contributors and editors might have felt 
compelled to curb some of the statements they might otherwise make on national issues 
for fear that they would transgress the rather vague boundaries outlined by the SBA. If 
this line of thinking is correct, it illustrates the limits on civic society imposed by the 
national discourse. It was fine for Singaporeans to speak their minds and have an open 
discussion on national issues, as long as it did not actually affect the political outcome 
of elections. To put it more bluntly, the authorities would step in if analyses and 
criticism reached a point where it would result in less votes for the party in government. 
Of course, aside from the coincidence in timing and from the way the state has 
conducted itself in the past, this remains speculation. - 84 - 
The saga of Sintercom is also interesting because of developments since then. 
After a couple of people tried to keep it running on servers based outside Singapore, it 
was discontinued for a variety of reasons, including fear of getting into trouble with the 
Singapore government. However, Sintercom was finally reborn in the form of ‘New 
Sintercom.’ The new editor’s real name is unknown; s/he goes by the name of ‘Lee 
Kuan Few,’ a play on Lee Kuan Yew,
33 the first Prime Minister of Singapore and 
current Senior Minister, and refuses to divulge any information (gender, occupation, 
location etc) that would help identify him or her. The site is hosted offshore in 
Sunnyvale, California, by Geocities, which is owned by the US Internet group, Yahoo. 
These measures enable the site to escape the regulatory requirements of Singapore, 
although the SBA could block the server, which could entail blocking a massive number 
of other sites hosted by Geocities. With rumours of further regulatory changes to come, 
it is unclear at this stage if Sintercom and other similar sites will be left alone for long. 
However, for the moment, the new Sintercom has reintroduced the features that were 
available before, except the food and ‘Singaporeana’ section which they have left out, 
and, with a forum open to visitors to air their views, the site is decidedly as political as 
before (if not more so). 
Just as interesting are the sites that may or may not set themselves as overtly 
political but, in different ways, challenge, and work outside the margins of the public 
discourse. The formation of gay networks, resources and support groups online is an 
excellent example of this. Please note that the following discussion is not a 
comprehensive account of gay politics and culture in Singapore, nor is it an attempt to 
do this. Instead, the topic is explored to the extent that it illustrates how the Internet 
provides a means of working outside the boundaries of public discourse. 
                                                 
33 ‘Kuan Few’ also invokes how some Singaporeans, particularly people from certain Chinese dialect 
groups, may pronounce ‘confuse’, therefore, the meaning of the pseudonym can be read as ‘Lee (as in 
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While non-heterosexual lifestyles and activities are marginalised in many 
countries, including Western democracies, in Singapore, it has not reached the point 
where, in the media, and in mainstream culture, there is anything more than a tacit 
acceptance of the existence of gay men and lesbian women. Rarely is there a positive 
‘coming out’ story, there are no festivals or marches that explicitly and publicly 
supports the rights of gays and lesbians and celebrate their existence in the community. 
There are nightclubs and other places widely-known to cater to gay men and lesbian 
women, but this is not explicitly spelled out and is, at the most, inferred in their 
marketing. The legal discourse reflects the general approach taken regarding this issue, 
mainly in the retention of a nineteenth century British law in Singapore statutes, that is, 
Penal code 377(A). This states, “Any male person who, in public or private, commits or 
abets the commission of or procures the commission by any male person of an act of 
gross indecency with another male person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a 
term which may extend to two years.” Since independence, the policy has been not to 
prosecute cases of mutual consent involving adults, however, this law can be exploited 
by someone with malicious intent, and leaving it in establishes the norm and is a barrier 
for many gay men to speak out and declare their sexuality. 
The general marginalisation of homosexuality in the dominant discourse is 
enacted in the Internet guidelines. Replying to a post to soc.culture.singapore 
complaining about the lack of concrete action undertaken against ‘gay sites’ and the 
toothlessness of the new guidelines, one person says: 
Even though I utterly deplore the homophobic inclination of the original 
post, the poster could hardly be blamed if even the government sees 
homosexuality as something to be curbed and minimised wherever 
possible. [cites the relevant section of the Internet Code of Practice] … 
Notice how both homosexuality and lesbianism have been defined as 
sexual perversions. I wonder whether this is the official position of the 
government or just that of the committee who drew up the SBA  (Stanton 
1996: n.p.). - 86 - 
As this poster points out, the social demarcation of homosexuality as something outside 
the boundary of acceptable and normal sexuality is reinforced by regulation, not merely 
in the retention of the colonial law, but in later texts such as the SBA Internet guidelines. 
As long as the latter remains, there is a case for saying that, policy and riders aside, gay 
and lesbian sexuality is still not accepted by the state. This is not to say that these social 
attitudes stem from the law, but that they work in tandem and reinforce each other. 
  This is illustrated in a couple of cases. One instance was the case of a sixteen-
year-old student who faced pressure from his school when he put up a personal 
homepage declaring he was gay and included his school affiliation on the page. 
According to Au Waipang, a social critic on gay issues, the local tabloid paper, The 
New Paper, used sensational language and had several inaccuracies; this account relies 
on the narrative available at his website, Yawning Bread, which is based on information 
supplied via personal communication with the youth (Au 1997).  According to this 
article, the school spoke to his mother days before the school leaving certificates were 
to be handed out, threatening to sue on the grounds of defamation. The mother, who 
knew her son was gay, did not know about the homepage and scolded her son, who 
thereupon removed the homepage. When the time came for the students to collect their 
certificates, his teacher withheld his, saying that they had to wait until the Principal 
came back from leave. When his father collected the certificate, he noticed the school 
had given a very negative report on his behaviour. He made a fuss and the principal 
changed it to a good report on the spot. His mother complained to the Ministry of 
Education. 
 When  the  SBA was contacted by the New Paper, they said that, firstly, they did 
not monitor personal homepages (not least because they do not have the resources), but 
acted on complaints from the public. Secondly, they had advised the school to take it up 
with the student. Aside from this, they did not clarify whether or not the homepage did - 87 - 
contravene their guidelines. I suggest that this is in keeping with the tacit policy of 
ambiguity in the interest of encouraging self-censorship. 
  As Au explains in his article, this case illustrates the multiplicity of attitudes in 
Singapore towards homosexuality:  
It seems to me from the foregoing, that attitudes towards homosexuality 
in Singapore are, far from being monolithically 'anti' [sic] as is 
commonly supposed, remarkably varied. Of course[,] there are the bigots 
like the schoolteacher and the 'Geddit' writer, but many others hold views 
which are multi-dimensioned. They try to balance their views with a 
sense of fairness, with a mother's loyalty to her son, with a grudging 
respect for a gay person's courage, and in the SBA's case, a degree of 
adherence to stated principles. At the same time, there is the all-too-
human tendency to pass the buck (the SBA), sweep under the carpet (the 
school principal), and to self-censor (the lesbian
34).  
It is therefore important to stress that Singaporean attitudes to homosexuality are often 
negative, sometimes confused, and sometimes supportive. These attitudes can be found 
among gay and lesbian people as well (Au 1999b; Ng 1999). 
  Despite this environment, a positive study on the Internet and the Singaporean 
gay (male) community was conducted by Ng King Kang for his Masters thesis in Mass 
Communication at Nanyang Technological University, published as The Rainbow 
Connection: The Internet and the Singapore Gay Community (1999). Ng uses a mixture 
of quantitative and qualitative methods to determine the Internet’s role in the lives of 
Singaporean gay males.
35 He concludes that the introduction of the Internet 
accompanies significant changes in individual attitudes and behaviour, as well as a more 
active and visible gay male community.  
As Ng himself said, there are problems with the sampling methods and the 
generalisability of his results mainly due to the sensitive nature of the topic and a 
general fear of surveillance in the wider community. His work identifies ways the 
                                                 
34 Tan is referring to another case covered in his article. 
35 Although Tan does not discuss the omission of gay women in his study, it is clear that he uses the term 
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Internet that is useful to Singaporean gay men as a way of circumventing the limits of 
the public discourse, although there would be a problem with assuming, from this study, 
that their use of the Internet is always related to their sexuality. The Internet 
applications most frequently used by the respondents in Ng’s survey were IRC,
36 Web 
browsing, and email. There are two main IRC channels that are used by gay men in 
Singapore, and these are #GAM (Gay Asian Men) and #GSG (Gay Singapore). These 
offer the opportunity to meet other gay men anonymously. As one participant in Ng’s 
qualitative interviews says: 
There are not many official gay bars, pubs or clubs in Singapore. 
Hence[,] there is not much of a chance for gays to interact among 
themselves. I think IRC has opened up a whole new avenue for us. It has 
definitely given gay people some space to breathe and be themselves…  
IRC provides that special place were [sic] you can be who you are and 
you do not need to put yourself up to any real risk… (Ng 1999: 49). 
The Internet assists in the initiation and development of relationships through IRC and 
email, which would otherwise be more difficult in the generally uncongenial 
atmosphere (‘unofficial’ gay pubs and nightclubs aside). This person continues on to 
say that he feels psychologically and mentally stronger, as he is now more accepting of 
himself, in part because he realises he is not alone and has a “space.” Ng’s interviews 
and surveys indicate that the Internet is important in facilitating a sense of 
connectedness to a wider gay community that would usually be difficult to do publicly. 
This is reminiscent of the notion of virtual community popularised by Howard 
Rheingold (1992). 
  Similarly, web sites put up by and for other gay men enable readers to gain 
exposure to experiences and issues in other countries, for instance, “societal and 
political treatment of gay people, sex, sexually transmitted diseases, popular hangouts, 
trends”. Since the Internet regulations are unclear as to how they define content as 
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“advocat[ing] homosexuality” (Singapore Broadcasting Authority 1996b and 1997), not 
surprisingly, non-Singaporean servers host all of the well-known sites run by 
Singaporeans. Ng identifies the following as the most popular amongst his respondents: 
Yawning Bread (www.geocities.com/WestHollywood/5738/),  Men on the Net 
(www.menonthenet.com), Utopia-Asia (www.utopia-asia.com), Aunty Teck’s Home for 
Women in Asia, and the GAM home page. 
While a couple of these sites are pornographic,
37 other sites discuss current 
issues relevant to gay men (and women). Yawning Bread, for instance, features several 
articles mostly written by its owner, Alex Au Waipang, and guest writers. The articles, 
which discuss a wide range of issues, are outside the Singaporean margins of acceptable 
public discourse. Au and the other writers cast their gaze on them from a position that is 
also not common in the public domain, that is, they try to avoid objectifying gay and 
lesbian people as ‘other’ and instead occupy subject positions as gay men or lesbian 
women. Events in the press and other media are analysed, often providing details absent 
from mainstream coverage. 
Au challenges another aspect of the Singaporean government’s official line, that 
is, that homosexuality is accepted so long as gay men and women do not try to ‘convert’ 
others. He argues that this is a weak position because the notion of ‘conversion’ stems 
from dubious attitudes towards homosexuality and is difficult to define anyway. Using 
examples, he illustrates that even the consensus implied in this position is problematic. 
The case of the sixteen-year-old and his website demonstrates the complex range of 
community reactions that go beyond claims that Singaporeans cannot accept 
homosexuality (these claims are used to justify the retention of the Section 377A and 
the wording of the SBA guidelines). Coupled with the complexity of attitudes in the 
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community, there is the reality of homophobia, especially in authority figures, as seen in 
examples of police persecution of gay men. 
The Singapore government enforces the registration of clubs and societies 
through the Societies Act. Clubs and societies that are not registered are defined as 
‘illegal’ and their members face the possibility of fines and imprisonment. For instance, 
a group of gay, lesbian, and bisexual, People like Us (PLU), was running informally in 
Singapore and becoming quite established, with as many as sixty attending the Sunday 
sessions. Because the group had noticed undercover agents attending their gatherings 
from early on, and to avoid sensationalistic media exposure, they decided to submit an 
application to the Registrar of Societies to formalise their organisation. The group 
submitted in November 1996 with the following goals: 
to promote awareness and understanding of the issues and problems 
concerning gay, lesbian and bisexual persons… [and to] (a) hold small 
group discussions, (b) conduct research, (c) organise social events and 
(d) circulate a newsletter among Ordinary Members and Associate 
Members  (Au 1999a). 
The application was rejected in a terse fashion without any reason. The applicants met 
with the same response through three appeals, including one to the office of the Prime 
Minister. It was only with the intervention of a Minister of Parliament, Simon Tay, that 
the group finally obtained a reason in 2000, more than three years later. The Registrar 
wrote that the rejection was made on the grounds of Section 4(2) of the Societies Act, 
that is, a society could be rejected if the Registrar thought that it was “likely to be used 
for unlawful purposes or for purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order 
in Singapore.” The group obtaining support from individual politicians, at least on the 
point that the Registrar provide them with a reason for rejection, was a small victory 
(Au 1999a: n.p.). It begged the question as to how the Registrar’s office decided that the 
society could “be used for unlawful purposes” or threaten the “public peace, welfare or - 91 - 
good order of Singapore.” This decision was reflected in the group’s subsequent 
encounters with the authorities. According to the website, the ten men and women who 
were brave enough to submit their names, identity card numbers and other personal 
information to accompany the registration have “disbanded”, as there was a likelihood 
of facing legal prosecution should these people continue to attend meetings after the 
rejection. 
In 2000, Alex Au applied for a Public Entertainment License, mandatory for 
indoor conferences and talks, to hold a forum on gays and lesbians within ‘Singapore 
21’. Singapore 21 was a government-led initiative to develop the ‘ideal’ Singaporean 
society. The forum was to address the scheme’s key ideas, that is, “Every Singaporean 
matters”, “Strong families,” “Opportunities for all,” “Feeling passionately about 
Singapore,” “Active citizens: making a difference to society”. According to Au: 
The conference hopes to examine where gay and lesbian Singaporeans 
stand in relation to these aspirations. There are tensions between each of 
the five ideas and the gay minority, and in resolving these tensions may 
lie a source of future strength for Singapore society (1999a). 
The Police Licensing Division rejected the application thus: 
I regret to inform you that your application is unsuccessful. The Police 
cannot allow the holding of this forum which will advance and legitimise 
the cause of homosexuals in Singapore. The mainstream moral values of 
Singaporeans are conservative, and the Penal Code has provisions against 
certain homosexual practices. It will therefore be contrary to the public 
interest to grant a public entertainment licence (Au 1999a). 
The original PLU does not exist in a form that would legally expose its 
participants, and Au applied for the license personally. However, returning to the main 
theme of this section, these setbacks have not stopped members of the gay community 
in Singapore from continuing similar activities. Information on subsequent “PLU-
inspired projects” is kept at the old PLU website at Geocities; mainly efforts to organise 
a “gay civil society” in Singapore, that is, network of support and social groups. The - 92 - 
PLU has filtered into the community, entering the Singaporean vernacular (although 
perhaps not in circulation outside the gay community): 
The term 'People Like Us' continues to be loosely applied to those who 
share the dream, including many who had not been involved in the early 
years of PLU. At the same time, its abbreviation 'plu' (pronounced like 
'blue') has entered Singapore English as a proud local term for 'gay', as in 
‘we are plu’ (Au 1999a) 
The PLU performs a networking function, bringing together the individuals and groups 
in this area, as well as providing a resource for gays and lesbians looking for 
information. From this site, people can find information on gay and lesbian email lists 
and other online forums; advice on legal rights and Singapore law; information on 
homosexuality addressed to families and friends as well as to gay people themselves; 
religion and sexuality; “gay-friendly” medical doctors, lawyers and counsellors; and, 
‘face to face’ support groups. 
  Besides the ones I have mentioned, there are other gay resources that I do not 
discuss in detail. There are email lists like SiGNel, a general forum for gay, lesbian, 
bisexual and transgender Singaporeans and Singapore residents. Some of these lists 
cater to specific interests and groups. There is also an activist email list, 
plusg@egroups.com, with a more restricted membership. In the midst of these 
resources, while Au, Ng, and others are positive about the direction of Singapore social 
change and attitudes towards gay and lesbian people, given the discursive limitations, it 
remains to be seen whether the traditional resistance points will yield. For instance, 
positive changes to the penal code, amendments to the practices of the police and 
government departments, and a more enlightened public education programme, all seem 
far away at this time. 
The legal restrictions and general attitude of the state proscribes the formation of 
interest groups that can more explicitly, directly, and publicly serve the interests of - 93 - 
bisexual, gay, and lesbian people. It is in this sense that the developments via the 
Internet hit a snag. In his review of Ng’s book, Alex Au, discusses the use of the phrase, 
‘coming out,’ by Ng’s interviewees. The interviewees use the term in the context of 
divulging their sexual orientation to other gay people on the Internet, often using a 
nickname. Au’s interpretation of this phrase is that it describes the process by which a 
gay person reveals to straight people that he/she is gay. Au asks: 
whether the internet [sic] truly encourages coming out. Or does it merely 
satisfy gay men in terms of their freedom to communicate within their 
niche, so that the need to deal with, to confront, society at large is 
actually reduced? Does the internet encourage escape rather than 
resolution? Does the compartmentalisation the internet enables augur 
well for the integration of gay people in society (Au 1999b)? 
This is a reminder that the phrase ‘virtual community’ and the full range of meanings 
surrounding this term and the experiences it describes needs some examination in 
addressing the value of such formations and experiences on the Internet. Au’s question, 
“Does the Internet encourage escape rather than resolution?” applies to the other forms 
of resistance I have discussed here and is not an easy one to answer.
 
However, it is quite evident that, despite limitations placed on their activities, 
the Internet has become a space which facilitates the growth and propagation of gay and 
lesbian groups and networks. These provide a source of support for many individuals, 
and the strength derived from such a collaborative network, might, hopefully, percolate 
through to the broader Singaporean society and go some way to positive legal, political 
and social change. 
  Finally, the Singaporean satirical humour sites also work the edges of the public 
discourses, in a different fashion. The state has not had a good track record for tolerance 
of social commentary, even masked in the form of satire. Amongst the sixteen people 
arrested in 1987 for taking part in the alleged ‘Marxist conspiracy’ (see footnote 27) 
were members of a theatre group, The Third Stage, specialising in social and political - 94 - 
satire. The reason given for their arrest was their connection with other members of the 
‘network.’ This does not contribute to a secure environment for criticism expressed 
through humour and satire. Satirists and comics, are thus aware of the possibility that 
they may overstep the boundaries, and may calculate whether the consequences, if any, 
may be too severe for their liking. 
  The two most renowned sites for Singaporean humour are Talking Cock and Mr 
Brown. The phrase, ‘talking cock,’ is Singlish for ‘talking nonsense,’ either as a form of 
criticism (as in “That’s ridiculous, you are talking cock”), in good-natured banter, 
and/or in the context of a casual social occasion, for instance, passing the time with a 
friend in a café (as in “We just met for lunch and talked cock for a while). It is a phrase 
more commonly used by males. Talking Cock, like the previous sites, is hosted offshore, 
this time at Huntington Beach, California. The owner, too, is based overseas in New 
York, and used to run the site anonymously. He has since revealed his identity, that is, 
he is Colin Goh, formerly a practising lawyer in Singapore and creator of Concrete 
Jungle, a comic strip published in the Singaporean tabloid, the New Nation. Goh is 
evidently aware of the legal and political limits he can work with, that is, so long as the 
site is regarded as humorous and not ‘political,’ it escapes the attentions of the 
authorities, as he points out below: 
Donno [sic]
38 why also,
39 but there seems to be a tendency by the press to 
paint us as a political satire site. 
We wish to state categorically that we are NOT a political satire site.  
We are simply, a satire site. Politics is just one of the many things we 
make fun of… 
…We suspect that we're basically a victim of the view that the expression 
of any alternative viewpoint is necessarily a political statement, 
regardless of how frivolous the treatment or subject.  
That may be so, especially in a fibre-deficient and kiasu
40 society like 
Singapore, but only in the broadest theoretical terms. 
                                                 
38 As this excerpt is littered with Singlish (Singaporean English vernacular) slang and grammar, I am not 
marking every instance of non-standard English spelling and grammar. 
39 ‘Donno why also’ means ‘don’t know why it is the case’. - 95 - 
We definitely do NOT have any particular social or political agenda 
except maybe that Singaporeans should relac
41 one corner a bit more, try 
to respect alternative views and opinions more, and eat more fibre. 
So, all you nice ISD
42 people, please put away your microphones and 
night vision goggles and spend your time doing more important things 
like tend to your air-conditioners
43 (Goh 2001). 
This statement is placed at the end of a string of articles written about the site describing 
it as a political satire site. An almost identical one is included in the site’s own self-
description. The emphasis here, and the reference to the ISD, indicate that the people 
behind the site are keen to avoid being asked to register as a political site with the 
Registrar and face similar issues of self-censorship and liability as the old Sintercom 
had to confront. 
  The people behind the site, perhaps intentionally, omit to point out that some 
forms of humour are subversive. Indeed, a similar criticism raised by Au against Ng’s 
proposition earlier has at least a little validity here, that is, websites and humour act as a 
safety valve. They release the built-up conflict and tensions created in discursive 
processes and thus are often part of what is allowable within its confines. Yet, to stop at 
this would be to overlook the other operations of humour and satire. Freud analysed 
jokes and their roots in the unconscious. He suggests that some forms of jokes allow an 
assertion of the ego against repression and can be a form of rebellion against authority 
(Freud 1963). On a societal level, Henri Berson describes the implied community and 
power of laughter: 
[this was the] conspiratorial power of laughter, by which society avenges 
itself for the liberties taken with it …  The function of laughter is to 
intimidate by ridicule …  Laughter is always the laughter of a group; 
                                                                                                                                               
40 ‘Kiasu’: adjective, literally means in Hokkien, ‘scared to lose’ but used by Singaporeans to refer to: 
excessive keenness to take advantage of special advantages; observing regulations and conditions in 
excess of the requirements; or working to an extreme degree. This behaviour is deemed by Singaporeans 
to be typically Singaporean. Examples include: someone overloading a plate during a buffet 
(smorgasbord), a student preparing an assignment way in advance of the deadline, queuing up in the early 
hours of the morning to obtain a special discount, and so forth. 
41 ‘Relac’: ‘relax.’ 
42 ISD: ‘Internal Security Department’, Singapore’s version of ASIO or the FBI. 
43 Another reference to the claims of former political detainees that, while under questioning, they were 
doused with cold water and questioned in very cold air-conditioned rooms. - 96 - 
however spontaneous it seems, it always implies a kind of freemasonry, 
or even complicity, with other laughers, real or imaginary (1900 cited in 
Larsen 1980: 2). 
Likewise, Fletcher’s definition of satire emphasises the requisite sense of shared norms 
and understanding of the reality under ridicule: 
Satire, as the term is defined here, is verbal aggression in which some 
aspect of historical reality is exposed to ridicule. It is a mode of aesthetic 
expression that relates to historical reality, involves at least implied 
norms against which a target can be exposed as ridiculous, and demands 
the pre-existence or creation of shared comprehension and evaluation 
between satirist and audience (Fletcher 1987: ix). 
  In this sense, then, especially in Singapore’s authoritarian setting, with the tight 
controls on public communication, jokes release (and reveal on analysis) the thoughts, 
attitudes and ideas, that would otherwise remain unvoiced and suppressed. Jokes also 
rely on a sense of imagined community, a shared understanding of the patterns in 
society and aspects of historical reality that are being held to ridicule. 
While Talking Cock may not officially confine itself to political commentary, its 
jokes, varying in intensity and depth, are generally addressed to the prevailing 
discourses in Singaporean society, discourses which the state and other institutions play 
a large part in maintaining and propagating. The process of sharing jokes reinforces a 
sense of unity with the imagined others, and the Internet site heightens this by blurring 
the boundaries between private and public, mass and personal communication, between 
producers and consumers of meaning. The avenues for readers to contribute to the site 
(and access these contributions), either in the form of their own satirical pieces or 
feedback, strengthen this sense of shared community. Next to the link to each article is 
the total number of ‘reads’, that is, the total number of times the article has been 
accessed. This is not an accurate indicator of the number of people reading a particular 
article, the counter is triggered even if someone accesses the page more than once and 
does not keep track of the circulation of each article when it is forwarded by email or - 97 - 
shared in other ways beyond the website. However, some totals are over seven thousand 
giving a sense of a large unseen community of readers sharing the same material and, 
perhaps, with similar attitudes to the governing discourses in Singapore. 
Talking Cock’s content is organised into sections, for instance, there is a ‘News’ 
section, which includes subsections like the ‘Local News’, ‘International News’, regular 
columns like ‘Dear Ah Beng’, ‘Lim Peh Ka Li Kong’, and a ‘Features’ section, 
including the popular ‘Coxford Singlish Dictionary’. Each of these lead to current and 
past pieces: for instance, in the local news section, the reader can find articles with 
headlines like ‘Long Queues May be Due to Terrorists, ISA Warn’, ‘Master Teachers 
Demand Servant Teachers’, and, the article with the most ‘reads’, 7,667 at the time of 
access, ‘Top Ten Reasons why your NRIC
44 particulars are needed when you buy an EZ 
Link Card’. The following passage from an article by ‘Dan Kok’ and ‘Kway Png’, ‘ISD 
Museum a Hit’, is an example of the kind of humour and commentary that can be found 
in Talking Cock: 
  With the Heritage Centre, Mr Wong said, the ISD took a step towards 
demystifying its work.  
“So that the public will support our work, we have to let them see that 
what we do is crucial to the stability of our nation.”  
Mr. Wong then gestured to some security threatening artifacts [sic] such 
as political banners, chewing gum, and copies of Cosmopolitan 
magazine. 
As Larsen remarks, “[j]okes may not be able to topple a dictatorial regime; but 
there is one important point which adds to the effectiveness of political humour: the 
oppressors have no defence against it. If they try to fight back they appear only more 
ridiculous” (1980: 3). Talking Cock takes advantage of this, as is evident by the choice 
of name (‘talking nonsense’) and the site description, although its situation is more 
                                                 
44 The ‘NRIC’ is Singapore’s identity card, mandatory for all Singaporean citizens and permanent 
residents. It holds details such as one’s date of birth, thumbprint, and blood type, photograph, address, 
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complex. Larsen goes on to say, “Furthermore they cannot punish the perpetrator. … 
Since anti-authoritarian jokes exist mainly in the ephemeral element of the spoken word 
… the angry rulers would hit only the empty air if they lashed out at them.” The Internet 
itself may often be ephemeral in the sense that the content of websites change and move 
in a way that material printed on paper cannot. However, in comparison to the spoken, 
unrecorded word, websites can also be enduring and concrete, archiving material in a 
form that does not decay over time. As said earlier, Talking Cock concretises and 
publicises ideas and attitudes that used to circulate in a more transient and intangible 
form. However, there is no cause for concern for those involved with the website as 
long as the Singaporean Internet regulations remain the same because: the site has a 
policy that all contributors use pseudonyms; is owned by someone based overseas; and, 
is hosted on offshore servers. All these allow the site to record and keep its material in 
circulation whilst remaining out of reach of anyone that might want to bring them to 
order.  
In the process of discussing resistance and the Internet, due to economies of 
length and time, I have omitted a number of other sites like the Think Centre (which 
faced similar problems as Sintercom), Mr Brown (a satirical site which has not been 
updated for a while). This is, thus, not a comprehensive account of all Singaporean 
counter-discursive sites. My main aim is to show how resistance can work within the 
limits set by the state by employing some of the avenues offered by Internet technology. 
In this section, I have foreground the agency of some marginalised and suppressed 
groups within Singaporean society. The far reach and structure of the Internet network, 
the availability to locate and maintain websites offshore, the complicity of libertarian 
groups that make available Internet services for activist groups, the ability to conduct 
this work anonymously, these features allow some form of public questioning and 
undermining of the received social and political reality of Singaporean society. - 99 - 
4.5 Limitations 
The Internet facilitated the widening of the field of Singaporean public discourse and 
tested its limits. Nevertheless, the examples of sites of resistance sustained through the 
Internet are very limited in a number of ways. On their own, they do not point to wide 
and substantial social change and are modest in their scope. The use of satire, for 
instance, is powerful in the sense that it allows people to explore subjects and attitudes 
that would be inexpressible in a more candid form. Paradoxically, satire is limited for 
the same reason it is powerful: it undercuts its opponents but leaves them standing 
anyway. The humorists (and the forms and content of satire) who survive are the ones 
who are judged to be ultimately harmless, if occasionally close to the bone. 
Similarly, the hosting of these sites overseas, and the anonymity of some of their 
contributors and producers, in the same way limit while they liberate. The old 
Sintercom, for instance, was built on the premise that Singaporean society and its 
authorities could accommodate debate and critique within a site hosted locally and 
managed and owned by named citizens. Its demise and rebirth as New Sintercom, sited 
overseas and with anonymous participants, not only suggests that Singapore may not be 
ready for the ideals of civil society shared by its former members, it also defines the site 
as officially ‘outside’ and marginal. In other words, the forms of discussion and content 
on the site are marginalised rather than integrated into wider Singaporean society. 
  More generally, Au’s point about the Internet being an avenue to escape the 
exigencies and strictures of everyday life, rather than confront and attempt to change the 
social environment, tallies with Garry Rodan’s position on the dearth of Singaporean 
civil society. This is a result of the continued hold of the   
state on many facets of Singaporean life, including its political scene, administrative 
and justice system, economy, education, and society, ample reason for general apathy 
amongst the population. Amongst Internet users, while the networking, communication - 100 - 
and exploration of marginal and resistant discourses is a step towards reform, this has 
limited effect if it stops short of changing oppressive institutional practices and 
discourses. 
One case in point is the arrest of Robert Ho, a former journalist turned activist. 
Ho posted articles under a pseudonym to soc.culture.singapore and SFD alleging that PAP 
government politicians breached election laws by banning people from lingering within 
two hundred metres of polling stations. He urged people, including opposition 
politicians, to lodge a protest by doing the same during the current elections. Facing a 
maximum penalty of three years in jail if convicted of the charge of inciting civil 
disobedience and violence, Ho’s charges were dropped when his wife agreed to send 
him for outpatient psychiatric treatment. The panoptic effect is evident: firstly, the 
authorities were able to identify the poster of these articles (the SFD allege that Ho’s 
account was monitored), and, secondly, Ho’s call for action failed in that there are no 
accounts of people entering polling stations illegally (Morris 2001). 
  Finally, while the proportion of Internet users in Singapore is sizeable (see 
figures quoted earlier), this is still a group of relatively privileged, well educated, 
predominantly English-speaking, and mainly male, users. How much do these sites of 
resistance reflect the interests of the upper-middle and upper classes, not least in that 
they are often run by members of these classes, neglecting the welfare of those less 
privileged? One hardly finds, for instance, criticism of the state’s paternalistic policies, 
and, Talking Cock, in dealing with the topic of ‘foreign maids’ tends to focus on the 
materialism and selfishness of Singaporeans, and pay relatively less attention to the 
poor working conditions and treatment of ‘foreign maids’, notably employed by the 
upper-middle classes and above. A common problem with liberal discourse in general, 
such blind spots exist in the areas of resistance on the Singapore Internet. - 101 - 
5. Conclusion 
The Singapore case illustrates the limits of both the (libertarian) Internet and state 
discourses, in the ‘truths’ they propagate about the Internet and in their positioning as 
opposing, separate discourses. The ‘light touch’ policy, in its inclusion of industry 
consultation and in advocating self-regulation, recruits the libertarian discourses of the 
Internet for the ends of the state and its institutions. To a certain extent, too, discourses 
surrounding cyberspace that affirm its potential as a place which transcends national and 
cultural limits, without attendant wider social change, mask fundamental problems in 
society. 
  On the other hand, the existence of sites like SFD, Singaporeans for Democracy 
and so forth demonstrate the possibilities for resistance, even within the regulatory 
environment introduced since 1996.  These are, to a large measure, enabled by the 
technologies of the Internet. However, they are also aided by the very libertarian 
discourses that are behind overseas organisations providing services such as free or low 
cost Internet services to activists, discourses that provide the vocabulary and ideas 
inspiring these people and groups. Practices like the use of pseudonyms and other 
techniques to hide the identities of producers and contributors and the use of multiple 
methods of distribution and participation (e.g. newsgroups, email, websites, IRC chat, 
and web forums) are drawn from established Internet culture. Through these methods, 
Singaporeans are now able to explore ideas that were previously out of reach or 
dangerous, to investigate outside the margins of the dominant, state-sanctioned, 
discourse, and even establish virtual communities and networks in these 
neighbourhoods, rather than keep within the ones approved by the authorities. 
  These forms of resistance are, however, limited, as long as the economic, legal, 
social and political frameworks that maintain the wider pervasive discourses remain in 
place. However popular they may become, they are still marginal discourses, and still - 102 - 
remain inadmissible, to be hidden from the local non-Internet public spaces. In addition, 
the Internet’s lauded ability to sidestep regulation is cannot be taken for granted and, 
indeed, in the case of Singapore, in the face of other cultural regulation, can be reduced 
in its influence. In the face of ongoing discussions of global and regional agreements on 
cyberspace regulation, copyright battles between corporations over P2P file sharing, the 
dismantling of anonymous email services like anon.penet.fi, and other developments, 
statements on the supposedly integral features of the Internet can no longer be made 
with as much confidence as before. This is more so after the 11 September terrorist 
attacks and the current climate prioritising security over privacy and the rights of 
individuals. 
This chapter has focussed on the context of state agency and regulation in 
discussing the alteration, maintenance, and resistance to, the national discourses on the 
Internet. The next chapter pays closer attention to how dominant discourses interpellate 
and structure the interaction of Usenet participants, overriding claims that Internet users 
are freed from the positioning and forms of subjectivity that occurs through visual (and 
other) markers of identity. 
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Subject: Asians don't stink, but their culture sure does. 
From: 100351.3267@compuserve.com (Alan Peyton-Smith) 
Date: 1996/10/23 
Message-Id: <54k7ke$j7t@reader1.reader.news.ozemail.net> 
Newsgroups: aus.politics,soc.culture.australian,soc.culture.hongkong,soc.cultu
re.china,soc.culture.taiwan,soc.culture.japan,soc.culture.korean,soc.culture.m
alaysia,soc.culture.singapore,soc.culture.asean,soc.culture.thailand,soc.cultu
re.indonesia 
Reality time, folks. 
It's not that Asians are ugly and they smell, that's got Pauline Hanson and 
most Australians woried, because they aren't, and they don't. 
They aren't ugly, and they don't smell.  
But I tell you what, there are certain aspects of their culture which are both 
ugly and smelly. 
Since WWII, it seems that Asian countries, especially Japan, have  done a 
magnificent job of "catching up" with the technology-based Western 
civilization. Largely, they've done it by becoming great  imitators. 
Well, not quite. They've done a great job of imitating the very *worst* 
aspects of Western civilization, such as rape-the-earth-and-exploit-the-
workers feral capitalism. Oh yes, they have surpassed their teachers in that. 
But what about the more *meritorious* aspects of our culture, such as 
presumption of innocence, fair trials, freedom of speech, human rights, 
democracy, accountability of public officials, seperation of church and state, 
protection of minorities, prevention of police brutality, freedom of the 
press, freedom of religion, etc etc?  
Some Asian countries pay lip service to one or two of these ideals, but it 
seems to me that they do so with a singular lack of enthusiasm. 
But not all Asian countries are backward and brutal, so they tell me. Our 
closest neighbour, Indonesia, is, they tell me, one of the more enlightened 
Asian cultures. You gotta be kidding. This is the country that will not allow 
Megawati's pro-democracy movement to exist. In Indonesia right now, the 
Moslems are burning Chinese houses of worship. And how can we forget the 2 
decades of holocaust in East Timor? While the average Indonesian citizen just 
sits there and  allows it all to go on. 
If that country and its people are being put forward as examples of the most 
enlightened Asian culture, THEN GOD HELP US, WHAT MUST SOME OF THE OTHERS BE 
LIKE?? Why would any intelligent Australian want our culture polluted by that 
type of culture? 
But, we accept immigrants from some of these countries. Come to Australia, we 
say. We won't force you to leave you barking-mad religion and culture behind, 
we don't care how barking mad it is. Oh no. We have multiculturalism, we want 
you to *keep* your barking-mad culture and religion alive, we will *PAY YOU* 
to keep your barking-mad culture and religion alive!! 
Pauline Hanson has never said that she's worried about the colour of anyone's 
skin. No. It's their culture, and their religion. 
"They have their own culture and religion, form ghettos and do not 
assimilate." 
Pauline Hanson is right. I believe we must preserve our culture at all costs. 
It is worth preserving 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
"He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from 
oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will 
reach to himself.” -- Thomas Paine ('Alan Peyton-Smith' 1996a: n.p.) 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Look! A Racist: Fanon and  
the Racial Politics of Flaming 
1. Introduction 
Our cultures are pretty much alike, according to your definition of 
culture anyway. The only things which differs from [sic] you and me is 
my skin colour and the colour of my hair, and that is the reason why you 
don't want Asians here ('Core' 1996).
1 
“Asians don’t stink, but [sic] their culture sure does!” This is one of the messages in a 
flame thread on Usenet
2 that caught my eye when undertaking the pilot research for this 
chapter (a transcript of the first post appears above). I was surveying the range of 
messages explicitly about race on Usenet, and especially the phenomenon of flaming 
and the part it plays in race relations on Usenet. After a year following flames in the 
soc.culture.singapore and soc.culture.australian newsgroups, I selected this thread 
because it began with a post presenting itself as supportive of the views of independent 
Member of Parliament, Pauline Hanson, the subject of controversy at the time I was 
collecting data for this chapter.
3 In addition, the subject title itself is a totalising and 
                                                 
1 Punctuation, spelling, and grammatical mistakes are commonplace on the Internet, particularly in 
Usenet and Chat messages and I will be refraining from acknowledging individual instances. For ease of 
reading, I have occasionally reformatted lines and trimmed off extra line spaces. Where I have retained 
the errors of the original source, I usually indicate this by inserting ‘sic’ or ‘as in original’ in the 
parenthetical reference. Analysis of the form of Usenet messages have been exhaustively done elsewhere, 
and are not the main focus of this paper, although it should be noted that ‘looking’ in Usenet also 
includes the way messages are presented. For instance, a poster that uses all capitals in their message is 
looked upon as a ‘newbie’, someone who is too lazy to type upper and lower case and is unaware of the 
‘netiquette’ that using uppercase is rude and constitutes shouting. 
2 Usenet newsgroups are akin to notice boards, anyone can put up a message and that message is 
available for anyone that comes across it to read, except that they exist as databases. A useful document 
defining Usenet has been compiled by various authors and posted regularly on Usenet itself, copies are 
also kept at web sites (Salzenberg, Spafford et al. 1994). ‘Flames’ are a slang term for replies on Usenet 
or email distribution lists using inflammatory and highly insulting language in order to hurt (burn) the 
other person.  
3 Pauline Hanson entered Australian national politics as a member of the Liberal Party and was 
disendorsed by the party because her views on Asian migration and Aboriginal people were considered 
so racist and right-wing as to potentially damage its image. She formed her own party, One Nation, and, 
for a time during the late 1990s and into the early 2000s, her and her party were prominent in media 
reports and the national consciousness.   - 106 - 
homogenising statement, inviting and provoking comment. It makes a distinction 
between the body and culture using a verb that itself, describing an olfactory 
characteristic, is very ‘bodily-oriented’. 
This study of the Usenet newsgroup thread has the following purpose: to analyse 
in detail the issue of visual difference and the margins of debate in Usenet postings 
about race. In this chapter, I ask: what are the differences and convergences between the 
visual image and the written text, and, more specifically, between the encounter on the 
street and the encounter on the Usenet newsgroups? What power relations are 
implicated in the Usenet encounter and processes of racialisation? 
  Perhaps the so-called ‘information age’ has magnified the global circulation of 
racial and cultural stereotypes that objectify and limit those positioned in the margins of 
discourse. The reverse of this is that we could be at the threshold of an age of dissolving 
centres, where those previously at the margins of discourse can finally participate 
unfettered in constructing meanings. This chapter addresses these questions through an 
examination of how the racialised ‘other’ may be objectified and denied full subjectivity 
when ‘looked’ at by the self, and, how the latter achieves their own subjectivity in the 
process. The possibility that these relations may be altered (perhaps not for the better) 
with the advent of new modes of discourse using new technologies is discussed. Hence, 
I consider the question of identity on the Internet; the claims of invisibility on the 
Internet are examined using ideas from Fanon’s Black Skin White Masks (1970) and 
through the case study of ‘flaming’ on Usenet newsgroups. 
1.1 Visuality 
The idea of invisibility, that is, the notion of “On the Internet, no one knows you’re a 
dog,”
4 is often seen as one of the reasons for the phenomenon of flaming and 
                                                 
4 This originated from a famous cartoon of a dog facing a computer screen and keyboard saying this to 
another dog.   - 107 - 
experimenting with identity on the Internet. The customary delineation of the visual and 
the written word from each other forms the basis of this assumption of invisibility, and 
is a binary I contest. For, amongst other things, ‘invisibility’ forms the basis of the 
claim that the medium of the Internet allows the participation of those from the 
periphery for the first time without the danger of prejudice. Invisibility in Usenet 
encounters is presumed (but is challenged in this chapter) because of the mediation of 
the written word and the possibility of masquerade and anonymity. For example, one 
participant, accused of belonging to a culture that produces racists, responds: 
You fail to see such a simple argument and instead have now criticised 
my culture without even knowing my background. You obviously 
assume I am Australian. Well, I'm not! Wouldn't it be interesting if I was 
from the same cultural background as you? You would then have 
attacked your own culture ('Car Son' 1996). 
In Usenet, identity cannot be ascribed by appearance; the bodily identifiers people 
depend on to position others are supposedly stripped away, allowing tactics like the 
above, where one can play with one’s identification and gain power in so doing. 
Whether this necessarily empowers marginalised people is another point. In apparent 
contrast, Fanon identifies the visual encounter between self and other as a process of 
violent inscription: the body of the other is fixed in the gaze of the white discourse, the 
‘I’ of the colonialised subject becomes othered. Fanon says: “I am given no chance. I 
am overdetermined from without. I am the slave not the ‘idea’ that others have of me 
but of my own appearance” (1970: 82). 
Fanon’s thought applies to more than just a physical encounter with the racial 
other and discursive constructs like race do not vanish in the advent of a new 
technology. Even without recourse to a visible, epidermal difference, there still exists 
systems of positioning subjects in the discourses used, maintained and negotiated in 
society at large, and thereby, the Internet. For instance, a person’s sanity (or lack   - 108 - 
thereof) is defined through a variety of exhibited behaviours and responses. H the 
person is treated depends on the diagnosis, not just within the medical field, but in the 
legal system, and by their relatives and friends.  
  Fanon uses a semi-autobiographical mode of writing to illustrate the process of 
objectification; he speaks of his entry as a subject in search of meaning and explanation,  
“I came into the world imbued with the will to find a meaning in things, my spirit filled 
with the desire to attain to the source of the world…” (1970: 77). However, instead of 
remaining a subject, he is inscribed as an object, “and then I found that I was an object 
in the midst of other objects.” Fanon is writing about how the body of the black man is 
inscribed by the gaze of the white self and thereupon fragments, unable to sustain itself, 
“I burst apart. Now the fragments have been put together again by another self”. The 
colonised other is denied full subjectivity and instead is an object; in contrast, the 
coloniser not only gains wholeness but his or her race is not prioritised as the main 
means of identification. 
Fanon is identifying a problematic that is encountered in the way the periphery 
is returning to the metropolis, the movement of people from the ex-colonies to the 
colonising centres. These developments entail the physical encounter of the other not 
only in the peripheries, but also within the metropoles, hence, the encounter of the 
imperial gaze and definition of oneself as an other. He says experiencing oneself as 
other happens in encounters with those of a ‘different race.’ 
Fanon’s thought is an amalgamation of ideas. Stuart Hall describes Fanon as 
being engaged in a three-way dialogue with psychoanalysis, Hegel, and Sartre (1996). 
From psychoanalysis, Fanon adopts Lacan’s mirror phase: the mirror phase’s 
recognition of lack that triggers the fissuring of the subject is applied to the relationship 
between the coloniser and the colonised. Hence, the separation of self from the other 
and subject from object has its roots in Lacanian psychoanalysis.   - 109 - 
This self-other problematic is also an echo of Hegel’s description of the master-
slave dialectic in which the self defines itself in relation to the other and, in the process, 
marginalises the other. Hegel suggests that: 
Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come 
out of itself. This has a twofold significance: first, it has lost itself, for it 
finds itself as an other being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the 
other, for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other 
sees its own self (Hegel 1977). 
Hegel’s view of subjectivity as dependent upon the demarcation of a self from an other 
forms the basis of Fanon’s existentialist angst, wherein the colonised other is split by 
the gaze of the colonial self. 
  Finally, even this deployment of Hegel is mediated by Sartrean existentialism, 
which involves a violent possession of oneself by the other. In existing for others, one is 
emptied out and one’s being is mastered. According to Sartre, “the Other is for me 
simultaneously the one who has stolen my body from me and the one who causes there 
to be a being which is my being” (‘me’ being the subject) (Sartre in Hall 1996: 29). 
On the Internet, such collisions between subjects are more frequent, because of 
the compression of time and space that accompanies such globalising media.
5 The 
question addressed here is how different can these electronically-mediated encounters 
be from the physical one that Fanon writes about, for Fanon focuses on the look, on the 
visibility of his difference. The distinction is not so clean – just as discourse regulates 
physical encounters and interpellates subjects, so does it likewise affect the textual
6 
domain of the Internet, particularly in Usenet newsgroups, and racial identification 
occurs in a different mode from the visual marker of skin colour. 
                                                 
5 While there is a time lag when retrieving data from remote servers, still there is a sense that one is 
‘visiting’ a location in space without actually moving − that space in between the locations appears 
compressed. I would hesitate to claim that this means that spatial distances and geographical locations do 
not matter. Access and speed of information flow are not equally available to all. 
6  Here, the word, ‘textual,’ is used to refer to writing, not to cultural texts, that is, units of meaning 
formed from the interaction of audience and signifiers and inclusive of pictures, sounds, and anything 
that is capable of conveying meaning.   - 110 - 
1.2 Fragmentation of the Subject: Cyberspace 
Fanon’s preoccupation with how black people are judged on their skin colour highlights 
the exteriority of the mode of identification he writes about. The subject’s entry into the 
interactive
7 space of the Internet is similar in that the subject negotiates the encounter 
with the perception of oneself as ‘an-other’ being. However, this process of 
identification is complicated by the apparent feature of the Usenet newsgroups where 
one can not only post freely, but can choose how to identify oneself
8 without the 
exterior identifier of skin colour. Features like this lead authors like Sherry Turkle to 
declare that: 
In cyberspace, we can talk, exchange ideas, and assume personae of our 
own creation. We have the opportunity to build new kinds of 
communities, virtual communities in which we participate with people 
from all over the world, people with whom we converse daily, people 
with whom we may have fairly intimate relationships but whom we may 
never physically meet (Turkle 1995: 9-10). 
Turkle’s work is based on her study of multiuser domains (MUDs), which differ from 
Usenet in that MUDs are a form of simultaneous communication; a kind of virtual reality 
where one can ‘enter’ as a character, create ‘objects’, and interact with other users 
logged on at the same time, all through written description or sometimes graphics. 
However, it is possible to identify common tropes in Usenet, including the absence of 
the physical signifier of the body permitting the construction of identity via written text. 
Performing the self in the form of written text facilitates the notion of the 
decentered, multiple and non-unitary self. This is partly a result of the way personal 
computer operating systems have developed, particularly ‘windows’, first seen in the 
Macintosh operating system and then Microsoft’s Windows software. According to 
                                                 
7 The space of the Internet as interactive in the sense that a person can place a message which many can 
read. The ‘audience’ are also potentially producers of messages in reply, communication is not one way 
but possibly multi-directional. In such a space, one’s identification by other users returns upon oneself 
and contributes to one’s articulation of identity. 
8 It is possible to ‘spoof’ (i.e., mimic) the email address from which one is posting and hence make it 
difficult for others to identify where one is from. Even so, the domain from whence one is posting does 
not correspond to race or nationality, although people sometimes make this assumption.   - 111 - 
Turkle, windows “have become a powerful metaphor for thinking about the self as a 
multiple, distributed system” (1995: 14). She writes of different windows as metaphors 
of different user selves distributed across the windows, one window for work-related 
files, another for home or personal interests, and so on, all these selves operating 
simultaneously on the screen.  
Windows enables the display of ‘spaces’ containing different priorities, aspects 
of the self and their everyday life. On Usenet, using either a browser or software 
developed specifically for newsgroups, it is possible to read, post, and jump between 
channels, displaying them at the same time (size of screen and design of software 
permitting) in multiple windows. The organisation of Usenet into different newsgroups 
encourages the impression of partial publics devoted to specific topics or interests; this, 
combined with windows, enables one user to potentially read and participate in different 
newsgroups. This environment also erases certainty of who is actually reading, whether 
some of the audience has actually ‘encountered’ one’s musings in other newsgroups as 
well. Moreover, the availability of anonymous ‘remailers’ and email forwarding 
services ensures that the identification of the user through their email address, and the 
path their post has taken to arrive at the newsgroup, is not always reliable. 
The online multiplicity of self may seem to echo Fanon’s description of the 
violent destruction of the unitary subject, and subsequent reconstitution in the 
epistemology of the white subject. The advent of the Internet takes this “decentered”, 
“fluid,” “nonlinear” and “opaque” self into play with other people, complicating further 
the issues at hand (Turkle 1995: 17). Turkle says: 
In my computer-mediated worlds, the self is multiple, fluid, and 
constituted in interaction with machine connections; it is made and 
transformed by language; sexual congress is an exchange of signifiers; 
and understanding follows from navigation and tinkering rather than 
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Here, Turkle is writing about the constitution of identity in the manipulation of 
signifiers, but hers is an autonomous self that is in control of its subjectivity − the 
cognitive perception of oneself (multiple or otherwise) mirrored directly in one’s online 
performance of identity. In contrast, Fanon’s subject, who has been pulverised and 
reconstituted by its encounter with the colonial gaze, is stripped of such autonomy and 
power. 
Is ‘the look’ totally absent in a written medium? In the first place, the distinction 
between the visual and the verbal is a problematic one. This division between writing 
and images is destabilised by Mitchell, who decries what he perceives as a gap in 
knowledge about images, for instance, their effects upon the audience and everyday 
reality, how to engage with them in practice, and how to make sense of their history 
(1994). He cites Rorty’s description of the history of philosophy as consisting of a 
progression of ‘turns’ where old issues are supplanted by new ones as they dissipate. 
Whilst Rorty’s chronology ended with the linguistic turn, Mitchell points out that we 
have entered the age of the “pictorial turn” (1994: 11), “an age of ‘spectacle’ (Guy 
Debord), ‘surveillance’ (Foucault), and all pervasive image-making” (Mitchell 
1994: 13). Ambivalence, fear and fetishisation of images is not new, what is particular 
to our times, to Mitchell, is the advent of technology that makes the possibility of 
entirely an image-driven culture realisable globally, thus we have a pictorial turn. 
  A problem for analysis, in the age of the pictorial turn, is the foundational role 
played by linguistic concepts to the analysis of cultural text, and the possible 
inadequacy of such textual analysis (as developed via linguistics) to satisfactorily 
explain the audience’s relationship to images. Mimetic, representational or semiotic 
approaches cannot explain the image as a “complex interplay between visuality, 
apparatus, institutions, discourse, bodies, and figurality” (Mitchell 1994: 16). As 
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the pictorial turn: 
is the realization that spectatorship (the look, the gaze, the glance, the 
practices of observation, surveillance, and visual pleasure) may be as 
deep a problem as various forms of reading (decipherment, decoding, 
interpretation, etc.) and that visual experience or ‘visual literacy’ might 
not be fully explicable on the model of textuality (1994: 16). 
This returns to Fanon’s conceptualisation of the ‘look’. Here, Mitchell suggests the 
spectatorship of ‘the look’ needs as much depth of analysis as reading. I also argue that 
Mitchell introduces the idea that it may be possible to observe ‘the look’ occurring in 
written texts. In other words, the inscription of the colonising gaze is not confined to 
physical encounters based on vision but also possible in writing. 
Homi Bhabha provides an instance where the look is overturned in a literary text 
(1994). In Bhabha’s concept of the “Invisible Eye/I”,
9 there is a space where the 
objectified other can subvert its objectification. Subjectivity is achieved at a cost, not 
only to the objectified self, but also in terms of the instability of the identification. The 
over-inscribed self has the potential to threaten the very being of the metropolitan self. 
Outside the frame imposed upon the other lies a self that is unseen, what Bhabha calls 
the “invisible eye” (1994: 46). In his analysis of Jin’s poem, ‘Strangers on a Hostile 
Landscape’,
10 Bhabha uses the notion of the eye that escapes vision, that returns to 
‘haunt’ the coloniser, the totalising gaze is returned “an anxious absence, a counter-gaze 
that turns the discriminatory look, which denies … cultural and sexual difference, back 
on itself” (1994: 47). In his view, this is possible through writing, which allows the 
                                                 
9 The invisible eye/I  is an idea suggested to Bhabha through his analysis of Jin’s poem, “Strangers On a 
Hostile Landscape” (Bhabha 1994). 
10  One day I learnt 
  a secret art, 
  Invisible-Ness, it was called. 
  I think it worked 
  as even now you look 
  but never see me… 
  Only my eyes will remain to watch and to haunt 
  and to turn your dreams 
  to chaos (Bhabha 1994: 46)   - 114 - 
questioning of the frame and the performance of this gap between presence and 
absence, visible and invisible. Thus I reach the problematic of this chapter: what the 
differences and convergences are between the visual image and the written text, and, 
more specifically, between the encounter on the street and the encounter on the Usenet 
newsgroups. What power relations are implicated in the Usenet encounter and processes 
of racialisation? 
2. The First Post 
The thread begins with the first message appearing on several soc.culture newsgroups, 
apparently from Alan Peyton-Smith (hereafter APS), with the subject header, “Asians 
Don’t Stink, But Their Culture Sure Does” (see Transcript 1: The First Post, Page 104). 
Such Usenet encounters are affected by the undeciderability of identity and, at the same 
time, the relative ease with which it is possible to track the online presence of the other. 
Identity on the Internet is partial and undeciderable because what we see online may not 
be what we get offline. Consequently, this study of Usenet raises questions as to how 
we have valorised certain aspects of the self, namely, the body, in defining ‘authentic’ 
identity. This may seem in keeping with the assumption that Internet technologies 
provide a disembodied space in which multiple subjectivities become possible 
(Featherstone and Burrows 1995). 
The line between the body and the online self may not be so clearly demarcated, 
though. In terms of racial politics on Usenet, the posts demonstrate how neo-
conservatism, while abandoning genetic accounts of inequality, have not yet discarded 
an ethnocentric and evolutionary model of different cultures. Body and culture become 
conflated in the latter, where, instead of criticising the body of the racial other, the 
other’s culture is attacked. In short, the impurities and deficiencies of the body of the 
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depended for colonial expansion still remain, albeit with greater instabilities and 
vulnerabilities. 
2.1 Uncertainty of Identification 
Unlike an encounter on the street, we are able to piece together some information about 
this person from the traces they leave online. So how does one construct APS’s identity 
from this post? First, acknowledging that the user name given may be a pseudonym, one 
can check the headers in the message. In the ‘From:’ field, we have this person’s email 
address, which we can use to find out more, that is, through the ‘fingering’ that is, a 
command issued through the network such as “finger 100351.3267@compuserve.com.” 
This is used to returned information like the users’ account name, and the last time they 
logged on, optionally also including information stored on the user’s directory on the 
provider’s server in a file called ‘.plan’. These days, though, this function has been 
disabled by most Internet service providers as a potential security hole and privacy 
threat, so, in this case, the command now returns, “[compuserve.com] connect: 
Connection refused”. Even if this was not the case, as mentioned earlier, it is possible to 
set up an account with an Internet service provider with a pseudonym and a matching 
“.plan” file, or an email forwarding account with a customised domain and username.  
A lengthy search through various web search engines, ‘people locators’ and 
other similar resources returned nothing on APS or their exact email address, when the 
search was broadened, the list returned was large and included other Compuserve email 
addresses as well. Again, a degree of user choice enters the equation, the trace we leave 
on the Internet depends on the online information we put up and the information we 
provide to a degree. APS could easily set up web pages under a different name and email 
address on a different domain. APS could be from anywhere (with email access) and of 
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person could locate APS. While people tend to accept the identities provided in messages 
and headers, unless they are given cause to doubt them, positioning is not as direct and 
immediate as a glance on a street. 
Disputes over posters’ identities are a common trope in this thread (and Usenet 
in general), ‘WoodStock’, for example, posts a reply to APS’s message: “More racist shit 
from disgruntle American because his job is lost to a superior Asian” ('Woodstock' 
1996: n.p.). The newsgroup thread receives this rejoinder the next day, “Hey, Peyton-
Smith is NOT ONE of us! He’s Australian” ('Dave Johnston' 1996: n.p.). A move to 
situate APS as yet another retrenched American has been thwarted, and WoodStock is 
forced to concede: “Ooops, that racist bastard is a disgruntle downunder boy … my 
mistake [sic].” Of course, APS may not be either Australian or American – both 
participants are relying on online evidence and there are ways in which one can post 
apparently from an email account in Australia while actually being elsewhere. So even a 
look at the path the message has taken through different servers may not be indicative 
of the location of the computer the message was posted from, not that location of a 
person is necessarily indicative of their cultural affiliations or nationality anyway. 
2.2 The Archive Search 
What yielded some results, however, was using web search facilities available for a 
Usenet archive called Deja News, which Google, groups.google.com, has taken over 
since the time of this research. While archives of Usenet newsgroups have long been in 
existence, they used to be very selective in terms of which newsgroups are archived and 
files were usually obtained via ‘File Transfer Protocol’ (FTP). Google archives most of 
the public newsgroups and is easy to use because searching is via web forms. More 
significantly, it is now possible to search for all the posts archived from a particular 
email address in the headers, or particular patterns of letters and words. Google   - 117 - 
simplifies things further: using their author profile service, we discover that 
‘100351.3267@compuserve.com’ has posted 1,556 articles. The majority of these 
articles were posted to aus.politics (1,391), with forty-seven messages to 
soc.culture.australian, forty-five to aus.legal, thirty-six to aus.general, the rest of the 
figure made up by miscellaneous postings to newsgroups like soc.religion.islam, 
can.politics, and so on. 
  Interestingly enough, of all the postings archived by Google from this email 
address, five, between 5 to 8 November 1996, appear under the name of ‘Nelson’. 
Notably, both pseudonyms, ‘Alan Peyton-Smith’ and ‘Nelson,’ signify an English 
heritage, suggesting a strong identification with the Anglo-Saxon (or Anglo-Celtic) 
culture that many consider as the core of Australian national culture. Whoever this is, 
100351.3267@compuserve.com seems to be consistently interested in racial politics: 
There seems to be some question in recent public debates on whether 
some Australians are 'disadvantaged' as a result of their race. How can 
there be any doubt? Consider the following: 
* A few weeks ago there was an (ATSIC) election in this country where 
most Australians were ineligible to stand or vote based on their race. 
* There are large areas of this country that are 'out of bounds' to the 
majority of  the population, and even if  restricted access is approved, the 
members of the non-referred race are obliged to carry an identity card & 
authorisation permit.  
* Past and present governments in this country oppose assimilation and 
endorse multiculturalism within the Australian population.  
* Current federal 'Affirmative Action' legislation purposely racially 
discriminates against the majority of the Australian population, and 
allows for a range of special and exclusive privileges to be assigned to 
minority races.  
The majority of the population is therefore disenfranchised, restricted in 
movement, segregated and disadvantaged by government legislation. In 
Australia these policies are known as "Political Correctness". In South 
Africa similar policies were known as the pillars of Apartheid. Has 
somebody changed the definition of racism recently ('Nelson' 1996)?
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This message is consistent with the views of Pauline Hanson and those later expressed 
under the APS pseudonym. This email address appears again on 15 November the same 
year, in a different newsgroup, this time without any name attached, in a thread about 
Michael Jackson’s first child: 
Oops! I have just stuffed up the Internet!!! This is the first time I have 
been on the Internet and I have just erased somebody elses point of 
view!! Oh Dear!! The shame of it all ('Re: Ack!!! Michael jackson to 
become a daddy!' 1996). 
In this instance, the participant claims to be posting for the first time, but the earliest 
post via 100351.3267@compuserve.com was in May 1996, addressing the issue of gun 
control in Australia. In 1996, Australia introduced a voluntary gun return scheme in 
which the government guaranteed to pay for the guns. This was after a killing spree in 
Tasmania by lone gun holder. The poster agrees with a suggestion that the guns should 
be tendered off to exporters, but, he adds, ideally to countries where guns are not legal. 
He reasons that it is in these countries that the people need protection from the state: 
…From Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, governments are perpetrating the 
most horrendous tortures on their UNARMED citizenry, their DISARMED 
citizenry. There is no way they would be allowed to commit these 
barbaric atrocities if their citizenry was armed. NO way!! Let me detail 
some of the atrocities that are happening… 
Afghanistan, beatings with electric shock batons. Bangladesh, prolonged 
beatings resulting in fractured limbs, systematic rape of prisoners. 
Bolivia, electric shocks administered to mouth, breasts, genitals, 
prisoners forced to suspend themselves horizontally between two chairs 
supported by only their tips of their toes and their head, if they fall, they 
are savagely beaten.. [sic] Chile, beatings and electric shocks 
administered to head, mouth, genitals while chained to a metal bed ("the 
electric grill", they call it..) Peru, severe beatings, electric shock, hooding 
for long periods,prisoner's hands handcuffed behind his or her back, and 
are then hauled up to the ceiling by a rope tied to the handcuffs..  This 
book goes on and on, pages of this stuff, sickening ('Alan Peyton-Smith' 
1996b: n.p., punctuation and spacing as in original). 
  Of the 217 messages in this thread, sixty-two are posted by 
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twenty-nine percent of the posts originating from the same email address. Someone 
begins to notice the high frequency and large volume of posting and ask how could one 
person manage to send so many replies over two months: “Hmm ever notice that it 
would seem like one guy (you) vs 10+ other posters? I'm surprised that you actually had 
the time to reply to almost everyone [sic]” ('Voxel' 1996). 
2.3 The Encounter 
People would not normally read newsgroups using archives like Google, although 
habits have altered somewhat,
11 and this would not be the way they would have seen 
and read the ‘Asians don’t stink’ thread. Usenet news software enable users to set 
customised filters to select which posts they see based on word patterns in the message 
headers and body. Threads about race are commonplace in soc.culture newsgroups, and 
people who are tired of seeing them develop filters, like filtering out all references to 
‘Asians’ or ‘whites’ in the subject headers, to prevent their newsreader from retrieving 
these messages. In my research, the opposite was done: instead, filters were devised to 
retrieve all references to ‘race’, ‘culture’, ‘Asians’, and ‘whites’. Therefore, unless one 
is using software without filters, or has not developed the technical expertise to set 
filters, quite likely the people who see these threads are either not bothered by them, 
actually interested in them, or simply new to Usenet practices. 
Usenet readers have different patterns of use that affect the way they encounter 
messages. Some may subscribe to several newsgroups, others may be more selective 
and read only a few newsgroups. While some read a newsgroup regularly over a year, 
some may subscribe and unsubscribe to different newsgroups rapidly. Therefore, some 
readers and respondents may be familiar with the posts from this particular individual, 
some would have seen this one for the first time. The development of this thread 
                                                 
11 The ability of browsers to display news article combined the availability of search engines on web 
pages that allow a great deal of selectivity and complex search operators and sorting criteria present an 
attractive alternative to traditional Usenet news software.   - 120 - 
increases the uncertainty of who is reading: since the message was cross-posted to 
twelve different newsgroups,
12 several different threads started to run concurrently, as 
replies often trimmed off the list of newsgroups, following the netiquette of not posting 
to too many newsgroups. 
Advice to new users on Usenet, IRC and Chat always cautions against 
immediately participating, rather, to ‘lurk’ for a while and familiarise themselves with 
the subculture in each newsgroup and chat area. Not only are there questions that are 
asked so regularly and repeatedly that asking it may result in the poster being flamed, 
but also there is always the chance that the poster is a ‘troll’, and the message 
‘flamebait’. The last two terms mean that the person posting (troll) sends messages 
designed to provoke a heated response (‘flamebait’). It is often inevitable that a 
medium-sized thread like this eventually includes comments like the following: 
[Quoting  APS:] These people are barking mad, and no self-appointed 
enlightened ivory-tower Leftist pseudo-intellectual is going to tell me 
otherwise. 
That sounds an awful lot like bait. Someone pass the burley. :) ('Greg 
Breen' 1996, as in original). 
Comments such as these reflect another form of ‘looking:’ explicitly naming a post and 
poster as belonging to a certain type or category in Usenet communications. These 
responses are highly political in the sense that they reduce the meanings of the text to 
the level of surface, disguising it as something quite harmless, in fact mundane. They 
legitimate the Usenet metanarrative of freedom of speech, are an attempt to rob the 
poster of the glory of initiating a long thread, and lastly, mock those gullible enough to 
fall for the trap. 
                                                 
12 The first message was cross-posted to the following newsgroups:  aus.politics, soc.culture.australian, 
soc.culture.hongkong, soc.culture.china, soc.culture.taiwan, soc.culture.japan, soc.culture.korean, 
soc.culture.malaysia, soc.culture.singapore, soc.culture.asean, soc.culture.thailand, soc.culture.Indonesia.   - 121 - 
  APS himself appropriates this role for his own political manoeuvre, one aspect, 
that is, the humiliation of the flamers, is exploited by his adoption of the ‘troll’ label, 
“To be honest, it was a gross over-simplification of my true opinions, I phrased that 
way in order to set a trap. Two people have wandered into it, but the one I wanted was 
smart enough to avoid it. Oh well. Say Lah Vee [sic]” ('Alan Peyton-Smith' 1996a).  
Flame threads often have the thrust-counter-thrust movement of a duel and this move is 
received with scorn. Tse Ka Chun replies on the same day: 
I am not going to argue about every little word that you've said, 
especially since I've disposed of your mail dating from a week ago in 
never, never land. If you say something to some effect, and then someone 
is supposed to fall into the trap of pointing that out without quoting your 
every utterance, then I think that's a pretty silly trap you have (1996). 
The attempt by APS to score a victory is overturned by Tse, who derides the worth of his 
feint. 
2.4 Truth and Rationality 
In his first sentence, “Reality time, folks”, APS seizes the role of the ‘truth-speaker’ for 
himself, the one who speaks reality, simultaneously implying that other ‘times’ have 
been  unreal. Rationality is important to APS. Like many people, he assumes the 
existence of an autonomous truth accessible through rationality, and, quite consciously, 
aligns himself with Enlightenment constructs of universal reason, freedoms, and 
humanity. Part of his stance is that Asian cultures are fundamentally incompatible with 
these ideals and Australia’s multicultural policy and migration programme would lead 
to their destruction. He assumes that these ideals of universal truths, freedoms, 
humanity, and reason are part of Australia’s heritage. In this manner, APS proceeds to 
construct a series of binaries that privilege the Anglo-Celtic-European culture he writes 
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In his book, Racist Culture, Goldberg draws on postmodern critiques of 
rationality and adds that racialisation occurred with modernity. According to Goldberg, 
racialisation’s beginnings are in early European exploration, with racist expression and 
violent material dispossession justified by the transformation in the seventeenth century 
in the mode of viewing subjects: 
The new philosophical assumption that bodies are but machines naturally 
divorceable from minds, that minds are nothing more than physical 
machines, opened the way to some extreme novel developments in 
technologies of physical power and bodily discipline. These technologies 
of discipline and power were superimposed upon human subjects; they 
encouraged docility by reducing even social subjectivities, or at least 
some forms of social subjectivity, to physical dimensions and correlates  
(Goldberg 1993). 
Enlightenment discourses of rationality masked the exercise and affirmation of 
asymmetric power relations, for instance, the subjugation of colonialised peoples. 
Although, as Goldberg argues above, the Enlightenment mapped the social onto 
the physical, APS argues that he is not conflating body and culture. He sets up an 
opposition between being anti-Asian for bodily reasons and being anti-Asian for 
reasons of culture, but interestingly labels undesirable aspects of the culture as “ugly 
and smelly.” APS displaces the adjectives normally applied to the body and applies them 
metaphorically to describe culture instead, but for what reason? 
  The writer, it seems, is supplying visual and olfactory cues for revulsion through 
the written text, attempting to replicate the immediacy of reflex reactions that ugliness 
and smelliness trigger on the street while keeping body and culture as a binary. In 
addition to the ekphrasis of an ugly culture, an odour is invoked. Culture, traditionally 
the binary opposite to nature and the physical, is bestowed a body through writing. 
  More than that, ‘smelly’ is often associated with decay, impurity, and filth. This 
is not the first time that these attributes have been associated with the racial other. 
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impurity, suggests that racialisation is given racist expression in the treatment of bodies. 
Through the body, discrimination is practised, but also, through the body, cultures are 
given a shape and form that legitimate imbalances of power: “the body comes to stand 
for the body politic, to symbolise society, to incorporate a vision of power”
 (Goldberg 
1993: 54). In turn, to avoid accusations of racism, claims that would normally apply to 
the body are displaced onto culture. The gap between culture and body are thus 
straddled via metaphor and ekphrasis. 
  In using bodily metaphors to describe ‘Asian culture,’
13  APS is borrowing 
distinctions applied to the body to define the culture as sick, unhealthy, and ‘other’, 
launching a series of posts in which this discursive strategy is developed and employed. 
According to Goldberg: 
Hierarchy is established on the basis of a value of purity – whether 
interpreted biologically (in terms of blood or genes), hygienically (in 
terms, for instance, of body odour), culturally (for example, language as 
signifying the evolution of thought patterns and rational capacity), or 
even environmentally (virtuous character, like nose shape and size, 
determined by climate) (Goldberg 1993: 54). 
In other words, Asian culture, the ‘other’ of APS’s post, is juxtaposed against western 
culture, the ‘self’ or ‘we’, and is represented as impure in terms of hygiene (through the 
subject header), and therefore something to be excluded, quarantined or, in the most 
patronisingly charitable instance, cured. 
 Accordingly,  APS’s argument revolves around this logic, that is, cultural 
impurity, hence, he refers to the adoption of ‘western’ models of capitalism by Asian 
nation states as “feral capitalism”. The ‘influx of Asian culture’ into Australia is 
described as ‘pollution’, again, reiteration of the ‘impure’ trope. He ascribes no 
originality or innovation, instead, Asians are “great imitators”. The position he adopts is 
                                                 
13 This chapter refers to many problematic terms, like ‘Asian culture,’ ‘Anglo-Celtic culture,’ ‘Asian,’ 
and so forth, terms which describe discursively-constructed categories and collectivities. Rather than 
littering the entire chapter with quotation marks, I will not be signalling every instance.   - 124 - 
thus symptomatic of racist expression of the following nature: “Impurity, dirt, disease, 
and pollution are expressed as functions of the transgression of classificatory categories, 
expressed, that is, in terms of laws, as also are danger and the breakdown of order” 
(Goldberg 1993: 54). 
This elucidation of danger and chaos is observable in APS’s message when he 
refers to “barking mad” religions and Asian politics, the implication is that Australia 
would be a safe, orderly and predictable place without being polluted by impure 
cultures. This, in turn, leads him to conclude, “Pauline Hanson is right. I believe we 
must preserve our culture at all costs. It is worth preserving”, ‘preserve’ once more 
bringing to mind purity (of what he calls “our culture”) needing protection from 
contamination and decay. Hence, impurity, disorder and the danger of contamination 
are expressed and in turn legitimate boundary maintenance calls for action, like 
restricting immigration. 
3. Framing the Discussion 
3.1 The Discourses of Race, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism 
In this section, I explore three issues arising from the first post to analyse the topic 
thread. The first element is the employment of dominant discourses delineating the 
‘truths’ that are possible when discussing race and culture. The second is how the 
initiator of the thread selects these truths and attempts to set out the boundaries of the 
discussion. This post, and the thread it sets off, employs racially and/or culturally 
marginalizing notions shaped during the course of Australian history, and most recently, 
and ironically, by the very discourse they criticise, that is, multiculturalism. 
As Jon Stratton discusses in detail in his book, Race Daze (1998), the 
phenomenon of Pauline Hanson (and APS) emerges from an environment in which a 
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thirty or forty years was prompted by a policy of official state multiculturalism. Echoing 
trends in Europe and the United States since World War II, Australian national 
discourse has moved from attributing differences through race and biology to cultural 
differentiation through the discourse of ethnicity. APS’s views are rather like Pauline 
Hanson’s (and other Australians),
14 described by Jon Stratton as a ‘culturalist’: 
On her own terms, then, Hanson is right. She is not a racist in the sense 
that she considers race to be determinative. What she is, to coin a 
neologism, is a culturalist. She considers that certain cultures are 
incompatible and that this incompatibility threatens the claimed unity of 
the Australian national culture. Race then becomes a marker of that 
cultural difference (1998: 64, author's emphasis). 
Like Hanson, APS emphasises that he is not racist in the sense that he is talking about 
biological differences. This is evident right from the start in the title of his launching 
post, through the use of certain phrases (e.g. “Asian culture”) throughout the message 
body, and in his précis of Hanson’s views. APS maintains this distinction through the 
thread. His response to posters accusing him of being racist is a variation upon “I'm 
talking about culture, not racial characteristics.” 
 Hanson  and  APS insist on a model of culture as “discrete, homogenous and 
integrated,” a myth that forms the foundation for their assumptions about Asian culture, 
itself a singular term describing diverse groupings of Indonesian, Chinese, Malay, Thai, 
Japanese, and Korean races (Stratton 1998: 63).
15  This idea of culture is a construct 
borne from anthropological studies of much smaller, bounded and homogenous 
societies, and adapted to the notion of a national culture, palpable and shared by 
members of a nation. In turn, cultural difference was also legitimated in that the idea 
that cultures are bounded and limited was a progression of the logic of the discourse of 
                                                 
14 John Howard, the Prime Minister at the time of writing, also shares this perspective of race and culture, 
and Stratton makes a case for arguing that the supporters of Pauline Hanson belong mainly to the lower 
middle class, as well as those who live in the bush. 
15 While Hanson is referring mainly to these races as Asian, she cites immigration figures that includes 
Turkish people under this category (Stratton 1998).   - 126 - 
national culture and anthropology, leading to the discourse of ethnicity in Australia and 
other countries. Hence, APS is able to refer to “our culture,” referring to ‘the Australian 
national culture,’ and “Asian culture” as something so fundamentally different that it is 
incompatible with the former. 
This discourse of ethnicity involves a slippage between race and culture in 
which race, far from losing its relevance, becomes a signifier of culture. Post-White 
Australia policy and during the era of multiculturalism, race was and is still used to 
signify irreconcilable cultural differences (Stratton 1998). The experience described by 
Fanon of being inscribed as other includes the attachment of a series of assumptions 
about culture based upon the signifier of the racialised body, a process that occurs in 
other types of encounters besides the street. In the formulation of Hanson and APS, the 
Australian national culture is Anglo-Celtic-European, and Asian culture, marked visibly 
through race, is the other that can never be part of the self: 
Why would any intelligent Australian want our culture polluted by that 
type of culture? But, we accept immigrants from some of these countries. 
Come to Australia, we say. We won't force you to leave you barking-mad 
religion and culture behind, we don't care how barking mad it is. Oh no. 
We have multiculturalism, we want you to +keep+ your barking-mad 
culture and religion alive, we will +PAY YOU+ to keep your barking-
mad culture and religion alive!! ('Alan Peyton-Smith' 1996a, as in 
original). 
Australian multiculturalism shares many general assumptions about culture and 
ethnic differences with its critics. Stratton’s distinction between “everyday 
multiculturalism” and “official multiculturalism” may highlight one problem with racist 
discourse regarding multiculturalism in Australia, which tends to make no such 
distinctions. According to Stratton, the former describes a lived reality, the 
intermingling, ebb, and flow of variable cultures, which occur in the course of everyday 
living. Official multiculturalism, on the other hand, describes the policy and public 
rhetoric of multiculturalism, although everyday multiculturalism is not entirely   - 127 - 
autonomous from official multiculturalism. Quite often, when people speak about 
multiculturalism, as in the passage quoted from APS’s post above, they are referring to 
official multiculturalism. 
Stratton says the discourse of ethnicity replaced the discourse of race during the 
government’s dismantling of the White Australia policy and developing of the policy of 
multiculturalism. The discourse of multiculturalism in Australia emphasises cultural 
compatibility and consensus, rather than Hanson and APS’s belief that some cultures are 
fundamentally incompatible. Multiculturalism in Australia, however, in effect 
encourages the preservation of a core Anglo-Celtic (and, in Hanson’s perspective, 
European) culture, central in the national imaginary. At the same time, the other 
cultures are, to the main, kept indefinitely on the periphery; for instance, an Australian-
born descendant of Italian immigrants is likely to be thought of as a ‘migrant’, with a 
culture that, although tolerated (or even celebrated), is not considered part of the core 
culture. Besides the use of the national discourse of culture, it is this image of 
Australian society, and the policy of multiculturalism, in conjunction with attitudes left-
over from the days of the White Australia policy, that contribute to the thinking of 
people like Pauline Hanson and APS (1998). 
3.2 Subjectivity: Self and Other 
Subjectivity, and the nature of virtual community, are also important in considering 
APS’s self-presentation. Derek Foster (1997) argues that participation in Internet forums 
such as Usenet and web bulletin boards can mean an assertion of the self and the 
individual rather than community, contrary to popular claims about the Internet and 
virtual community. Some features celebrated as permitting the formation of virtual 
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identity, can actually prevent the triumph of Gemeinschaft,
16 communal relations, over 
Gesellschaft, impersonal relations. As Foster points out, the ability to play with identity, 
and the distanciation from one’s immediate space encourages a situation whereby “our 
social cyberspatial selves are far more likely an extension of our conscious selves than a 
representation of self-conscious being. To be properly self-conscious, one must take 
into account the other” (1997: 32). Otherwise, the other is only significant to define the 
self. 
In this light, APS’s post performs and recirculates a “conscious self” without 
self-reflexivity, one that utilises and is located within an unproblematised imagined 
community of like-beings. In an epoch traversed by discourses of transnational, fluid 
and multiple identities, and a medium that apparently amplifies these phenomena, the 
initial post uses simple binaries that place ‘Asian culture’ squarely in the realm of the 
negative. All the different cultures are gathered up under the singular umbrella term, 
‘Asian culture,’ and a selective use of examples allows him to make universalising 
claims about supposed common features amongst the different ethnicities. The culture 
he is writing from has the fluidity and tolerance denied the cultures he criticises. All the 
negative elements he attributes to Asian culture are, conversely, absent or replaced with 
finer qualities. 
While Usenet newsgroups may appear to encourage an active engagement with 
the other and with diversity, Foster again raises the possibility that individuals might 
actually reify or develop self-definitions in defence against the multitude of competing 
identities, cultures, and viewpoints. On the various Internet spaces, Foster writes: 
                                                 
16 Terms famously used by Ferdinand Toennies (1957, cited in Foster 1997), Foster defines Gemeinschaft 
thus: “the term embodies a set of voluntary, social, and reciprochal relations that are bound together by 
an immutable ‘we-feeling,’” in other words, it embodies the notion of community. Gesellschaft, on the 
other hand, describe impersonal, utilitarian social relationships, characteristic of modern, industrial and 
urban society.   - 129 - 
Instead of simply assuming that beneficiant [sic] acculturation occurs, 
one might rather see the individual gravitating towards spaces that do not 
seem so strange, and engaging in a process of self-legitimisation. In order 
to reduce cognitive dissonance, individuals engage in selective exposure 
as they embark upon their potential learning experience (Foster 1997: 
33). 
CMC allows the pursuit of specific areas of interest with increasing narrowness. Usenet 
is divided up into several different newsgroups, arranged hierarchically into subtopics. I 
have already discussed how individuals can select to read groups within these 
hierarchies. Within the groups themselves, most of the software people use to read 
newsgroups
17 can be set to filter certain topics and posters through the use of 
keywords.
18 
Nonetheless, in seeming contradiction, this post was cross-posted to a number of 
newsgroups that were dominated by south-, southeast- and east-Asian readers and 
posters, yet the implied audience is (white) Australian. The combination of the third 
person plural for Asians with the first person plural reserved for “Pauline Hanson and 
most Australians,” establishes Asians and their ‘culture’ as the other, and ‘most 
Australians’ as the self that is apparently distinct from ‘them.’ It may seem strange, 
therefore, that this post was sent to so many newsgroups with participants from the 
nations he criticises, however, in a way, cross-posting to these newsgroups is an 
extension of APS’s logic that Asian culture is homogenous. He is distributing his post to 
the national groups that he believes belongs to Asian culture. The result of this tactic 
was that the thread included responses from Australians and overseas Chinese in Hong 
Kong and Singapore (although none, at least overtly through certain cues, from 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan or Korea). 
                                                 
17 Examples of newsreader software include Agent and Outlook Express. 
18 Usenet participants can choose, for instance, not to download or display any posts by such and such a 
person, anything posted with ‘$$$’ or ‘make money fast,’ or anything with certain derogatory terms in 
the subject headings. On the other hand, they can set their software to highlight messages in the same 
way, for instance, to download and prominently display all messages with ‘Asian’ in the title in 
soc.culture.australia or ‘book five’ in the Harry Potter newsgroups.   - 130 - 
Without going into APS’s intentions, his message drew heated responses 
(‘flames’) diametrically opposed to the views he expressed. Just as the message 
reiterates discursive boundaries and distinctions between race and culture, Asian and 
Australian culture and all their attendant negatives and positives, so such a post would 
tend to encourage polar responses from the Usenet participants, especially because it 
was cross-posted to these newsgroups. The resulting ‘flame war’ would tend to reify 
this divide and work against the formation of “mutual commitment, mutual 
involvement, mutual responsibility, and mutual respect between a society and its 
individual members” (Foster 1997: 25) that could form the foundations for (an 
inclusive) community. 
4. The Challenge 
A few questions are evident in the way power operates through this thread. Firstly, I 
explore how these responses were framed by the initial post and by APS’s diligence in 
responding to most of the posts. Secondly, these responses sometimes reconfigure the 
terms within which the ‘truths’ surrounding race and culture were discussed within the 
thread. Thirdly, this analysis needs to take into account the culture of the Internet, 
particularly Usenet news, as this also affects the way questions of race and culture are 
handled in this thread. 
The interweaving thread under analysis raised a number of important issues 
regarding identity: that is, the ambiguity of identity cues, the representation of self and 
other, and the permeable boundary between body and culture. There is also the interplay 
of discourses: the discourses of rationality and democracy (and their opposites) trope 
through the thread. More Usenet-specific discursive rules and practices also play a role 
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  Mainly, I am interested in examining how far the thread goes in challenging the 
culturalist assumptions personified by Pauline Hanson and reiterated by APS.  These 
assumptions are that culture is internally homogenous, and discrete; secondly, that there 
are some cultures that are incompatible in essence; thirdly, that, to survive and thrive, a 
national culture must be homogenous (drawing again from Stratton). More specifically, 
in the exchanges on this thread, I am interested in knowing whether any of the 
participants question the underpinning assumptions about Asian culture, Australian 
culture and its heritage, and the effect of migration? In the midst of this, what part does 
Usenet and its discourses play? 
4.1 The Return of the Gaze 
The contributors to this thread write within boundaries, that is, the limitations of the 
idioms and practices available in the discourses that, generally, prevail in their societies, 
and, more specifically, as deployed by APS in his launching essay. In addition, Usenet 
debates also tend to have a certain confrontational style that exacerbates any polarities 
already inherent or developing in wider society. The effects of these are evident in how 
certain posts on this subject thread utilise and reinforce the discourse that overruns 
APS’s contributions, either in agreement with him or in the process of opposing his 
position. The ultimate question is the extent to which the participants manage to 
challenge the culturalist discourse that veils APS’s racism by disputing the terms within 
which he initiated the discussion. To some extent, the responses to APS’s posts subvert 
the objectification of ‘Asians’ and ‘Asian culture,’ they turn the gaze back on the gazer, 
and expose the discursive aspect of the ‘truths’ he utters. The discussion that follows is 
organised around the terms that ‘frame’, and sometimes are subverted by, the responses 
to APS’s post.   - 132 - 
4.2 ‘Cultural Differences’ 
Some posts did not dismantle the constructs of culture and cultural differences but 
instead replicated them. Even while attacking APS’s views, posters, for instance, would 
use a similar binary, that is, Western culture in opposition to Asian culture. One such 
example is the following, which, like APS’s post, relies on broad categories that use race 
to stand for cultural differences, and examples from different countries to legitimate 
claims about white culture (this phrase is not used but can be inferred): 
Emission of carbon dioxide from USA and European countries together 
constitute about three quarters of teh CO2 emission. Trees chopped down 
in North America and Europe, together, also constitute a larger 
proportion than those in any other part of the world! You people have 
already raped the earth thoroughly and still continue to do so vigorously! 
But you ae telling the Asian countries to remain status quo, that means, 
no increase in CO2 emission… What ever Asian countries need, we 
should beg from the almighty white men and women ('Loo SL' 1996: 
n.p., as in original)! 
Ironically enough, APS’s response to this post is to insert, under extracts of the above 
message, “I'm talking about AUSTRALIA.” The discourse employed by APS allows him to 
claim that Europeans and Americans have similar heritages and characteristics to 
Australian national culture, enough to easily assimilate into it, and at the same time to 
strategically isolate Australia whenever anything negative was suggested about this 
common culture and its attendant effects. While this post (and APS’s reply) may 
implicitly suggest the holes in the discourse, it (and the others like it) still reinforces the 
idea that there are distinct cultures, which could be called Asian and Western (or white). 
This assumption still leaves the door open for Hanson and APS’s assertion that these 
cultures are fundamentally too different to co-exist. 
  The difficulty of departing from this framework and idiom is evident. 
Participants often use phrases that interpellate themselves and each other within this 
binary model of Western/white/Australian and Eastern/Asian culture. Accompanying 
some of these posts is a tone of outright hostility and a host of expletives; an extract   - 133 - 
from the first response from ‘TpX’,
19 for instance, includes the following, which is the 
mildest part of the message: “[W]hat fuking rite do u have to say that my culture stinks? 
and my religion barking mad [sic]?” (1996: n.p.). This poster seems to have at least 
partially adopted the constructs of the first post in that he/she identifies themselves as 
‘Asian’ and possessing the ‘Asian culture’ that APS criticises. In a subsequent argument 
between  TpX and another poster who criticises the obscenities in his message, it 
becomes evident that TpX is aware of this problem: “asian culture… there is no such 
thing, there are chinese culture and vietnamese culture etc not asian culture [sic]!” 
('TpX' 1996). Even with this awareness, the oppositional rhetorical tradition of Usenet 
debate (especially with flame threads) combined with the binary structure that frames 
the topic and the limitations of the language available to talk about it encourages a 
gladiatorial exchange, which obscures these fundamental discursive fissures. In turn, a 
polarisation of apparently completely incompatible positions develops, for instance, 
between racist or culturalist claims made on different sides of the debate (‘Asian’ or 
‘Australian/White’), or those supporting multiculturalism. One outraged poster, for 
example, in his criticism of APS, makes similar broad claims using the same binary, 
including the mapping of ‘white’ onto ‘Australian’: 
Who gave you the right to say that our culture is barking mad when I 
believe that your (Australian) culture is built upon by generations of 
criminals !!! Pay us ??? Mind you that some of the biggest money 
inflows into Australia is Asian money. It is Asian investments in 
Australia that has brought many of my kin to your country. 
Demographically, most welfare receipients are Aussies themselves!!! 
[sic] ('Winston Chua' 1996: n.p.). 
  In the midst of this, there are those who do question the terms within which the 
debate is set. One author, for instance, may still use the us|them binary (while 
                                                 
19 This message was dated 21 October 1996, whilst the first post was dated 23 October 1996, which could 
be due to the variances in the rates at which different Usenet servers download and forward messages.   - 134 - 
identifying himself as ‘Asian’), but does probe the extent to which the cultures are 
discrete: 
The things that you accuse Asian societies of are those that have their 
foundations in the Western world in general, and they are certainly not 
unique to Austrailia [sic]. What makes Austrailia so special in this 
cultural construction? […] As long as you can't prove what is distinct in 
Austrailian culture or Austrailian behavior as opposed to the general 
Western view, then pointing out the shortcomings of the latter in essence 
refutes the statements you have made about this supposed superiority of 
‘Austrailian culture’ ('Jeffrey Szeto' 1996: n.p.). 
Another person interrogates dominant assumptions of what comprises ‘Australian 
culture’: 
What culture is that? Aussie culture. Can someone please define this to 
me. I have spoken to many of my Aussie friends and they all reckon 
aussie culture is about something to do with the bush and the outback. 
What nonsense! How many aussies have even been to the outback at 
least once in their lifetime? Or is it the fish and chips meal you have 
every Friday night watching the good old footy on tv? Please someone, 
tell me what is exactly aussie culture ('Core' 1996)? 
Yet this same person deplores the situation in Cabramatta and says, “We may form 
ghettos but we do eventually assimilate. If you came to a new country, you would live 
close to all your relatives and friends too wouldn't you [sic] ('Core' 1996)?”  
Responses like these may illustrate the strength of the hegemony surrounding 
constructs of cultural difference in Australia, but they also show the possibilities, within 
these discursive limitations, for deconstruction. An example of this line of enquiry, that 
is, into the classificatory scheme of the initial post is the following: 
You've been seeking a definition of "racist" in this thread. I'd like to 
expand that search to define "Asian culture". I know people of Thai, 
Japanese, Chinese, Korean and Viet Namese backrounds [sic]. All have 
different cultural "traits".  Something common to all that I have 
perceived is "respect of elders".  Now, is that something to be against? I'd 
like someone, like PH or even APS, to define this "Asian culture" they are 
so afraid of being overrun by ('Dave Johnston' 1996: n.p.). 
Other posts also make the point that the term ‘Asian culture’ does not reflect the wide 
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homogenising categories, but an improvement on the monolithic ‘Asian culture.’ 
Another writer says, “The culture that you are so desperate to preserve from (potential) 
Asian Australians itself is partly made up of Asian Australian culture” and that “Asian 
culture is not a single culture.”  
This poster comes the closest to Stratton’s idea of creolisation; he or she departs 
from either advocating assimilation or the official form of multiculturalism in 
suggesting that Australian culture itself is a blend of different cultures. In addition, he 
or she continues: 
  You see, the truth is, like it or not, every culture has its merits and 
demerits. It might also help if you express more intelligence by avoiding 
generalisations and assumptions when you argue against "Asian culture.” 
I am forced to argue for "Asian culture" because you started it, but there 
is no such thing. It's a bit like grouping a cat and a horse together because 
they both have four legs ('Tse Ka Chun' 1996). 
All the participants have to engage with or work within the framing structures 
functioning in society and deployed by APS, and those critical of his stance ‘are forced 
to argue’ within these precincts. However, as this same post indicates, some of the 
writers are aware of and can communicate this problem in their responses. This led to 
confusing juxtapositions. Within the same message, it is possible to find statements 
critiquing the use of essentialistic categories like ‘Asian culture’ and ‘Australian 
culture’ running alongside other statements that rely on such categories. 
4.3 ‘I’m not talking about Race, I’m talking about Culture’ 
The distinction between race and culture was another problematic aspect of APS’s 
message. In his title alone, body-race and culture are blended through the metaphor of 
‘smelliness,’ a kind of ekphrastic racism where smell and bodily characteristics are 
superimposed on culture. To recap my earlier discussion, Hanson’s position that she is 
not racist as she is objecting to ‘Asian culture,’ not race, is a position that veils 
fundamentally racist assumptions of the connection between race and culture and ethnic   - 136 - 
categories based on racial distinctions. This is especially the case when the next step in 
this logic is that since Asians have a distinct culture that renders them incompatible 
with ‘true blue’ Australian culture, hence the numbers of Asian immigrants should be 
reduced drastically. In Australian public discourse, race has a “subterranean life” and a 
new meaning in “its use as a marker of incompatible cultural difference” (paraphrase of 
Stratton 1998: 33). 
In response to critics that emphasise race and racism, APS often repeats his 
assertion that it is not Asian race(s) that ‘stinks’ but their ‘culture.’ This is 
disingenuous, in the light of the above, for he links race and culture in the logic and 
signifying chain he utilises. Although many of the contributors to the thread identify 
APS and Hanson as racists, only a few query the separation of culture from race in his 
post. The following post is an exception: 
Don't give us this bullshit about how when you are just talking about 
culture that is not equivalent to being racist. If the culture and the person 
comes as a complete package, degrading one means degrading the other 
as well. What is the difference between you saying "I think yellow skin 
color is inferior based on my own personal preferences" and "I think 
Asian cultures are inferior based on my own personal preferences"? You 
ARE blatantly racist, whether you like to admit it or not [sic] ('Jeffrey 
Szeto' 1996). 
Interestingly, in this passage, ‘Szeto’, it seems, is not arguing against associating certain 
cultural constructs with certain races, but the reverse, to this person, APS is racist 
because culture and race goes hand in hand, so criticising a culture is criticising a race. 
However, as the earlier extract (and other instances in his contribution) written by him 
indicates, he is aware that notions surrounding Asian and Australian culture are 
constructs (at least partially). These contradictions, therefore, are the result of discursive 
constraint, that is, the terms of reference in this thread including the discourses of 
ethnicity and race, forces that determine what can be said, down to the minutiae of 
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Other posters reinforce the semiotic link between race and culture in public 
discourse while censuring APS, rather than deconstructing it. Some conflate the two, like 
Hanson,  APS, and indeed, many Australian representations of ‘non-white’ otherness. 
One example of this is the following response to APS’s challenge to identify the racism 
in his writing: 
I will merely say that I have reason to believe that your prejudicial 
statements about Asian culture, made subjectively and with insufficient 
information, has prejudicial connotations to race, if only because 
different races follow different cultures and can be argued to have 
various tendencies to develop different cultural systems ('Tse Ka Chun' 
1996). 
In the process of identifying APS as a racist, this participant, like many others, has 
affirmed the basis for his racism. As with earlier examples, this illustrates the 
persistence of such constructs. These participants, from Australia and elsewhere, in 
support of multiculturalism do not associate it with the views of Pauline Hanson or APS, 
that is, that the myths of official multiculturalism underlie the assumptions of the racists 
they denounce. 
4.4 Representation of Self and Other:  
While the reification of cultural differences and binaries, which form the basis of 
culturalist and racist ideas in Australia, is a problem, responses to these may also be 
destabilising. Instead of allowing APS to remain the observing rational subject that 
objectifies and overdetermines the ethnic other, the participants disturb this relationship 
by casting their gaze upon the ‘white,’ ‘Anglo-Celtic,’ and ‘European’ cultures that 
form the core Australian national culture that APS writes from and wants to preserve. 
The dominant discourses around race and culture (as discussed above) employed by 
Hanson, Howard,
20 and APS may circumscribe this challenge somewhat, but some of the 
other participants do still destabilise the subject/object relationship employed by APS. 
                                                 
20 John Howard was the Prime Minister of Australia during these posts and at the time of writing.   - 138 - 
4.5 Authority: Rationality 
In a similar manner, the other participants also expose some of the weaknesses of the 
discourse of rationality utilised by APS. Having placed the theme of rationality (and its 
opposite) in the foreground through his responses, APS continues to stress the mapping 
of the rational with himself and ‘our (Australian) culture’ and the irrational, “barking 
mad,” with ‘Asian culture.’ For instance, replying to TpX’s vitriolic expletive-strewn 
post, APS writes, “So much for rational, reasoned debate.” To another message insulting 
him, he replies: 
I tell you what, after seeing the trash posts from some of you people, my 
respect for Asians generally has really plummeted. I thought most of 
them were calm, quiet, rational people, but now I see that's just a facade. 
Give them a keyboard and a 'net connection, and all the poison and 
nastiness is there on show for all to see ('Alan Peyton-Smith' 1996a). 
In extracts like this, the ‘subterranean racism’ of APS’s perspective is revealed. Aspects 
of culture are conflated onto the signifier ‘Asians,’ in this case, Asians have a “calm, 
quiet, rational” “façade” that masks their “poison and nastiness.”  APS seizes responses 
that allow him to reinforce this view of Asians while his handling of his opponents 
encourages inflamed messages. 
 In  countering  APS, therefore, some participants try to unsettle this binary of 
rationality/irrationality and avoid the kind of impulsive abusive replies that allow APS to 
claim that Asians are irrational, uncivilised and so forth. Some writers examine his 
claims and attempt to identify flaws in his reasoning: 
Let me refute your argument with two points of my own. First, you have 
again fallen into the trap of generalising and assuming. In the "Eastern 
world," which probably accounts for half the number of countries in the 
world, there are inevitably dictatorships, a disproportionately large 
number too, I will admit. However there are also democratic countries 
where freedom of speech prevails, Japan, Taiwan, TpX, etc... being prime 
examples. Secondly, the fact that "Eastern" governments systematically 
silence opponents do not mean that Asians in general approve of it, for 
even in "Western" democracies governments are not fully representative 
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Another example: 
YOU have labelled Asians to be barking mad or otherwise undesirable … 
it is the standard of undesirability which is at debate here. I am saying a.) 
your conception of Asian culture is wrong and b.) the standard which you 
applied to arrive at that judgment is not necessarily relevant to the issue 
of inferiority. The bottom line is:  you made a personal judgment, then 
you claimed universal support of that judgment from most of Austrailia, 
and then you used these premises to come to the conclusion that Asians 
need to be excluded in Austrailia's immigration policy. The route by 
which you arrived at your judgment is faulty; your claim to support of 
your judgment is unproven, and the conclusion you draw from such 
faulty premises is obviously unjustified ('Jeffrey Szeto' 1996, as in 
original). 
These writers, as explained earlier, may be constrained by the idiom which they have to 
work within, but they attempt to oppose APS in two ways: firstly, by deconstructing his 
writing through analysis, secondly, employing a composed writing style. 
  APS does not attempt to meet his adversaries halfway but insists on recycling the 
same generalisations and assumptions that incensed them in the first place. This tactic 
prevents any form of mutual understanding, and any alteration in his fundamental 
position, instead, the thread spirals onwards. As one poster says to Tse Ka Chun, hoping 
to obtain a concession from certain people, that is, APS, through rational debate is 
hopeless: 
… I note that your messages originate in Hong Kong so you may not be 
familiar with some of the more ... shall we say 'unique' aspects of 
Australian internet 'debating' culture. You see, with some correspondents, 
using rational argument just makes things worse. I think by now you may 
have some sense of this. 
Now I also believe that a strong sense of personal pride is a feature of 
Asian culture, so you may feel honour bound to keep on going with this 
thread until you finally have won the day through force of argument. 
I warn you now - its not worth it! You will experience exasperation, 
consume inordinate quantities of your time, bandwidth and emotional 
energy. Everyone else's kill files will become huge and, in the end, you'll 
have to give up anyway [sic] ('Rob Silva' 1996).   - 140 - 
The claim here, that Australian Usenet culture is unique in that it has people on whom 
rational argument is wasted, is debatable, that is, this may not be unique to Australia 
(similarly, the statement regarding a “strong sense of personal pride”). However, more 
relevantly, this does raise the issue of the limits of debate when it might be the case that 
a regular contributor is not actually interested in shifting their position for reasons of 
their own. Indeed, the topic thread gathers at least 241
21 messages without APS altering 
his position, at the most, he makes minor concessions, some of which he subsequently 
withdraws. By this time, however, it is clear that the majority of the people contributing 
to this thread do not agree with APS. 
5. Conclusion 
Despite the absence of traditional visual markers on the Internet, similar processes of 
inscription described by Fanon still occur, processes that give lie to the popular belief 
that the Internet liberates subjects from the confines of racial classification. In the 
Usenet flame thread I chose to analyse, it is clear that the participants were limited in 
their ability to counter the culturalist-racist discourse underpinning claims that Asian 
culture was incompatible with Australian culture. This was in part due to limitations in 
the idiom available to the participants, an idiom that integrated some of the culturalist 
and racist ideas circulating in Australia. However, there is at least one positive aspect of 
the study: the persistence of some of the people writing to the group, and their ability to 
write back. These challenged the received ideas about race and culture, despite the 
limitations imposed by the discourse and idiom they had to work within. In this respect, 
the other, constructed by the original poster, subverted the gaze by gazing back. This 
case was one of relatively spontaneous interaction between individual participants, in 
the next chapter, I shall address the use of the Internet to form virtual communities and 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Diasporic Formations, the Internet, and Gender:  
The Chinese Diaspora and the Riots in Indonesia 
(May 1998)
1 
1. Introduction 
In my previous chapter, using the example of a topic thread in Usenet news, I dealt with 
the ways in which debates surrounding race and culture originally grounded in national 
discourses can spill out into transnational virtual communities. In this chapter, I explore 
how the Internet provides social activists with an avenue to reach, stir emotions, and 
enlist people far beyond the confines of immediate location. The increasing popularity 
of the Internet has been accompanied by a surge in activists’ use of the web, email, and 
newsgroups. From June 1998, some Internet users passed around email messages 
describing rapes and violence against ethnic Chinese women in Indonesia. Sometimes, 
these messages included first-hand accounts, image-file attachments and/or links to 
photographs and other texts supporting the claims. Existing and new web sites 
incorporated images that purported to be of the raped women and often hailed the 
Internet user as ethnic Chinese, calling upon their sympathies as fellow Chinese of the 
victims. 
In exploring activists’ use of the Internet and the example of the ethnic Chinese 
women, I will analyse the medium of the Internet and the use of this technology in 
cultural politics, in particular, for diasporic community formation. My broader concern 
is the concept of a ‘global Chinese community’, and how activists use the Internet to 
facilitate this communal formation and consolidation. More specifically, I focus upon 
                                                 
1 Versions of this chapter were previously published in: "Global Chinese Fraternity and the Indonesian 
Riots of May 1998: The Online Gathering of Dispersed Chinese,” Intersections, Issue 4, September 2000; 
and “Discursive Violence on the Internet and the May 1998 Riots” in Violent Conflicts in Indonesia, 
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the Internet as a medium for the distribution of images through email, web, and 
newsgroups. 
Some of the reactions to these images, and, in general, to the political and social 
turmoil in Indonesia in May 1998 triggered by the Asian economic crisis, bring to the 
fore reservations about virtual community and the Internet. I will therefore analyse the 
use and development of technologies of the Internet for the creation and growth of 
online transnational communal formations. This critique incorporates a discussion of the 
changes undergone in the meanings and deployment of the term ‘diaspora’ in diasporic 
activist politics. With the “quilting” (Wood and Adams 1998) of dispersed Chinese 
ethno-communities into a Chinese virtual community come refreshed hegemonic 
formations. The discourses used in descriptions of related issues and events in web 
pages by and for ethnic Chinese raise concerns about how to narrate, and counter, 
oppression whilst dodging the homogenising and universalising discourses which 
accompany strategic alliances based upon ethnicity. 
A variety of readings can be, and have been, made of the case of the May 1998 
riots in Jakarta, in part due to the reach of its email and web dissemination and the 
variances in tone and perspective in print and press radio coverage in Indonesia and 
overseas. Contributing to the confusion are the actions of local and international 
activists, the intersecting racial, state, and gender politics, and the context of general 
confusion and chaos in which these rapes took place. At least three writers have written 
on the case of the May 1998 rapes: Ariel Heryanto, ‘Rape, Race and Reporting’ (1999), 
Ien Ang, ‘Indonesia on My Mind: Subjects in History and the Contradictions of 
Diaspora’ (Ang forthcoming), and Laura Lochore, ‘Virtual Rape: Vivian’s Story’ 
(Lochore 2000). Each of these authors works through the complexities of the events 
carefully, and, for reasons of brevity, the following summary cannot adequately capture 
the subtleties of their analyses. Heryanto discusses the Indonesian social and political   - 144 - 
environment before, during, and after these events and the difficulties in speaking about 
the topic of rape and violence in general, and the May 1998 case specifically. Ang’s 
chapter deals with the question of the diasporic intellectual in analysing the website, 
Huaren, and the way it addresses and tries to construct a diasporic Chinese community. 
Finally, Lochore’s article discusses the violence of the print media’s appropriation of 
the story of one of the victims told on the net. 
1.1 Activism and the Internet 
This chapter addresses a topic that the previous analyses necessarily refer to briefly - the 
medium of the Internet itself and the implications in developments in the way cultural 
politics and activism, in this case, Chinese global diasporic community formation, uses 
Internet technology. The primary focus is upon the appropriation and use of images in 
online activism. The East Timor International Support Centre claims that some of the 
images sent around and displayed on web sites, also subsequently printed in 
newspapers, originated from their web site, Timor Today, and in fact represented 
atrocities wrought on East Timorese by the Indonesian army and militia. The discursive 
violence done to the images under discussion on the Internet is part of a mobilising 
strategy. The case discussed here led to what Anderson has described as “long distance 
nationalism” that allows the activist to play a “national hero” “on the other side of the 
planet” (to borrow the phrasing from Anderson 1994: 326). This has become possible 
through the transnational mediascape provided by electronic and other forms of media. 
The advantages of the Internet that led to the deployment of this 
communications technology on behalf of the East Timorese struggle for independence 
are the same ones behind the appropriation of these images for other struggles against 
oppression and violence. Individuals downloaded and redeployed images from the web 
site (amongst other ones from elsewhere) to address the killing and raping of ethnic   - 145 - 
Chinese women during the May 1998 Indonesian riots. NetAction, a project run by The 
Tides Center [sic], a US non-profit organization, produced a guide called The Virtual 
Activist Training Course, which summarises what the Internet has to offer for activists. 
It focuses on the opportunities the technology presents for networking and collaboration 
between activist organisations, reaching out to individuals and communities, collecting 
signatures for petitions, and raising membership and funds (NetAction/The Tides Center 
1998). This chapter addresses the option that NetAction calls “email and web-based 
outreach” (n.p.). 
I am interested in identifying tactics for resistance and activism using the 
Internet while managing to retain grassroots relevance and minimising the violations 
that seem inevitable in the representation of the marginalised. Before doing this, I 
identify some of the pitfalls for social activists using the Internet, no matter how well 
intentioned their activism might be. Hence, rather than undercut online activism, the 
critical analysis that follows is meant to facilitate the development of a suitable praxis 
for action, which is sensitive to the politics of representation. 
1.2 Subjectivity and Belonging 
Appadurai describes how the electronic media have transformed the work of the 
imagination as a crucial aspect of modern subjectivity. Television, radio, and other 
forms of electronic “media transform the field of mass mediation because they offer 
new resources and new disciplines for the construction of imagined selves and imagined 
worlds” (1996: 3). As with all forms of media, the Internet does not introduce 
something ‘new’ in this sense. Like print and other older media, along with other forms 
of electronic media, Internet applications “are resources for experiments with self-
making in all sorts of societies, for all sorts of persons.”   - 146 - 
Digital media refigures ‘mass communication’ and is a form of media where 
audiences and producers are not as distinguishable. Thus, we get a situation where an 
audience member-web surfer can view a web site, download its photographs, perhaps 
alter them, and then display them on another web site, perhaps with a different context, 
as a web producer. As Stone suggests, reading practices have altered (Stone 1994). 
Computer-mediated forms of communication allow for a more interactive social 
practice in which the reader has an effect on the textual environment. Simultaneously, 
like other forms of electronic media, there is a distance from events brought to 
individuals by the Internet. This dislocation raises a further question in relation to the 
issue at hand: how then do we identify the ‘authentic’ under these circumstances? 
The body of writing about cosmopolitanism is also useful. Especially within 
communities with a powerful discourse of nationalism, ‘locals’ traditionally regard 
cosmopolitans with suspicion as the dislocated stranger/intruder that is exempt from the 
responsibilities of locals and take for granted the centrality of the West. The last decade 
has seen the reformulation of cosmopolitanism to include new forms of 
cosmopolitanism that are strongly located and/or originate from “below” (Nielson 
1999). I discuss the viability and necessity of retaining a strong link to the grassroots 
and argue that this is vital in relation to global activism on the Internet. While I shall 
demonstrate how the traditional suspicion of the cosmopolitan stranger is applicable in 
the case today, I am not dismissing the possibility of ‘neo-cosmopolitan activists’ who 
work with or are part of local cultures they represent and yet utilise the global arena to 
achieve their aims. 
I want to demonstrate how the meanings attached to the images of women’s 
bodies distributed via the Internet contributed to the development of Chinese diasporic 
consciousness. This argument requires a brief description of the local context of these 
images and events in Indonesia and of how ethnocidal violence represents an assault on   - 147 - 
a racial body. At the same time, there are special meanings attached to rape in general 
and to this particular case that also affect reactions to the images. Relatedly, these 
images of women’s bodies are involved in the transnational production of meanings to 
support calls for global solidarity amongst ethnic Chinese. 
2. The Applicability of ‘Diaspora’ 
Firstly, I consider the applicability of the term, ‘diaspora’ to ethnic Chinese outside 
China, including the US and Southeast Asia. The phrase, “[w]here once were 
dispersions, there is now diaspora,” cryptically sums up Tölölyan’s observation that the 
term, diaspora, has been broadened to encompass the dispersed communities outside the 
Jewish, Greek, and Armenian diasporas (Tölölyan 1996: 9). For Tölölyan, diaspora, 
once a term “saturated with the meanings of exile, loss, dislocation, powerlessness and 
plain pain became a useful, even desirable way to describe a range of dispersions.” The 
Chinese dispersal occurred over a long period of time and for a variety of reasons, rather 
than as the result of a single catastrophe or pogrom. 
In contrast to the ‘traditional’ diasporas, the dispersal of Chinese was often the 
result, not of a crisis or exile, but of poverty and the demand for labour and capital by 
transnational capitalism. Ethnic Chinese were either abducted to work as indentured 
labourers or they themselves chose to migrate in search of a better life (Pan 1991). The 
Chinese diaspora illustrates the reconceptualisation of diaspora described by Tölölyan; 
its development is not wholly due to exile and loss, nor is there always a strong tie to a 
motherland. 
2.1 The Formation of Diasporic Identification 
The motives, conscious or otherwise, behind the appropriation of the images to 
represent the rape of ethnic Chinese women, have their foundation in the construction of 
diasporic solidarity. In the contemporary world, the distinction between an ethnic   - 148 - 
community and a diasporic one lies in the diasporic community’s effort to retain and 
build ties to the homeland and kindred communities in other nations and states. As 
Tölölyan argues, a diaspora is not something merely defined by “being” and birth, but 
also by “doing” and “feeling” (1996: 30), implying that the boundary between ethnic 
and diasporic communities is not distinct but is defined by emotion and behaviour. 
Therefore, I analyse the Chinese websites featuring the Indonesian riots in the context of 
the raising of diasporic consciousness amongst globally dispersed ethnic Chinese. 
Through these sites, it is possible to understand the ways in which people understand 
the dispersed individuals and communities of ethnic Chinese as diasporic through 
Internet links formed across national boundaries and distances. 
The renaming of dispersed ethnic Chinese as the Chinese diaspora is significant 
when we consider the questions relating to the identity of the (Indonesian) Chinese and 
the ‘diasporic activists.’ This is where the homogenising claims of the aforementioned 
‘consciousness raising diasporans’ meet with popular notions of chineseness. They both 
tend to assume a stable ethnic Chinese collectivity with cultural practices and beliefs 
that cut across localities, nations, dialects and histories (Coppel 1983).
2 The web sites 
acknowledge briefly the different histories and cultures of ethnic Chinese around the 
world but these are more often obscured in favour of promoting solidarity between 
ethnic Chinese born and/or living in Southeast Asia, East Asia, the US, England, 
Indonesia and so forth. The productive sharing of oppression, exile, and loss of 
diasporic awareness and activism in reality obscures other aspects of diaspora. For 
instance, it becomes difficult to incorporate into this picture the complicity of some 
mobile diasporans in transnational capitalism and its accompanying “scattered 
hegemonies” (Grewan & Kaplan 1994). Tölölyan claims, “the new meanings of 
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essentialised collection of traditional traits of the Chinese. It is actually a set of practices that developed in 
response to the conditions of colonialism, migration and postcolonialism (Ong 1998).   - 149 - 
diaspora have often been coupled with a larger project of re-articulating the nation-state 
and the concepts of national identity, indeed of identity as such,” (1996: 5) mainly 
serving the interests of transnational elites and the diasporists. These mutual interests lie 
in the decline of both “the nation’s aspiration to normative homogeneity” and “the 
state’s hegemony” (1996: 4). The renaming of dispersions into diasporas allows the 
assumption of local and transnational stateless power, based upon multiple and 
transnational belonging and loyalties, that could sustain both the homeland and the 
ethno-diasporan community. 
Accompanying the construction of a homogenous global Chinese diaspora is the 
reiteration of pain and loss that reinforces the diasporic effect, and, thus, reinforces the 
feelings of commonality. Wanning Sun describes, for instance, how the Nanjing 
Massacre websites demonstrate the power of reviving cultural memories, of ritualistic 
pleasure in sharing outrage and pain, resulting in a feeling of communal belonging (Sun 
1998). This process cuts across and works through national boundaries and 
subjectivities, and it is my contention that the websites discussed in this chapter, 
featuring the photos of abused women, produce a similar effect. 
One of the factors leading to the rise of diasporic consciousness in some 
communities, identified by Tölölyan, is the ease and speed of communication and travel 
in comparison to earlier dispersions, when immigration often led to isolation from 
homeland and kin. We can understand the relationship between the Internet as a media 
technology, the diasporic groups, and activism via Appadurai’s conceptualisation of 
global cultural flows and how “they occur in and through the growing disjunctures   - 150 - 
between ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes and ideoscapes.”
3 Ethnic 
politics and diaspora specifically, reflect these disjunctures between the mediascape, 
technoscape, and ethnoscape. 
Research on the transnational Hakka community and the Hakka Global Network 
(hereafter HGN) email list provides an example of the formation of transnational 
communities via computer-mediated communication. Eriberto Lozada (1996) conducted 
systematic discourse analysis on a sample of email messages in the HGN in order to 
identify the part played by the Internet in defining Hakka identity. His research 
demonstrated that various characteristics of the email list showed the  “production of 
locality … [and] neighborhoods [sic]” across great distances (Appadurai 1996: 306). 
Lozada found that members used the first-person in their messages, arranged ‘offline’ 
meetings, and messages were direct and intimate. Feelings of community that used to be 
localised are now global, as Appadurai writes: “ethnicity, once a genie contained in the 
bottle of some sort of locality (however large) has now become a global force, forever 
slipping in and through the cracks between states and borders” (1996: 306). 
The “global force” of ethnicity is complicated because the Internet is not 
actually available to all and is a technology which requires a large financial and training 
investment. Researchers in this medium are familiar with the debate over who has 
access to these resources, the disproportionate demographic make-up of Internet users, 
and so on. Bosah Ebo calls these two extreme positions, “cybertopia”, the Internet as a 
“great equalizer”, and “cyberghetto”, “the Internet as a resource of disproportionate 
access and its technology, content, and [n]etiquette all reflect certain class, gender, and 
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and pull migration theory, consumers and producers (and other Marxist models); they do not account for 
complexities introduced by disjunctures between economy, culture, and politics. The different 'scapes' 
introduced are to indicate the different types of agents involved (nation-states, multinationals, diasporic 
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racial inequalities” (Ebo 1998: 2). The problems of long distance nationalism are 
compounded by the unequal access, of different people, in this case, within the ‘Chinese 
diaspora’, to Internet technology. The power to define the experience of members of a 
collective, in the Internet context, lies in the hands of those positioned advantageously 
in terms of their income and geographic location. In the final section of this article, I 
address the implications of this situation for the handling of the ethnic violence during 
the May 1998 riots by certain diasporic Chinese web sites hosted in servers located in 
the US. 
Today, web pages, news groups, chat and email on the Internet, together with 
the declining cost and increasing reach of older technologies like the telephone and 
television, provide people with increased opportunities to ‘feel’ and enact a sense of 
belonging to a larger, transnational diasporic community. This is a form of transnational 
communication, where several of the audience are subjects who are removed from the 
events described, yet relocated as members of a diasporic community, in this case as a 
member of an imaginary transnational Chinese community. These web pages enact the 
particular snarl of gender, racial and diasporic politics that can complicate the study of 
ethno-diasporic Chinese formations. Most importantly, this case of the images and 
messages sent via the Internet illustrates the part that Internet communication plays in 
articulating these complex collisions. 
3. The Rapes in Jakarta, 1998 
To describe briefly the context of this article: the rapes occurred in the midst of the riots 
in Jakarta in May 1998, preceded by Indonesia’s economic crisis beginning in mid-
1997.
4 Indonesian people held extensive demonstrations against Suharto, which 
escalated after the shooting of four Trisakti University students on 12 May 1998. 
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Wholesale looting in Jakarta and other cities marked the next three days, and the main 
targets of these acts were Chinese Indonesians in recognisably Chinese areas. 
  It was only in the beginning of June that the public became aware of the rapes. 
Tim Relawan Untuk Kemanusiaan (the Volunteers Team for Humanity) compiled 
accounts of the rape, along with the location and details of the incidents. I cite the 
findings of the Team with the disclaimer that the government team confirmed only a 
third (fifty-two cases) of the 168 rapes (including twenty deaths) reported by the 
Volunteers Team for Humanity. It is unlikely that any of these figures represent the real 
numbers, however. The Team compared the rape locations to the location of the riots, 
and the conclusion of the early report was that the rapes occurred in areas of Chinese 
concentration while the riots were more widely dispersed all over Jakarta (Tim Relawan 
Untuk Kemanusiaan 1998). In addition, the rapes happened at the same time as the riots, 
and in the more violent areas of destruction, burning, and death. 
  From common aspects in the modus operandi, the Team concluded that the rapes 
were organised and the Team members raised questions as to the identity of the 
planners. According to their data, many of the main instigators and perpetuators were 
unknown to the victims and their families. In addition, the Team amassed material, 
which indicated that rumours of the imminent rioting and rapes spread days before their 
actual occurrence. If this is true, the perpetuators could have pre-planned the riots and 
rapes of 1998. The Team is careful to list a range of possibilities rather than single out 
members of the military, that is, they say the perpetrators could be “of [a] government 
body, of the armed forces (ABRI), of any exclusive syndicate, of groups of bandit or 
hired gangsters or any other group of society” (Tim Relawan Untuk Kemanusiaan 1998: 
n.p.).   - 153 - 
3.1 Meanings surrounding Mass Rape and Violence 
Appadurai’s proposal that extreme group violence against social familiars is associated 
with uncertainty over identity is relevant in exploring the semiotic impact of the rapes 
and the violence. In particular, his analysis relates to “cosmologies in flux, categories 
under stress, and ideas striving for the logic of self-evidence” (Appadurai 1998: 231). In 
the context of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, the massive retrenchments, rising food 
prices and general economic turmoil (Williams 1998) pushed groups in Indonesia over 
the threshold. Various writers have documented the historical and social background to 
the complexities of racial politics. In the mood for change and with blame directed at 
the Suharto regime, not surprisingly, the ethnic Chinese, as a visible minority in Jakarta, 
became the closest and easiest target. 
  According to Appadurai, ethnocidal violence “is an effort to stabilize the body 
of the ethnic other; to eliminate the flux introduced by somatic variation, by mixture and 
intermarriage: and to evict the possibility of further somatic change or slippage” 
(Appadurai 1998: 232). He draws on anthropological work by Liisa Malkki on Hutu 
refugees to explain the extreme brutality displayed toward the body of the ethnic other 
in such explosive circumstances. In Appadurai’s application, policies of assimilation 
tend to cover over, yet generate some deep conflicts and contradictions. Violence in 
such situations represents an effort to uncover the ‘enemy within’. Rape, in such 
circumstances, has special meanings: it is a direct attack on the organs of ethnic 
reproduction and is “the most violent form of penetration, investigation, and exploration 
of the body of the enemy” (Appadurai 1998, p.239). 
  Thus, in one sense, the rape of Chinese women could be an instance of the kinds 
of logic that prevail during a time of uncertainty about identity and expresses itself as 
violence against social intimates. In the context of the deployment of these images and 
narratives on the Internet, it is also necessary to consider another aspect of the violence,   - 154 - 
that is, gender politics. Rape is more than just another version of violence, and to treat it 
as such would be to ignore the pattern of domination and submission that defines and 
directs female sexuality - and who controls it (Websdale and Chesney-Lind 1998). 
  Sexual violence against women in warfare is not new, and it is debatable 
whether it is a recent phenomenon in term of ethnic violence. It is, most commonly, a 
matter surrounded by silence, or naturalised as an unfortunate side effect of war or 
violent conflict. The silence is paralleled in academia; for instance, there is a dearth of 
research on the mass rapes in Berlin at the close of World War II (Siefert 1994; 
Appadurai 1998: 231). While acknowledging the differences between the two cases, 
some of Siefert’s explanations of rape and violence against women in the Bosnia-
Herzegovina conflict are applicable to the present context. Both cases of rape are an 
attack on the culture of the other and, as Siefert describes it, an “element of male 
communication” (1994: 59). During times of war, women are raped to communicate to 
other men that they are not masculine and competent enough to “protect ‘their’ 
women.” 
  Siefert’s explanation of rape, while useful for understanding the rapes of 
Chinese women in Indonesia, needs further clarification. These meanings surrounding 
the rapes should be qualified by Heryanto’s observation that the May 1998 rapes did not 
occur in the context of war or explicit military manoeuvres (as in Siefert’s case studies): 
In most of these troubled areas there was usually an official articulation 
of goals to be achieved, or rewards to be gained after or beyond the 
destruction of female bodies (Heryanto 1999: 309). 
He comments that the context of the May 1998 rapes, in contrast, was distinguished by 
the absence of these goals and rewards and so he hesitantly uses the term “political 
rapes.”   - 155 - 
  The negative message contained in communication via rape still exists, but in a 
different sense. Heryanto explains that it was a stock practice amongst police and 
military officers to force other victims to watch or take part in the violence, and thus to 
victimise on a greater scale. The ‘victims’ also included NGO activists who suffered 
emotionally when seeking out and hearing accounts of the rapes, as well as the audience 
of the media accounts and images. Coupled with the selection of ethnic Chinese women 
as the targets of rape, racialised accounts of the violence were encouraged. This 
racialised account obscured the other forces at work during the riots, for instance the 
strained relations between the military, the state and the Indonesian public, and instead 
pinned the blame on racism and economic envy, and latterly, religious differences. 
4. The Representation of the Rapes 
The process described by Heryanto had repercussions overseas in the way people read 
the images of the abused women. Sun points out how “the images of violated female 
bodies may also be used as a metonym in representing the traumatised nation in anti-
imperialist discourse” (Sun 1998: 17). Rather than a representation of assault on the 
nation, Chinese bulletin messages and web sites tended to represent the assaults as being 
against the transnational Chinese (imagined) community. The images are mobilised in 
speed and forms made possible by the convergence of Internet and digital imaging 
technologies. The compression of space and time has permitted long-distance 
nationalism, so much so that diasporas can begin to create transnational communal 
networks. 
  Laura Lochore raises an ethical problem with representation in her analysis of 
the Sydney Morning Herald’s appropriation and retelling of the story of one of the 
victims of the May 1998 riots (Vivian) that was passed around the Internet (Lochore 
2000). Lochore’s conclusion that newspapers and emails appropriated the voice of the   - 156 - 
subaltern, Vivian, to suit “neo-(post)colonial ends” applies also to the specific images 
used in accounts of the rapes. The women in the images I discuss, like Vivian’s story, 
have been virtually raped in the process of recovering their bodies and their violation 
from invisibility. The stories and experiences of these women, having been silenced, are 
recovered and reshaped and used for political ends. In this way, images of abused 
women are stripped of context and then re-contextualised to suit particular regional 
issues. The women are renamed by firstly losing their names and identity, and then by 
being re-identified as victims. Images of their bodies are then re-re-labelled yet again as 
victims in a different context. 
4.1 Relabelling 
The images under discussion were photographs converted to digital information 
allowing them to be displayed on web sites and attached to email and newsgroup 
messages. One photograph showed the bruised and bloody body of a woman, her back 
towards the viewer, in a building scrawled with Bahasa Indonesian words. This photo, 
along with a variety of other images, was seen in many of the sites I visited (Indonesian 
Free Press 1998; World Huaren Federation 1998). Another photo presented a naked 
woman being penetrated by one man, with another behind him. There were other 
photographs of battered bodies of women: some with men wearing army uniforms; 
some without; many displayed extreme acts of violence and were of seemingly dead 
women, as in the case of one photo where the body of a woman was apparently impaled 
through her private parts by a broomstick. All these images, either accompanying email 
or newsgroup messages, or on web sites, were identified as being of Chinese women 
who were raped by either Indonesian army personnel or by pribumi men. 
  Some of these photographs were relabelled as showing raped and/or murdered 
ethnic Chinese women. The ETISC web site claims that the pictures depict the torture of   - 157 - 
women in East Timor by the Indonesian military and paramilitary stationed there, and 
the pictures used to represent raped Chinese women in Jakarta were selected from forty 
photographs that could be downloaded from the site (East Timor International Support 
Center 1997). These forty photographs are, according to ETISC, a selection from two 
hundred photos that were smuggled to the ETISC in late 1997. The words on the 
woman’s body are written in Bahasa Indonesian. The words written on her back right 
leg and buttock are, “Champion cat shit Dead like a rat.” On her back are the words, 
“Like this, so that you get to feel the consequences.” In a couple of the photographs, 
soldiers hold a sign, inscribed with the words, “Hidup hadiah
5 Nobel” [Bahasa 
Indonesian for ‘Long live the Nobel award’], over her body. The ETISC explains that the 
text that accompanied the two hundred photos surmises that the sign was probably hers 
and that this indicates she was one of the crowd welcoming Bishop Belo back after he 
received the Nobel Peace Prize. This might mean she was tortured and killed in 
December 1996. 
  Digital technology makes possible the relabelling of the images of the abused 
women and enables the creation and storage of photographs that will not decay with 
time. This “manufactures a present that will forever be new and clear and always 
convenient” (Chow 1993: 169). The digital form of these images also allows their 
speedy passage through computer networks. In other words, the mobility and continued 
importance of images are paradoxically possible through the very technologies that 
make their ‘authenticity’ (as referents to reality) even more questionable than before. 
  Staff reporters for the Asian Wall Street Journal wrote an article identifying the 
sources of some of the photographs of purported rape victims used in a variety of   
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ETISC deduced the full phrase.   - 158 - 
 
websites, including print media: 
Newspapers in Hong Kong and elsewhere ran the pictures, describing 
them as photos of rape victims. 
That the pictures have been accepted so readily illustrates the growing 
power of computers and the Internet. At least some of the pictures 
circulating - there are at least fifteen - were culled from an Asian 
pornography web site, a gruesome U.S.-based exhibition of gory photos, 
and an East Timorese exile homepage on the Internet (Wagstaff and 
Solomon 1998: n.p.). 
Through the technologies of digital photography and the online media, pictures on the 
Internet can be downloaded and pasted up somewhere else, as can photographs sent as 
file attachments in email and to newsgroups. Attributing this redeployment and 
acceptance to the “growing power of computers and the Internet” alone would be to 
make the mistake of assuming that technology is an autonomous entity. In fact, the 
Internet, like other media technologies, is influenced by the variety of institutions and 
organisations and the ideological motives of individuals that surround it. Even after the 
publication of the above report, several sites did not remove these photographs; instead, 
some captioned them as “fake” and linked them to pages specifically about the 
Indonesian riots, even though they may not have originated in that context (for instance, 
Huaren). 
5. Responses of Internet Users 
The responses from people on web pages such as Huaren and Indonesia Online to these 
images, do not give the sense that these participants are conscious of the issue of 
authenticity. The claim that we are witnessing the “death of photography”, so dear to 
those writing on the “visual age”,
6 oversimplifies the complex ways in which we 
interact with images. The force and impact of images remain regardless of the 
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knowledge that images can be edited, manipulated, created and, hence, can no longer be 
considered as ‘evidence’ of events. For instance, a woman describing herself as a 
Catholic, Chinese woman who spent her school years in Jakarta,
7 now residing in San 
Francisco, posts her reaction to the photographs: 
This evening, an Indonesian friend visited me at my home here in bay 
area. He showed me pictures about the raping of Chinese women by 
pribumi men recently. On the street, in the market, on the sidewalk, in a 
broad day light. I saw those horrendous pictures for fifteen seconds then 
closed my eyes and sobed and sobed [sic] (Alacoque 1998: n.p.). 
A desire to enable web surfers to distinguish between the falsely identified (that is, 
relabelled) and the ‘real’ photographs may motivate the continued inclusion of these 
photographs in the websites. The possibilities provided by the combined media of 
digital photography and the Internet enable a substitution of meaning whereby these 
photographs come to represent the atrocities conducted against ethnic Chinese women 
in the May 1998 riots symbolically, rather than referentially. 
  Some of the motives of producers of sites such as Huaren during this time
8 could 
be discerned in proclamations on their web pages: 
Chinese Diaspora had existed for many centuries and spread far and 
wide. Early mistreatments had caused many descendents to feel 
confused, indifferent, or ambivalent towards their heritage. With modern 
communication technology, this is the right time to bring us together and 
to promote the sense of kinship [as in original] (World Huaren Federation 
1998: n.p.). 
There is unevenness in the relationship between the “kin” here, that is, between the 
author and the scattered people with their unique personal histories for whom he is 
speaking. Of the “ethnic Chinese”, who has access to this technology? Who is writing 
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cues, quite often, the surname, although Indonesian Chinese generally do not have 'Chinese' surnames, 
through such phrases such as 'we Chinese,' or through more overt declarations as in the unquoted part of 
this message. 
8 The organisation, and the website, has changed in many ways since the time of writing, although the 
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here? The organisation behind the Huaren website, World Huaren Federation, was then 
based in San Francisco and yet claimed to speak for the ethnic Chinese as a whole. This 
is the other side of the picture, as opposed to the more positive aspects presented in 
liberal discourses about the Internet and new ‘postmodern’ communication 
technologies. The technology is being used to arouse feelings of solidarity amongst 
ethnic Chinese around the world in a way that accentuates racial distinctions to the 
detriment of locally-grounded activism that is sensitive to the regional politics of race - 
a danger of ‘long distance nationalism’ that Anderson warned against. 
  The meanings of rape in the context of extreme ethnocidal violence, that is, rape 
as an assault on the ethnic Chinese and rape as an aspect of men communicating to other 
men, have gone online. Witness this post to an Indonesian online forum: 
Subject: Chinese-Indonesian Men are A Bunch of Cowards 
The first thing that came to my mind when reading the rape reports was: 
‘Where were the men?’ There were no mention whatsoever of any 
resistance put up by Indonesian-Chinese men to protect the safety and 
honour of their women. They seem to always rely on their money to 
‘buy’ some soldiers or security guards for their protection.... 
What a bunch of cowards!! You gave bad name to all Chinese [as in 
original] (Ng 1998: n.p.). 
These sentiments about Indonesian Chinese men were uncommon (at least, they were 
not expressed often). However, the post is typical of many of the messages on the forum 
in that it utilises the patriarchal discourses of masculinity, male honour, and women and 
their bodies as property to be protected. The last sentence, “You gave bad name to all 
Chinese”, can be read as an instance of negative feelings about the diasporic ties 
between Chinese communities, especially when he refers to their reliance on money to 
perform their ‘masculine’ task of protecting “their women”. Even so, these ties between 
different ethnic Chinese communities have been naturalised and felt keenly. Just as 
Nigel Ng sees a connection between the “name” (or ‘face’) of all Chinese and what he   - 161 - 
perceives as cowardice of the Indonesian Chinese men, the ethnic Chinese online 
activists and respondents echo this connection. The atrocities conducted on these 
women have become atrocities against Chinese as a whole. 
  As explained earlier, the origin of many of the other photographs used in activist 
sites was also called into question, that is the photographs were not from the May 1998 
riots in Jakarta, and this in turn affected how the rape issue was addressed by the media 
and people in power. Rape, especially on the scale of May 1998, is a difficult enough 
thing to prove without the added tag of ‘false’ or ‘inauthentic’. In the process of 
establishing communality amongst Chinese online, the diasporic activists have 
unwittingly complicated the investigation into this issue. A pro-Habibie Jakarta 
newspaper, Republika, in an article headlined, ‘Is it True that Mass Rape Took Place’, 2 
August 1998, questions whether the mass rapes actually occurred (Human Rights Watch 
1998). In a climate where the Indonesian state and the military were eager to deny the 
rapes, pro-government press and individuals in Indonesia seized upon the questionable 
authenticity of the circulated images. 
  In terms of reactions outside Indonesia, however, while the written narratives 
included in these email were powerful on their own, including horrific accounts of 
violence and hostility towards Chinese, burning of buildings, invasion of homes and 
businesses and so forth, the ‘rape’ images provoked a visceral reflex in the people to 
whom I showed them. The reaction was one of revulsion and, in turn, anger, often 
leading to the expression that ‘something should be done’. This response towards the 
images, together with the representation of the assaults as resulting from racial discord 
and economic disparity, made for a powerful means of drawing together Chinese around 
the world. As the email ‘forwards’ increased and the topic entered current affairs, some 
ethnic Chinese and some of the media, addressed the rapes as crimes against ethnic 
Chinese as a whole. On web bulletin boards, people presenting themselves as ethnic   - 162 - 
Chinese called for greater Chinese solidarity around the globe.
9 Such forms of diasporic 
communality are open to a similar criticism to that of a feminism based on a 
universalising discourse of global sisterhood. This is a universalisation that uses the 
politics of location as an ‘instrument of hegemony’ (Kaplan 1994), reiterating 
boundaries and performing its own marginalising, homogenisation that ultimately 
subsumes a myriad different identities and injustices under one banner. 
  In the calls for greater Chinese solidarity, patriarchal discourses of honour and 
protection (read ownership) of women are employed to feed into the sense of outrage 
felt by readers. This paternalistic attitude applies to women and also to the ‘less 
fortunate’ in the Chinese ethno-diaspora. As one poster protests: 
I’ve got a message for all of you who sent fake photos. Do you know that 
what you’re doing will only worsen things in Indonesia??? Sure, rich 
chinese in Indonesia can just pack up and leave right away. But how 
about the middle-class chinese??? They’re trapped in Indonesia. The 
more you try to divide the pribumis from the Chinese, another riot is 
more likely to happen. DON’T MISLEAD PEOPLE!! I’m a chinese in 
Indonesia, and I’m only thinking logically and practically [as in original] 
('Uchoks' 1998). 
This post highlights the dangers in the way diasporic sites like Huaren have taken up the 
issue. In their zeal to establish wrongs done to ethnic Chinese elsewhere, issues of class, 
transnationality and mobility (and lack thereof) become subsumed under all-
encompassing collectivities. 
  Despite frustration expressed on the Huaren site,
10 the online furore has had an 
impact ‘offline’ or, in Internet parlance, IRL (in real life), demonstrating the potency of 
the distributed images and accounts, as well as the refiguring of the Chinese dispersion 
into diaspora, for transnational politics. Activist groups and other organisations in 
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frustration and cynicism about the online discourse being divorced from making an actual impact in 
Indonesia itself. She also describes briefly the various schemes thought up online, for instance, assisting 
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Singapore, Philippines, China, Thailand, the United States and elsewhere, held 
exhibitions and protests and the governments of these countries were compelled to at 
the very least demand an investigation into the rape cases. In Singapore, the Association 
of Women for Action and Research (AWARE) put up an exhibition that included 
photographs culled from these diasporic Chinese web sites (Zakaria 1998). Forty 
thousand Singaporeans signed the AWARE statement calling for sanctions should there 
be a re-occurrence of the rapes (Widyono 1998). 
6. Reservations 
6.1 East Timor 
The use of images of women’s bodies is problematic, not least because the victims are 
not in a position to protest the way their experience is represented and used. As Susan 
Sontag wrote, “To photograph is to appropriate the thing photographed. It means putting 
oneself into a certain relation to the world that feels like knowledge—and therefore, like 
power” (1977: 4). It is a reminder of how the plundering of bloodied body images has 
always been a feature of exoticism, patriotism, pornography, journalism, history, and 
horror – and how these discourses merge and procreate with each other. The use of 
photographs from East Timor is an example of this plundering, particularly when it is 
highly possible that the perpetuators of the rape of East Timorese women were the ones 
that took the photographs. In this case, Sontag’s claim, that “the act of taking pictures is 
a semblance of appropriation, a semblance of rape” (1977: 24), is particularly apt. 
The dissemination of the photographs obscured the complexities of the local 
politics in East Timor itself. While Internet participants made similar assertions, that is, 
that the Indonesian army was complicit and actively took part in the violence and rapes 
there, the knowledge that some of these images originated from East Timor combined 
with the captioning and the context provided in the emails and web sites, did not dispel   - 164 - 
anger. In fact, some were aggravated further and saw race and racism as the primary 
cause (sometimes accompanied by the economic) of the violence. They employed an 
essentialising opposition of ‘good/victimised Chinese’ and ‘bad pribumis’. This 
opposition took on a global dimension, that is, some Internet participants substituted 
‘pribumis’ with ‘non-chinese oppressor’, and added this case to the list of grievances 
against the way diasporic Chinese were treated in various parts of the world. 
  One message to the Indonesia Online forum, entitled “This is a small group of 
Indonesians. Not the entire Indonesia[!]”, reads: 
It seems the most debate on the news board is either ‘Indonesians are the 
bad guys’ or ‘It might not be the Indonesians!’ It is almost certainly the 
Indonesians, but in these revolting rape photos, it seems the most 
offenders are dressed in Army Uniform. Should you not shout your 
protest upon the Indonesian Army and not the Indonesians themselves? 
[as in original] ('An Australian' 1998). 
This is followed by a response entitled “Shut Up Aussie[!]”, “Australians are racists too, 
they also party [sic] from queen hanson.racist have no right to speak here [sic]” 
('freeman' 1998). The posters of email and newsgroup messages responding to and 
distributing the images and narratives began to refer to a global alliance, a solidarity 
amongst all Chinese against oppression of Chinese. In the midst of this, they ignored the 
plight of the East Timorese, because it did not fit their binary. 
  Another theme that emerges in both the kinds of reactions online and the 
violence against the Chinese is the perspective of Chinese as transnational elites. This 
view of “parachute Chinese” sees them as without loyalty to the nation they reside in 
and with a mobility suited to the logic of flexible accumulation that presides in this age 
of transnational capitalism (Ong 1998). The culpability of transnational diasporic 
practices in contributing to or at least enlarging existing social problems, including the 
social stratification in Indonesia should be taken into account. Simultaneously, we need   - 165 - 
to be aware of the problem that the image of the wealthy and mobile Chinese is also a 
dangerous and misleading stereotype. 
6.2 New Hegemonies 
Ang points out that some Chinese Indonesians started to protest against the unthinking 
appropriation of these issues to generate Chinese solidarity thus deepening the trench 
between Chinese and pribumi Indonesians. In addition to the East Timor aspect, an 
interesting development in relation to the discursive violence that can accompany 
cosmopolitans championing of local causes is in the independent spin-off of Huaren, the 
Southeast Asian Hanren Network. The site also attempts to gather overseas Chinese 
under one umbrella, “Southeast Asian Chinese”, ‘Hanren’ literally meaning ‘Han’ 
people, descendants of Emperor Shih Huang-Ti. However, there is some recognition 
that global solidarity has its problems: 
I was inspired to create this site by the need for a venue where the 
Chinese people in this region can speak out on issues specific to us. The 
recent troubles in Indonesia attracted a lot of attention. People all over 
the world were touched by the plight of the Chinese Indonesians and 
many tried to help. Many were also speaking on our behalf. Although the 
intentions were noble, I believe nobody understands our problems better 
than we do. Hence this site. I see myself first and foremost as Southeast 
Asian, not a Chinese who just happen [sic] to be living in Southeast Asia. 
I am deeply concerned about the destiny of my country and feel 
responsible for it. I’m sure many other Southeast Asian Chinese feel the 
same way (Ooi 1998: n.p.). 
The author informs visitors that he is Malaysian Chinese with a Malay grandmother, 
and a girlfriend in Jakarta. In a way, this site points towards the space provided in the 
hybrid, detached-reattached facet of overseas Chinese coupled with an obvious, recently 
challenged, yet crucial aspect of the Internet; its mutability. 
6.3 The Role of the Diasporic Intellectual 
What practices can diasporic intellectuals adopt in order to avoid replicating the 
‘scattered hegemonies’ of transnational cultural flows today? In her discussion of the   - 166 - 
Huaren web site and the rape of Chinese women during the riots, Ien Ang reveals that 
the Huaren producers contacted her for support and her permission for the site to 
reproduce some of her articles on Chinese identity (Ang 1998). Huaren asked her to 
speak on behalf of the Chinese diasporic community. In her own words, “I felt 
interpellated directly and straight forwardly as a diasporic Chinese intellectual, and 
asked to speak up as a member of this group, to speak on behalf of it and for it” (Ang 
1998: n.p.). 
  Ang declined this invitation. In this instance, Rey Chow’s employment of de 
Certeau’s definition of strategy and tactic is useful in considering the agency of 
diasporic intellectuals (Chow 1993). Diasporic intellectuals themselves are involved in 
the development of diasporic consciousness via the intellectualisation of the everyday 
realities of dispersal (Safran 1991 cited in Chow 1993). Their texts may become 
weapons (Michel de Certeau, cited in Chow 1993) in this reproduction of scattered 
hegemonies that accompany the formation of transnational solidarities. Rey Chow 
describes the diasporic intellectual’s dilemma thus: 
Going far beyond the responsibility any individual bears for belonging to 
a community, ‘Chineseness’... lies at the root of a violence which works 
by the most deeply ingrained feelings of ‘bonding’ and which—even at 
the cost of social alienation—diasporic intellectuals must collectively 
resist (Chow 1993: 25). 
Bearing this in mind, Ang’s refusal is an instance of preserving that play between 
location and detachment that has traditionally cast cosmopolitans under suspicion by 
nationalists, but is instead a positive tactic that avoids the seductive lure of solidarity 
based on ethnic affiliation. In addition, she enacts and proposes hybridity as a resistive 
tactic that does not rule out other avenues of going against the grain of these 
transnational imaginary communities and their attendant hegemonies. Hybridity’s 
smudging of borders, fluidity, and mutability should not be considered redundant but as   - 167 - 
ongoing tactics that work on a micro-scale, a process of erosion rather than a systematic 
centralised strategy that installs new marginalising discourses and habitats. 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I do not argue against all forms of online activism, or against the 
involvement of relatively well-positioned elites in regional issues. The online activism 
at the very least did draw attention to the rapes, raised awareness, and kept the issue in 
the public spotlight internationally. This international attention compelled the then-new 
Habibie government, which took office after Suharto’s resignation, to set up a 
government team to investigate the accounts. 
  My concern here is, however, with the homogenising effect of the practices and 
discourses that this case illustrates. The case of the online dissemination of stories and 
images of raped ethnic Chinese women indicates how a politics that emphasises ethnic 
solidarity and homogeneity can bury the particularities of a local situation. The 
indications that people outside the local community could have planned and instigated 
the riots and rapes were ignored in favour of a position that preferred to emphasise an 
oppositional relationship between ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese. This is partly a 
consequence of the emphasis on diasporic identification and solidarity. 
  The emphasis on race in directing the responses of readers and viewers of these 
stories and images online repeated the totalising process behind the violence in 
Indonesia. The web bulletin boards of sites like Huaren included the occasional post that 
reminded readers not to draw all pribumi Indonesians with a broad brush-stroke, but 
heated responses that reasserted the bipolar image of Chinese pitted against pribumi and 
other non-Chinese drowned out these messages. A hegemonic formation was 
established in the process, whereby ethnic Chinese were aligned globally within the 
‘Chinese diaspora’.   - 168 - 
  At the same time, the very technologies that allow these totalising formations 
and strategies can provide avenues for tactics of resistance. I have sought to identify, in 
this case study, some of the problems with Internet activism. As I have said in my 
introduction, the same attributes that allow the Internet to be such a positive tool for 
social activism allow these problems of representation, authenticity, and appropriation. 
This misappropriation points to the necessity of retaining a strong grounding in the 
physical, cultural, political and social environment surrounding these issues. An 
organisation with close ties and involvement of the locals affected by the issues, could 
deploy the advantages offered by the Internet to reach a wider international community, 
collaborate with other organisations, and lobby for change. 
The key is to tread between cybertopia and cyberghetto, to recognise the 
dangers, limitations (structurally inherent or otherwise), as well as find the potential, of 
this technology, and employ tactics that resist these universalising discourses of 
solidarity. This medium is employed increasingly to address social inequality and crises, 
such as violence directed against ethnic communities. These developments of online 
activism and extremism, of increasing polarisation in interaction certainly need closer 
examination. Generally, this research has to take into account how the Internet as a 
technology is structured, how software developments, Internet conventions and 
practices, and so forth, are not neutral technologies but are likely to be affected by the 
particular economies that produced them. More specifically, we also have to be aware 
of the hazards of transnational diasporans who have the luxury of playing national 
heroes on the other side of the world. Academics studying diaspora, and race and 
cultural studies, need to research the interface (or lack thereof) between the local, the 
global, and how these recent developments in communication technology affect and are 
affected by practices and tactics of online activists. CHAPTER FOUR 
Online Activism: The Anti-Capitalist Network 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Online Activism: The Anti-Capitalist Network 
1. Introduction 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, the Internet offers scope to activists to contact 
like-minded individuals. A guide to online activist tools begins, “The Internet makes it 
possible for activists to expand our networks by identifying and contacting activists in 
other communities who have similar interests” (NetAction/The Tides Center 1998). 
This, in itself, is not totally novel: Appadurai argues that the electronic media have 
transformed the “work of the imagination” (the reworking of social life in art, myth, 
ritual and dreams), and uses the example of diasporic communities to illustrate 
discontinuities, for instance, ruptures between the discourses of nation, ethnicity and 
culture (Appadurai 1996: 7). Chapter Three examined one instance of the use of the 
Internet to construct a network to address problems across national boundaries and 
geographical space, a network based on ethnic affiliation. In this chapter, I explore 
another type of transnational network, one based on a discourse and ideology that is 
meant to embrace the local, but works on a global scale. I look at the ways in which the 
development of Internet technology and practices, as Appadurai puts it, “can become 
the fuel for action” and how: 
[i]t is the imagination, in its collective forms, that creates ideas of 
neighbourhood and nationhood, of moral economies and unjust rule, of 
higher wages and foreign labour projects. The imagination is today a 
staging ground for action, and not only for escape (Appadurai 1996: 7). 
He continues to describe how this occurs through the mass media creating “sodalities”, 
that is, communities with the potential to move from “shared imagination to collective 
action” (Appadurai 1996: 8). I am interested in the forms of ethics and tactics that are   - 171 - 
palatable in the light of the increased velocity and reach of transnational communication 
technologies like the Internet. It was with this in mind that I identify and analyse various 
tactics and modes of practice in activism reliant upon the Internet. 
2. The Context of Globalisation and Cosmopolitanism 
In considering the significance, impact, and practices of online activism, my 
assumptions regarding the cultural and economic context of globalisation and 
cosmopolitanism, outlined in the introductory chapter, significantly shape this analysis 
of organisations using the Internet for activism. The implications of this environment 
for local marginal cultures form the backdrop for my analysis of the activist groups 
online. This chapter discusses forms of appropriation by local and marginal groups, 
using the technology most touted as ‘global’ and ‘empowering’, the Internet. I argue 
that the same technologies and modes of representation, as much as they control and 
shape the imagination in ways which support imperialism, are paradoxically avenues for 
resistance and empowerment. For instance, individuals and groups can appropriate 
global culture and communication for alternative forms of identity formation (outside 
the strictures of the local environment) and as a means to combat local oppression. 
However, activists need to balance this with the dangers of globalisation firmly in 
mind—for instance, the possibility of cultural homogenisation. 
2.1 Grassroots Globalisation 
In my introductory chapter, I discussed how, in the late nineteenth century, some writers 
identified globalisation as a process that developed in conjunction with and in support 
of colonialism. Likewise, some analysts now view current global processes as linked to 
modernisation, in particular, Americanisation, contributing to the uneven distribution of 
capital and knowledge and consolidating the division of labour established in colonial   - 172 - 
times. As Arrighi and Silver point out, towards the end of the twentieth century, the 
concern regarding subordinate groups is whether they face a: 
‘race to the bottom’ in wages and working conditions as the world’s 
workers are brought into competition in a single labour market … the 
threat of capital flight [is] realistic and palatable everywhere. The result 
is an overall decline in the capacity of workers to protect and advance 
their interests (1999: 10). 
Appadurai sees promise in the phenomenon of globalisation from below, which 
he says is already happening and addresses the current development of a “double 
apartheid”  (2000: 2). The first divide is between the understanding and debates 
surrounding globalisation in the academy and that of “vernacular discourses about the 
global, worldwide, that are typically concerned with how to plausibly protect cultural 
autonomy and economic survival in some local, national, or regional, sphere” (2000: 2) 
in the era of globalisation. The second apartheid describes how the poor and their 
activists are left out of these two realms of debate. These gaps are under challenge: 
But a series of social forms has emerged to contest, interrogate, and 
reverse these developments and to create forms of knowledge transfer 
and social mobilization that proceed independently of the actions of 
corporate capital and the nation-state system (and its internal affiliates 
and guarantors). 
These social forms work on behalf of the poor using “strategies, visions and horizons 
for globalization” that Appadurai terms “grassroots globalisation” (2000: 2). 
  This ‘grassroots globalisation’ is seen in the worldwide emergence of 
institutions, in particular, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), “concerned with 
mobilizing highly specific local, national, and regional groups on matters of equity, 
access, justice, and redistribution” (Appadurai 2000: 15, my emphasis). According to 
Appadurai, these play out the local and particular on a global arena and work against the 
inequitable aspects of globalising forces whilst adapting the structures of 
communication and organization introduced by the latter. He sees the promise of     - 173 - 
‘globalisation from below’ in NGOs which “are self-consciously global in their 
concerns and their strategies[;] … this subgroup has recently been labelled 
transnational advocacy networks (herefter, TANs)” (2000: 15, my emphasis). 
 These  ‘TANs’ could address two results of globalisation: the “predatory 
mobility” of global capital, and the “compromised sovereignty” of the state (Appadurai 
2000: 16, discussed in [globalisation section]). However, as Appadurai goes on to 
suggest, the problem is that: 
[m]ost TANs suffer from their inability to counter global capital precisely 
in its global dimensions. They often lack the assets, the vision, the 
planning and the brute energy of capital to globalize through the capture 
of markets, the hijacking of public resources, the erosion of state 
sovereignties, and the control of media. 
In the same article, Appadurai remarks on how new information technologies contribute 
to the increasing reach and speed of global capital “as measures of integration and 
interconnectivity.” However, the new information technologies also open up 
possibilities for resistance to global capital, as seen in the anti-Nike and MacDonalds’ 
websites. My intention is not to disregard or deny the former role but to address the 
extent and ways in which activists working against global capital both locally and 
transnationally can commandeer these technologies.
1 Some writers see the Internet as a 
contested territory that offers possibilities for resistance and the creation of a democratic 
public sphere: “A large number of insurgent intellectuals are already making use of 
these new technologies and public spheres in their political projects,” writes Kellner, 
citing the example of the Zapatistas (1999: 106). 
  In this chapter, I also discuss developments in online activism that begins to 
address the problems of vocabulary and awareness described by Appadurai. He suggests 
that the language used by universities and policy-makers in describing global issues, 
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missions, and strategies, estranges grassroots advocacy networks. I argue that certain 
activists using the Internet do have a clear understanding of the advantages of counter-
globalisation in general and how it could introduce “locational, informational, and 
political flexibility currently monopolized by global corporations and their national-
civic allies” (2000: 17).
2  The forms of activism under examination here also benefit 
from modern variants of cosmopolitanism in the sense that, as in traditional 
cosmopolitanism, there is a gaze beyond the local; there is a sense of connectedness and 
commitment to a wider humanity. At the same time, in these later forms of 
cosmopolitanism, there is also a strong awareness of the need to remain tied to the 
particular and local.
3 
  The concern for a wider humanity, or, a sense of connectedness with other issues 
and other places, allows the formation of transnational alliances that bind together 
activists working in different locations and on different issues, with concerns that 
overlap, in this case, concerns surrounding globalisation. Concurrently, there needs to 
be a strong connection with the local and particular to reduce the same problems of 
representation, that is, the homogenisation, objectification and appropriation of the 
politics and issues of cultural others (discussed in Chapter Three). At least a strong, 
critical consciousness and a praxis that maintains these ties with the grassroots helps 
minimise these problems of representation while allowing activists to work against 
global capital in its arena. The discourse that structures the forms of activism under 
examination here is one that tries to balance all these requirements in its development of 
a global activism against global capitalism. 
                                                 
2 Appadurai ends his essay by describing a critical pedagogy based upon innovations in talking about and 
sharing knowledge about globalisation, a pedagogy that could facilitate new dialogue between academics, 
activists, policy-makers and intellectuals in various cultures (2000: 18). 
3 For an explanation of these forms of cosmopolitanism, see Introduction.   - 175 - 
Foucault’s ideas about discourse, truth, and power are instructive in this analysis 
of websites in relation to globalisation and progressive politics. His discussion of the 
way discourse defines ‘what counts as truth’ in society; the complex interplay and 
changes between and within discourses and how power runs through discourse and 
positions subjects are particularly useful. While I use the singular, ‘discourse’, this is 
not to indicate that there is one universal discourse, unchanging across contexts; as 
Foucault claims: 
There is not (or, at least, as far as the historical description whose 
possibility we are tracing here is concerned) a sort of ideal discourse that 
is both ultimate and timeless, and which choices [sic], extrinsic in origin, 
have perverted, disturbed, suppressed, or thrust towards a possibly distant 
future… (Foucault 1972: 70). 
I use the singular form to refer to the concept in abstract terms while acknowledging 
that there are multiple discourses in society, competing, complementing, replacing and 
appropriating one another. New discourses can emerge out of the ashes of old ones, and 
old discourses can fade in relevance. 
This analysis is a synchronic account of a fluid, changing field, which yet retains 
certain constant elements, in reaction to Foucault’s criticism that the act of analysis 
often presents the field as static. This is to avoid the problem he had with disciplines 
like archaeology (of his time), that is, “to treat history only to freeze it” (Foucault 
1972:166). The analysis, therefore, traces, not some universal form of discourse for 
action, global action, ‘anti-neo-liberalism’, anti-globalisation’ or ‘anti-capitalist’ 
action,
4 in the twenty-first century, rather, it describes discursive developments within a 
particular timeframe, that is, from the later half of the nineteen-nineties to the beginning 
of the twenty-first century, and pertaining to particular events and groups. 
                                                 
4 The phrases, ‘anti-globalisation’ and ‘anti-capitalism,’ are used interchangeably with the other terms as 
they are the terms used in popular discourse, for instance, by the mass media, to describe these activists 
and actions. However, some activists have pointed out that it is more accurate to call them ‘anti-neo-
liberalism’ as they are not against ‘globalisation,’ using as they do global processes and channels. Nor are 
all of them ‘anti-capital’ (Graeber 2001).   - 176 - 
3. Tactics and Modes of Practice in Online Web Activism: A 
Case Study 
3.1 S11, www.s11.org 
3.1.1 Description of Site 
On 12 June 2001, entering the ‘root’ level
5 of the S11 site (the home page), 
www.s11.org, I was presented with an arresting sight: the running backs of three naked 
people, two males and one female, against a plain blue backdrop. Members of S11 have 
since updated this page so it is no longer available. However, an analysis of this old 
page is still worthwhile as it expressed key aspects of the S11 organisation, which, 
although not encompassing all of the operations and meanings put forth in their website, 
serves as a valuable introduction to the sorts of subject positioning that informs their 
work. Past visitors to the sites, whether activists, journalists, law enforcers or other 
parties, would have the meanings generated by this page in their memory, they are 
likely to influence readings of the activities and material put forward in this, and other 
subsequent websites and actions. I, therefore, analyse the page as a cultural memory: a 
historical residue in the consciousness of a significant portion of the current website 
visitors that continues to have an impact on the present. Most of these are also elements 
of the global action discourse that have been carried over from the past. I will discuss 
the development of these tropes in the later part of this chapter. 
                                                 
5 I refer to the way websites are often organised like file directories on our personal computer 
hard-drives—often, when we type in a basic URL, web address, such as www.s11.org, we are presented 
with the page on the root directory, usually called the ‘home’ page. Conventionally, this page is named 
“index.html” and this page may contain links to other pages on the site, such as “www.s11.org/m1” – the 
backslash indicates that the page is on a ‘branching’ directory from the root. However, also as frequently, 
the Internet user may not even get to the home page, rather, the file on the root directory immediately 
directs the Internet user to a different page; in the case of S11, this maintains the way pages may be 
organised thematically (i.e. keep the files in the directory, m1) while directing the Internet user to the 
updated, more current, content seamlessly.   - 177 - 
3.1.2 “Would Jesus have gone to S11?” 
Figure 1: S11’s ‘base level’ Web page (www.s11.org, on 9 October 2001) 
The figures of the three naked individuals, besides being iconic (being photographs), are 
also indexical and symbolic (Pierce, 1931, cited in Silverman 1983). The figures seem 
caught in motion, the one in the foreground seems to be running, and they all are 
moving towards a destination not revealed ostensibly, but, as the large lettering on top 
indicates, quite obviously towards the current action, the M1 (May 1
st 2001) 
demonstrations. The figures, therefore, are indexical in the sense that they are pointing 
the Internet user towards another object—this impression is achieved by the sense of 
movement and the position of the viewer behind the, gazing in the same direction they 
are moving. The man on the right is even pointing outwards and upwards, seemingly 
towards the ‘m1’ lettering. In a metonymic fashion, the three figures appear to be part of 
a past protest. Symbolically, the three represent both the participants in global actions 
and the ‘spirit’ of the anti-globalisation movement. In public nudity, there is always a 
mixture of threat and vulnerability—that is, boundaries and taboos surrounding public   - 178 - 
behaviour and sexuality are challenged whilst the lack of protection and weapons 
declare their vulnerability.
6 There is also a sense of pride in public displays of the 
body—defiance against shame. Finally, public nudity is one of the most effective forms 
of calling attention to an issue—ostensibly the central drive of protestor activity. While 
the dreadlocks
7 and dyed hair are contemporary, they are simultaneously evocative of 
traditional counter-culture, where dress and the way people wear their hair emphasises 
the difference in their lifestyles, attitudes and beliefs from the mainstream (read 
dominant discourse). 
These suggestions of vulnerability, challenge, pride, youth and contemporariness 
linked with traditional counter-culture are a call to a path to spiritual rapture or a better 
future. This latter claim may sound like a stretch of my imagination, but the effects 
created by digital image editors
8 plus the banner below the image achieves this 
impression. The diffused white border around the figures and lettering, albeit a 
conventional technique used often in photographic and graphic manipulation of objects, 
creates a kind of ‘halo’ effect. They are moving forward, the pair holding hands in front 
are smaller than the one in the foreground, leading the eye towards a destination hinted 
at by the other signs in this text. The blue background is evocative of clear blue skies, 
and, along with all the outdoor activities a fine day can promise, brings to mind 
optimism and a bright outlook. This is reinforced by the high contrast of the nude 
figures, apparently taken in strong daylight. Finally, the banner below this dissolves 
between “would Jesus have gone to S11?” and “will you go to mayday 2001?” In 
western epistemology, the figure of “Jesus” means several things, but the meanings 
evoked in this context refers to those of divinity and strength combined with human 
                                                 
6 As I show, this is in keeping with the theme of non-violence. 
7 ‘Dreadlocks’ describes a hairstyle where the hair strands are randomly knotted and fused together in 
locks. It is traditionally associated with Rastafarians, but is now an alternative culture style somewhat 
detached from the Rastafarian religion and way of life. 
8 Photoshop and CorelDraw are examples of software that can digitally manipulate images and 
photographs.   - 179 - 
frailty and self-sacrifice to the masses for the salvation and hope of humanity. Thus, the 
reader establishes the link between the three naked figures, the figure of ‘Jesus’ and 
Christian salvation, and the anti-globalisation actions. 
In the context of the anti-globalisation movement, some of these meanings have 
a lot to do with the rhizomorphic spread of websites left in the wake of the different 
actions staged across the globe. The Mayday 2001 action, or ‘M1’, occurred, not in 
isolation, but was the latest in a series that began on 18 June 1998. The page refers the 
Internet user to both the past action, S11, and the current one, M1, and links the two in 
three ways: the huge “S11=M1” near the top, the banner below, and the links to the “old 
site – frozen” and the “new site: live now”. I will discuss some of the reasons for this 
later. However, the immediate practical end here is to provide a smooth transition, and 
enough notice, to Internet users that a new action is being planned. This notice is for 
people who have used this site before and are checking on updates, or people who have 
not seen this site before but would like information on either the old action, which they 
may have heard of elsewhere, or would like information on the current developments. 
Semiotically, the two are linked in meaning—that is, quite obviously, equating the new 
planned action with the old one, which was, by then, legendary (or infamous, depending 
on perspective)—in a sense, saying to the user, “Remember S11, well, you can be part of 
something like that now.” 
Significantly, too, the names of the action, S11 and M1, are, by now, a common 
strategic element. They link the local action to a series of actions across the globe (see 
Table 2, page  230), that is, making temporal and spatial associations, through the 
convention of combining the first letter of the month and the day of the event around 
which actions are organised—thus, the letter ‘S’ for September, and the numeral ‘11’ 
for the eleventh. In this way, the activists link the action in Melbourne on 11 September 
2001, ‘M1,’ to the September 11
th demonstrations in Melbourne the previous year and to   - 180 - 
‘N30,’ Seattle, 30 November 1999. This shorthand displaces the various meanings 
associated with these other, earlier, events, for instance, civil disruption, peaceful 
protests that turned violent, strikes against globalisation and global corporations, onto 
the new ones. Over time, the naming method facilitates the building of legends amongst 
activists, media, and people not connected with the action, all conveniently collected 
under short labels. They are also an ingenious device that reminds all and sundry of the 
timing of this event, including the press, television and radio, other protestors, potential 
spectators, and so forth. 
Another link with past actions, their events and meanings, with the ongoing or 
upcoming ones is accessible via the images of the three naked figures: in this case, 
some
9 protestors stripped off in celebration of the final day of the S11 protests (30 
September 2001). Police charged at least three protestors with offensive behaviour. In 
all three cases, the presiding magistrate dismissed this charge but fined one three 
hundred dollars for providing a false name, and awarded the other two seven hundred 
and fifty dollars in legal costs against the police (Butcher 2001). The image of the three 
naked protestors celebrates the outcome of the legal actions against the nude protestors 
and is an online repetition of the ‘offending’ act. For the viewers who already are aware 
of this connection, this image is a playful gibe at the authorities. The web page, in 
invoking this memory, connects with the audience members equipped with this 
knowledge, whether they were present, or absent, and sympathetic, or not, to the 
protestors’ activities. This particular link is a local one, that is, it specifically connects 
with the Melbourne action and its developments, and Melbourne-dwellers are more 
likely to be informed of these proceedings as they play out in the state-based 
newspapers and other media than people living elsewhere. 
                                                 
9 One newspaper source counted six in total (The Australian 2001), and the S11 site mentions four that ran 
a ‘victory lap’ around the crown casino and clashed with police (S-11 2001b).   - 181 - 
At the same time, the distinctive discursive operations of this website vis a vis 
global/local networking is one more instance of a universal motif, that is, the 
prosecution of anti-globalisation protestors around the world. This technique is 
ironically similar to some of the techniques of prominent global corporations, that is, the 
use of a central motif adjusted to maximise local cultural formations. This is a technique 
of merging local and global connections to effectively mobilise individuals and groups 
in local communities, while simultaneously connecting them up to a wider movement, 
using the meanings, knowledge (discourses), the techniques and operations, already 
established across the world. 
To sum up, from an analysis of this page, significant techniques and meanings 
emerge which trope through the other websites spawned in the global anti-globalisation 
movement. They are interdependent semiotic structures that reinforce and buttress these 
organizations; they are linked together in signifying chains, and, hence, connect the 
various affiliates that utilise these meanings. The first of these is the formation of 
communality through counter-culture associations, inspired by the promise of spiritual 
rapture or a utopian future (and the fear of its opposite, a present dystopia), and 
martyrdom via self-sacrifice for the greater good. Secondly, this communality merges 
with the global in space and time through constant references to past actions spanning 
different places and times since the inception of this particular movement. While the 
novelty of organising via the Internet is not lost on the members of the organizations, 
the websites also enact meanings and actions that bind them to traditional forms of 
protest. Some of these include the juxtaposition of peaceful protestors against hostile 
authority figures who legally prosecute and enact violence upon the protestors. Another 
contrast is the combination of threat with vulnerability: while the activists seek attention 
through the violating of boundaries, signifiers of defencelessness often accompany the 
implied threat. The thematic of opposition to authority and civil disruption recurs   - 182 - 
online, either in the retelling of the events through bulletins and reports or in the use of 
material from the events, for instance, photographs and slogans. 
3.2 Structure of the Global Action Network 
In this section, I am using the word, ‘network’, to refer to the following connections: 
that between the actions listed in Table 2 (Page 230) as well as between the groups 
involved in each action, not just technically, but also semiotically, communicatively, 
and organisationally. I am not using it in the computing and Internet sense, that is, a 
series of terminals, computers, and Internet sites linked up on one or more servers.
10 
The strength of these actions is in the establishment and nature of these bonds, 
especially their flexibility. Many of these ties are not formal and fixed but are unofficial 
and fluid; the structure of the network obtains these characteristics. I have mentioned 
that the organisational structure of the network is rhizomorphic.
11 This is, 
coincidentally, a structure common to the Internet, and it is worth reflecting on this 
coincidence as it reveals some of the common cultural assumptions and goals in the 
development of both the global action network and the Internet. 
  Deleuze and Guattari are critical of the traditional Western forms of writing and 
philosophy; these betray a ‘tree-based’ (arborescent) structure that is hierarchical in its 
branching offs, centralised in having a primary tap root and fixed in always tracing back 
to the singular, central structure. They argue, “this thought has never understood 
multiplicity: it requires a strong principal unity as a presupposition in order to arrive at 
two following an intellectual method” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983). The rhizome, on the 
other hand, “connects any point with any other point … has neither beginning nor end, 
but always a middle, through which it pushes and overflows” (47). Moreover, “the 
                                                 
10 These include, for instance, the intranets of some organizations, like a university network, or larger 
scale networks, like Microsoft.com 
11 Rather than strictly rhizomatic, the Internet features structures which veer between tree-based and 
rhizomic, hence, I use the term, ‘rhizomorphic.’   - 183 - 
rhizome refers to a map that must be produced or constructed, is always detachable, 
connectable, reversible, and modifiable, with multiple entrances and exits, with its lines 
of flight” (48-49). Finally, these represent extremes, it is possible for certain root-based 
structures to be rhizomorphic at certain nodes, and tree structures to exist in rhizomes.  
The preceding description suggests why certain rhizomorphic features of the 
Internet and the network of the activist groups are useful. The Internet allows for a 
fluidity affiliate groups can link from or form links to the websites and actions.
12 It 
provides many different ways in which one could enter and exit this network and its 
discourse, and the sense of not having a fixed beginning or ending, because of the 
multiplicity of groups and histories involved. All these features suggest a rhizome-like 
structure. Yet, some degree of arborescence is also incorporated: the websites have a 
degree of hierarchical organisation with ‘root’ index pages that lead to subsidiary sites 
(even if a user may still enter a site from any point), the groups themselves also have 
representatives and divisions through which decisions are made and tasks are divided. 
This is why I suggest that the network of lines connecting the various ‘nodes’ (groups 
and actions) have a rhizomorphic rather than rhizomatic structure: the network oscillates 
between tree and root and rhizome structures. A progressive politics that wishes to 
avoid hierarchy and centralised organisation is likely to see the rhizome structure as 
most suitable to its needs. As I will indicate later, many in the network understand this. 
I contacted the S11 organization and asked if they could answer some of my 
questions. The response was cooperative and established the principle that the actions 
should be and are coordinated through a ‘non-hierarchical’ structure of power. He or she 
was willing to answer the questions, but only as a “s11.org webmaster”, saying, “with 
our power structure of affinity groups its impossible for ANYONE to be a s11 
spokesperson” (personal communication 2001). This brings me to consider an issue in 
                                                 
12 By ‘links,’ I refer to hypertext linking, but, in this case, the other meanings also apply.   - 184 - 
my approach to the field, that is, when studying a network that is presenting an image of 
being deliberately non-hierarchical, and grassroots-directed, how far is it valid or 
possible to trace the ‘origins’? This question still stands even if I avoid over-prioritising 
the agency of particular individuals or groups in describing the development of this type 
of activism (Foucault 1972).
13 
  I began this research after the 30 November 1999 action in Seattle. I therefore 
worked backwards through the websites of past actions and followed links to more 
information. In some instances, the trail was cold: some links were outdated and did not 
work, some websites were not longer kept on the server they used to be on, and had 
been moved or simply were no longer available. Additionally, the websites tended to 
avoid or neglect identifying an agent that was initiating all the actions. Contacts tended 
to be for the particular action of the day and the site directed readers to email addresses 
rather than phone numbers. Some of the email (and postal) addresses were no longer in 
use, being set up for the duration of the action, and webmasters and organisers often 
gave ‘pseudonymous’
14 addresses. 
I decided that the actual process of tracing the sites through ‘web-surfing’ was a 
good test of whether the actions and affiliates were as ‘decentred’ as they made out, at 
least, in terms of the content and the way the websites were constructed and linked up. 
The fact that I was able to identify the group that kept track and initiated most of the 
actions (at least, the more prominent ones) indicates that the actions were not 
completely random and initiated by local groups. On the other hand, the task was 
difficult and time-consuming
15 enough to suggest that the network was highly 
                                                 
13 Foucault’s stance on this is that such subject-centred analyses tend to neglect the crucial discursive 
elements that play a significant part in the development and maintenance of cultural formations. On the 
other hand, the Zapatistas and their leader, Subcommandant Marcos, are significant in as much as they are 
important signifiers in the discourse. 
14 For an explanation of this term, see Chapter 1, page 46. 
15 Some sites would identify another site that began the particular action, on looking at this site, I would 
discover yet another organization behind it, or reach a dead end. It was through exhausting the links in 
this way that a very likely candidate was unearthed.   - 185 - 
successful in maintaining its decentred and grassroots-based approach to organization. I 
am interested in, and analyse, how this strategy of working through affinity groups 
translates into practice through information available in the selected websites. 
Foucault’s work on discursive formations is useful for doing this. Foucault 
argues that a discursive formation is identifiable through common patterns in the 
ordering of objects, kind of statements made possible, ideas and theories. He argues 
that: 
Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a 
system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, 
concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, 
correlations, positions and functionings, transformations), we will say, 
for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with a discursive 
formation… (Foucault 1972: 38). 
In the process of identifying the discursive formation of anti-capitalist activism, I also 
examine certain significant junctures in its development to the present form. 
Anti-capitalist activism has moved on from its ‘roots,’ redressed itself according to 
particular contexts of time and place – but it has an inheritance that has directed its 
changes, that has informed its practices and responses. 
3.3 The Codes of the Network: an Historical Account 
The activists’ aim for a decentred, non-hierarchical yet closely connected network is 
reflected, maintained and re-introduced in each website through semiotic coding. David 
Chandler defines a semiotic code as “a set of practices familiar to users of the medium 
operating within a broad cultural framework” (Chandler 1994: n.p.). Here, I am 
describing the diverse and multiply-located participants in these actions as operating 
within a transnational framework that shares certain common practices or semiotic 
codes. Semiotic codes are the socially-defined rules for constructing meaning out of 
signifiers. While the web page analysed earlier uses traditional codes, for instance, 
typography, layout, and photography, some of the deployments of these codes in the   - 186 - 
specific combinations identified above are becoming unique to this genre and form of 
activism. 
In this less than exhaustive semiotic analysis, I aim to identify common patterns 
in the use of semiotic codes, and thereby to identify some of the ‘truths’ in this 
particular discourse. I juxtapose these ‘truths’ against the structural organization and 
operation of these activist groups to illustrate the degree to which they are a response to 
globalisation, that is, how far they appropriate some of its methods and meanings. There 
is also the possibility that these networks may replicate, to the detriment of their explicit 
objectives, the operations of the thing they criticise. The approach here is diachronic in 
that I am studying the evolution of this semiotic code over time, and its articulation 
within an identifiable discursive formation, that is, of anti-capitalist global activism. I 
am also identifying this evolving system through its deployment, that is, discerning the 
langue from the parole, the ‘grammar’ of global action activism through the usage. In 
this latter aspect, I am aided somewhat by the fact that many of the organizations have 
already clearly drawn up the principles of this ‘grammar’, and the most significant of 
these is the Peoples’ Global Action (PGA). 
3.3.1 The Peoples’ Global Action 
In the following discussion of events leading to the formation of the PGA and its first 
global action, I am aware of the need to maintain a balance, that is, depicting the aims, 
goals, and practices of the movement without becoming an uncritical promoter. On the 
other hand, a critical analysis of the movement would be weak if it became overly 
sceptical and patronising and failed to acknowledge its achievements or potential. 
Hence, this description is written about the surface of the discourse. Readers should not 
regard it as total approval or support of its feats, that is, not “How successful is the   - 187 - 
movement in attaining its ideals?” but, rather, “How successful has the discourse of the 
movement been in establishing, reproducing and maintaining itself?” 
3.3.2 The Zapatistas 
The first global action that captured the attention of the various media and audiences 
world-wide was in Seattle, November 30 1999, mainly because of the effects of the 
activists upon the third conference of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the 
operations of the city itself, and the reaction of the city government and its law 
enforcers. There was another reason, and this was to do with the simultaneous protests 
world-wide:  
Whether you were on the streets of Seattle that day dodging the rubber 
bullets, or following the hundreds of bullock carts converging on the 
Narmada dam in India, or marching with trade unionists in Manila, or in 
London trapped by the £3m police operation, or mocking the stock 
exchange in Buenos Aires, or even occupying a McDonalds in Milan... 
one thing was clear to everyone:  at the end of the 20th century resistance 
had become as transnational as capital (Peoples' Global Action 2000a: 
n.p., my emphasis). 
However, as well known as the Seattle event is, this was not the beginning of this 
network neither was it the first global action. The fifth bulletin of the Peoples’ Global 
Action website, dated February 2000, under the section, ‘The Accelerating History of 
PGA’, provides an interesting history. The syntactical ordering of the history is telling. It 
begins with a reference to Berlin, how it was supposed to be the end of history, moves 
on to Seattle, saying, “It was clear that history had a lot further to go”. However, it is 
also clear, in the move away from Seattle, and the emphasis in the quote below, that the 
movement is trying to get away from the image that these actions originate from as 
Western a place as Seattle: 
It wasn't in the acrid mist of Seattle's tear gas that this global movement 
was born, but in the humid mist of the Chiapas jungle, in Southern 
Mexico on New Years Day 1994. This was the day the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect, a day when two 
thousand indigenous peoples from several groups came out from the   - 188 - 
mountains and forests. Masked, armed and calling themselves Zapatistas, 
their battle cry was "Ya Basta" - "Enough is Enough". An extraordinary 
popular uprising, which was to help change the landscape of global 
resistance, had begun. Using a jungle battered laptop computer and 
intermediaries to get the discs to an internet connected computer, the 
Zapatistas were able to bypass the media censorship of the Mexican state 
and communicate directly. People everywhere soon heard of the uprising 
(Peoples' Global Action 2000a: n.p.). 
While celebrating the fame and achievements of Seattle, and claiming it for its own, the 
movement simultaneously breaks away from this by beginning the paragraph with “It 
wasn’t… Seattle”—placing this negation in the forefront. This rupture is lessened 
somewhat through displacement and the use of similarity. The use of displacement, as 
Silverman points out, “neutralizes the differences between two similar or contiguous 
things by asserting their emotional equivalence
” (1983: 89), this is apparent in the 
repetition of the word, ‘mist’, first in the “acrid mist” of tear gas in Seattle, second, in 
the “humid mist” in Chiapas. Both evoke a stifling, in the case of Seattle, a decidedly 
unhealthy, atmosphere, with human figures surrounded by a haze. While the Zapatistas 
have a mysterious central figure, Marcos, who provides a rallying point for their 
activities, this is not evident here. However, the similarity in their construction in the 
above passage overrides this key difference. The figures and actions of the participants, 
in this passage, are renowned and celebrated, but not on an individual level—they are 
half-shrouded in mist and anonymous. This is a pattern manifested in other global 
actions. 
On a broader level, the Zapatistas in Mexico and the activists in Seattle both are 
working against the dominant ideology and power in society and supporting or 
representing the disenfranchised. Specifically, both also see the forces of globalisation 
as key agents of oppression and the need to reach beyond the local and particular, while 
retaining their specificities, in order to undermine these global processes and agents. 
This practice is also clear in the earlier passage quoted: the contrasts between the   - 189 - 
actions in Seattle, India, London, Manila, Buenos Aires and Milan are highlighted, for 
this is part of the currency of the global action movement: the multiplicity of issues and 
participants involved. The PGA also emphasises the correspondence between all these 
different actions, their locations and concerns, is also emphasised. They all fall under, in 
this rubric, resistance on a transnational basis, attempts to engage with a common foe, 
global capital, on its own turf. 
There are significant differences, of course. “Displacement involves the transfer 
of psychic intensity from an unacceptable element to an acceptable one” (Silverman 
1983: 89) and the differences indicate why the new element here, Chiapas, is more 
acceptable as the origins of the global action movement. The first clues are discernible 
in the differences between the ‘mists.’ Tear gas is synthetic and often used in urban civil 
unrest, whilst the phrase ‘humid mist’ does not immediately evoke an urban 
environment, being the result of a combination of a sultry climate and thick vegetation. 
Then, of course, there is the contrast between the city, Seattle, and the jungle in 
Chiapas, Mexico. The former is in the North hemisphere, the latter in the South; one has 
an urban environment, the other rural. It is not a great stretch to imagine why, at this 
point in the movement, its members are keen to highlight the movement’s roots in 
Chiapas, while celebrating the accomplishments of Seattle. The Peoples’ Global Action 
is closely allied to interests that began the spread of global action activism, more than 
subsequent organizations that have sprung up since. The semiotic choices in the above 
passage reflect the desire to keep this connection active, to harness the power and 
renown of the newer movements to these originating ones. Not doing so might 
otherwise open the actions to dismissal as originating from ‘liberal western university 
students’, a criticism handy not only to the right, but also to the critical left. Having 
indigenous roots also conforms more to the discourse of the movement, particularly the 
notion of organization ‘from below’, that is, at the grassroots level, rather than from   - 190 - 
above—there is more ‘street cred’, as the parlance goes—particularly as the Zapatista 
(Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, hereafter EZLN or Zapatista) cause is 
relatively popular on the Internet. 
The Zapatista rebels are a famous case of insurgents successfully utilising the 
Internet and altering the course of events in the process. Since the mid-twentieth 
century, writers within the political, media-culture and social disciplines write of the 
Zapatista movement and the surge of online activism as, at the least, indicating a 
discursive shift or a fresh form of counter-resistance. Most of the material on the 
Internet is uncritical of the Zapatistas, and to an unusual extent. My search on the 
keyword, “Zapatista”, in November 2001, turned up only a few articles out of seven 
hundred that criticised the Zapatista movement.
16  Since many others have already 
written about Zapatistas, I shall focus mainly on that which is relevant to the topic of the 
global action movement and the development of online activism. 
The two main points of interest to me are the contribution of the Zapatistas to the 
practices of the present-day global action movement, and the critiques of the Zapatistas, 
especially in the processes of organising action, since these also raise points of concern 
that might be relevant to the movements which have since emerged. The global action 
movement’s remarkable awareness of the importance of organisational structure, 
methods of diffusion and the processes of launching operations ensures that a degree of 
discursive unity is preserved through its various networks and offshoots. These are 
observable in the Zapatista example. 
  Chiapas is not a place new to violent conflict and has seen periods of extreme 
tension over issues such as inequitable land distribution, state repression and sanctioned 
violence, environmental destruction and the disenfranchisement and oppression of 
indigenous peoples (Mekenkamp 1998). The Zapatistas named themselves after 
                                                 
16 I will say more about this in my critique near the end of this chapter.   - 191 - 
Emiliano Zapata, a South Mexican revolutionary army general who fought for agrarian 
reform during the Mexican Revolution (1910 to 1920) and was assassinated in 1919. 
The international news media first paid attention to them on New Year’s day, 1994, 
when they took control of San Cristobal and the other towns of Chiapas (Cleaver 1994). 
A researcher and participant in the online activities of the Zapatistas, Harry 
Cleaver, of the University of Texas (Austin), published two influential texts on their 
history and development. These articulate the discursive methods and practices of the 
Zapatistas and their adoption by activist groups elsewhere. The Zapatista insurgency in 
Chiapas coincided with the first day of the operation of North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and its spokespeople unequivocally condemned NAFTA. This, 
consequently, meant that the networks and resources of the organizations anti-NAFTA in 
sentiment were in place and prepared to support and distribute news and information 
about the events to the world: 
Over the last few years the fight against NAFTA took the form of growing 
coalitions of grassroot groups in Canada, the United States and Mexico. 
In each country a broad coalition, such as the Mexican Action Network 
on Free Trade, was constituted by knitting together several hundred 
groups opposed to the new trade pact (Cleaver 1994: n.p.). 
The first lesson for activists was that they could obtain huge benefits from 
forming a massive alliance between many diverse interest groups, the sum, as it were, 
was greater than the parts. The “several hundred groups” represented very different 
concerns: 
From the beginning, the building of alliances to oppose NAFTA involved 
not only the obviously concerned (U.S. workers threatened with losing 
their jobs as plants were relocated to Mexico, Mexicans concerned with 
the invasion of U.S. capital) but a wide variety of others who could see 
the indirect threats in this capitalist reorganization of trade relations, e.g., 
ecological activitists [sic], women's groups, human rights organizations 
and yes, organizations of indigenous groups throughout the continent.   - 192 - 
The adversary they held in common, NAFTA, became a rallying point for all the groups. 
The following passage by Cleaver indicates the inspiration for the global action 
movement: 
Through the years of struggle against NAFTA position papers circulated, 
studies were undertaken, discussion raged about the interconnections of 
the concerns of all these groups. The anti-NAFTA struggle proved to be 
both a catalyst and a vehicle for overcoming the separateness and 
isolation which had previously weakened all of its component groups 
(Cleaver 1994, my emphasis). 
Activists representing wide strata of classes united to make up a ‘fabric of cooperation’. 
Thus, “[t]hat knitting together was accomplished partly through joint discussions and 
actions and partly through the sharing of information and analysis about the meaning 
and implications of the agreement” (Cleaver 1994). In Chapter Three, I wrote of the 
weaving together of ethnic Chinese over the issue of violence against Indonesian 
Chinese.  Similarly, NAFTA and its free trade measures was the rallying point that aided 
the Zapatistas; the events of New Year’s Day 1994 consolidated the associations already 
in the process of establishing. 
After the Chiapas rebellion, the Zapatistas popularised a critique of capitalism 
and “neo-liberalism” and a plan of action against them that became the theoretical 
ground for the ensuing global actions, long after the Zapatista connection itself went 
into disuse or was forgotten.  I shall provide more details of these ideas when I discuss 
the first and second ‘international encounters’ of the People’s Global Action, being the 
founding principles of the global action discourse. At this point, it is sufficient to note 
that publishing these ideas as part of the call for participants in the encounters are 
conceivably the consequence of the successful ‘anti-NAFTA’ politics. 
As Cleaver goes on to point out, the second lesson was the means of this 
networking. The means to link groups separated by distance was already available     - 193 - 
 
through the same technology developed decades earlier by the United States military: 
Increasingly, computer communications became a basic political tool for 
extremely rapid sharing among groups and individuals. The same 
processes of communication linked the coalitions in each country in a 
manner never before seen in the Western Hemisphere (Cleaver 1994: 
n.p.). 
The news of the Chiapas campaign travelled remarkably quickly, considering the 
unexpectedness of the events, and their distance from global media centres. The 
Zapatistas had their statements faxed to several news media from the first day, and 
because other reports were not yet forthcoming, the reporters relied on these statements 
for information on what was going on. The activists supplemented these with reports 
and communication between individuals and groups on email lists, Usenet newsgroups 
and activist networks. These were collated and organised into news digests, increasing 
their accessibility over time and space, and expanding their dissemination outside 
regular participants of Internet forums on Mexican issues: 
As EZLN documents and news reports circulated they generated and were 
quickly acompanied [sic] by discussion, additional information from 
those with an intimate knowledge of Chiapas (e.g., academics who had 
done research in the area, human rights advocates concerned with its long 
history of abuse) and rapidly multiplying analyses of the developing 
situation and its background. All of this electronically circulated 
information and analysis fed into more traditional means of circulating 
news of working class struggle: militant newspapers, magazines and 
radio stations (Cleaver 1994). 
In this way, the Zaptistas used a combination of communication media technologies to 
devastating effect, overcoming the difficulties of distance and equipment, giving the 
Zapatistas prominence in the traditional media and promoting its assertions and 
objectives through other channels of communication.   - 194 - 
  Playing on the mythic origins of the movement, the Chiapas and anti-NAFTA 
movement also inspired the rhizomorphic structure of the anti-globalisation global 
action groups: 
Beyond the particular issue of the agreement, the process of alliance 
building has created a new organizational form – a multiplicity of 
rhizomatically linked autonomous groups – connecting all kinds of 
struggles throughout North America that have previously been 
disconnected and separate (Cleaver 1994). 
Aside from Cleaver, other commentators also explain their attraction to the Zapatistas’ 
cause as being the result of the latter’s goal to make changes in political practice rather 
than supplant the political leadership (Rodriguez 1995; Ten Dam 1999a; Ten Dam 
1999b). In other words, they demanded changes in discursive practices rather than in the 
composition of the dominant subjects in the discourse. In an interview conducted on the 
day of the Zapatistas’ advance in Chiapas, when asked why some of them wore masks, 
Subcomandante Marcos responded: 
Those of us who are more handsome always have to protect ourselves... 
What is happening is that, in this case, the officers are those who are 
masked, for two reasons. One, the primary one, is that we have to watch 
out for protagonism, in other words, that people do not promote 
themselves too much. 
The mask is so that there is no protagonism, if you understand me, that 
we sometimes have a lot of, those of us who get into this business of 
appearing a lot... It is about being anonymous, not because we fear for 
ourselves, but rather so that they cannot corrupt us; for that reason some 
wear ski masks, so that they will not appear often and say, "What about 
me over here?" We know that our leadership is collective and that we 
have to submit to them. Even though you happen to be listening to me 
here now because I am here, but in other places others, masked in the 
same way, are talking. This masked person today is called Marcos here 
and tomorrow will be called Pedro in Margaritas or Josue' in Ocosingo or 
Alfredo in Altamirano or whatever he is called (La Jornada 1994: n.p.). 
This claim that they aim to have no central protagonist is inconsistent with the fact that 
documentary makers, news media and activists centre the Zapatista ideology and 
activities around the masked charismatic figure of Marcos. In addition, Zapatista   - 195 - 
materials prominently feature his statements. This indicates a flaw in this vision that I 
will deal with later; a gap between the explicit objectives and beliefs of the movement, 
and their actualisation in organisational processes and practices. Therefore, for the 
moment, I draw attention to this practice of anonymity, or, at least, the presentation of 
solidarity without placing one key figure into prominence, to highlight another pattern 
taken up in global action discourse. 
Another related theme taken up by global action discourse was the Zapatistas’ 
emphasis on community decision-making. This, and other concepts, was demonstrated 
in communities established in land abandoned by landowners during the uprising.
17 
Community representatives divided these ex-ranch lands amongst the families and 
allocated space, for instance, a house, for international observers. Activists from other 
countries stayed to observe or participate in projects and used this as a model for 
decision-making and networking in their own organizations, especially those working in 
global actions. Weekly assemblies open to everyone in the community enact the 
Zapatistas’ concept of direct democracy and anyone over the age of twelve was entitled 
to vote on decisions affecting the community. Through these observers, Zapatista 
notions like “leading by obeying [the community’s will]” and communal-based ways of 
living spread outside Mexico. 
The participation of intellectuals, students, and academics assisted in the 
diffusion of a comprehensive set of vocabulary, theories, objects and subjectivities 
through different groups, interests, and locations. Cleaver, a good example of this form 
of intellectual contribution, believes that there are, as he puts it, “lessons for all of us” 
from this example: 
It provides something different: an inspiring example of how a workable 
solution to the post-socialist problem of revolutionary organization and 
                                                 
17 A pamphlet, entitled “Chiapas Revealed,” discusses one such area, called Dies de Abril, 10 April, 
named after the day Zapata was assassinated (Irish Mexico Group 2001).   - 196 - 
struggle can be sought. The struggles of the Indians in Chiapas, like the 
anti-NAFTA movement which laid the groundwork for their circulation, 
demonstrate how organization can proceed locally, regionally and 
internationally through a diversity of forms which can be effective 
precisely to the degree that they weave a fabric of cooperation to achieve 
the (often quite different) concrete material projects of the participants 
(Cleaver 1994). 
This, and another article by Cleaver about the Zapatistas (1995), are available from the 
University of Texas server under the aegis of an organization named ‘Accion Zapatista’. 
Websites by global action activists link to articles like these, which thereby become part 
of the resources available to activists. Others take part in exchanges on Usenet 
newsgroups and online bulletin boards. David Graeber, for instance, writes in a public 
Internet forum: 
Academics who for years have published essays that sound like position 
papers for large social movements that do not in fact exist seem seized 
with confusion or worse, highminded contempt, now that real ones are 
everywhere emerging. As an active participant in the movement as well 
as an anthropologist, I want to provide some broad background for those 
intellectuals who might be interested in taking up some of their historical 
responsibilities. This essay is meant to clear away a few misconceptions 
(Graeber 2001). 
These academics and intellectuals ‘normalise’ the discourse: they contextualise and 
historicise the practices and ideas of the global action movement. Even as they declare 
how these constitute a new phase in the practice and thinking of activists, as both 
Cleaver and Graeber do, they are integrating these into discourse (for instance, 
academic) that is more acceptable. This is not too hard to do, as the people at the roots 
of the Zapatista are also very aware of previous models of revolutionary change and 
practice. The evidence of this sort of thinking through of the basic assumptions and   - 197 - 
minute details of practice appears to bode well for the continuation of fundamental 
ideals of the movement.
18 
Graeber responds to the criticism in the left press “that the globalization 
movement, while tactically brilliant, has no central theme or coherent ideology” and that 
of “academic social theorists who should know better, like Hardt and Negri, or Slavoj 
Zizek” who claim that the movement is simply oppositional to all forms of organization. 
Instead: 
It is not opposed to organization; it is about creating new forms of 
organization. It is not lacking in ideology; those new forms of 
organization are its ideology. It is a movement about creating and 
enacting horizontal networks instead of top-down (especially, state-like, 
corporate or party) structures, networks based on principles of 
decentralized, nonhierarchical consensus democracy (Graeber 2001). 
Intellectuals and university students are often the ones leading the revolutionary charge, 
and this kind of discussion, especially in a space that is not quite ‘academic’, attracts the 
attention of academics and non-academics alike. Cleaver contextualises the Zapatista 
movement as one that offers a path to a left disenchanted by the failures of communism 
and the social revolutions of the sixties and seventies. These, and the other tropes 
established above, became part of the initial call for participants in meetings organised 
by the Zapatistas together with other organizations; meetings that led to the formation of 
the Peoples’ Global Action. 
                                                 
18 This is consistent with something Foucault says about revolutionary action: 
 
If at the base there has not been the work of thought upon itself and if, in fact, modes of 
thought, that is to say modes of action, have not been altered, whatever the project for 
reform, we know that it will be swamped, digested by modes of behavior and institutions 
that will always be the same (Foucault 1988: 156). 
 
However, while the activists frequently state that the practices of the movement are opposed to the 
practices of what they are criticising, for instance, organisational hierarchies, the above description does 
not, as yet, confirm that this is what is happening.   - 198 - 
3.3.3 The Formation of Peoples’ Global Action: the First and Second 
Encounter and the First PGA Conference 
The first steps towards the creation of the Peoples’ Global Action were made in January 
1996 when the Zapatistas issued a call to actvists to hold five continental conferences all 
over the world. They planned for an intercontinental ‘encuentro’ held in Chiapas to 
follow these conferences. This, the ‘First Intercontinental Encounter (or Gathering) for 
Humanity and Against Neoliberalism’, would be held from 27 July to 3 August 1996. 
The details of these were in an invitation entitled, the ‘Declaration of La Realidad’,
19 
issued by the ‘Clandestine Indigenous Revolutionary Committee General Command of 
the Zapatista Army of National Liberation’
20 and ‘Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos’ 
(Marcos and Zapatista Army of National Liberation 1996). This invitation was through 
the network already built up before and after the Zapatista fight in Chiapas in 1994, and 
distributed to diverse newsgroups, email lists, and web pages of various activists and 
organisations. 
The invitations enact the lessons of the Chiapas struggle. One of these lessons is 
to identify a specific common object, a shared enemy, most obviously, ‘neoliberalism’.  
For instance, the invitations are addressed “[t]o all who force themselves to resist the 
world crime known as ‘Neoliberalism’ and aim for humanity and hope to be better, be 
synonymous of future [sic]” (Marcos and Zapatista Army of National Liberation 1996: 
n.p.). The Zapatistas identify ‘Neoliberalism’ as the figure spawning NAFTA, the catalyst 
for the Chiapas rebellion. Neo-liberalism is broader than NAFTA and therefore more 
suitable for inspiring activists from around the world. 
  The argument of the Zapatistas, which became the discourse of ‘anti-
globalisation’ or ‘global-action’ activists, is compelling to many of the groups it 
addresses, as it combines traditional left-wing notions of ideology and a critical stance 
                                                 
19 La Realidad refers to a community run by the Zapatistas and means, literally, ‘Reality’. 
20 Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN).   - 199 - 
towards capitalism, with an analysis of developments in more recent times and the offer 
of new hope: 
The new distribution of the world excludes "minorities". The indigenous, 
youth, women, homosexuals, lesbians, people of color, immigrants, 
workers, peasants; the majority who make up the world basements are 
presented, for power, as disposable. The new distribution of the world 
excludes the majorities (Marcos and Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation 1996, my emphasis). 
In this passage, the point is established, that what is usually considered marginal, and, 
even in some left-wing critiques of capitalist societies, lacking in power, could be 
actually a ‘majority’, implying that, in solidarity, these excluded and marginalised 
communities could become very powerful. 
  In this theoretical paradigm, the material economy of neo-liberalism is just as 
inequitable as the early capitalism criticised by Marxists in the past: “The new 
distribution of the world only has one place for money and its servants. Men, women 
and machines become equal in servitude and in being disposable. The lie governs and it 
multiplies itself in means and methods” (Marcos and Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation 1996). The “lie” that they refer to is the ideology of neo-liberalism and the 
discourse that is under attack. According to this ‘anti-capitalist’ discourse, this lie 
consists of several elements: 
A new lie is sold to us as history. The lie about the defeat of hope, the lie 
about the defeat of dignity, the lie about the defeat of humanity. The 
mirror of power offers us an equilibrium in the balance scale: the lie 
about the victory of cynicism, the lie about the victory of servitude, the 
lie about the victory of neoliberalism (Marcos and Zapatista Army of 
National Liberation 1996, my emphasis).  
The writers in this declaration identify, therefore, a key restriction in the discourse of 
neo-liberalism, and this is the ‘defeat of hope’. The Zapatistas, and the meetings they 
propose, offer this hope, and this is the important aspect of the invitation. They insist   - 200 - 
that “[a]gainst the international of terror representing neoliberalism, we must raise the 
international of hope” (Marcos and Zapatista Army of National Liberation 1996). 
Having established the enemy as ‘neo-liberalism’, the Zapatistas’ invitation 
added a very long and detailed list of all who belonged to the paradigmatic category of 
‘enemies of neoliberalism’, for instance:  
To all who struggle for human values of democracy, liberty and justice… 
…To all individuals, groups, collectives, movements, social, civic and 
political organizations, neighborhood associations, cooperatives, all the 
lefts known and to be known; non-governmental organizations, groups in 
solidarity with struggles of the world people, bands, tribes, intellectuals, 
indigenous people, students, musicians, workers, artists, teachers, 
peasants, cultural groups, youth movements, alternative communication 
media, ecologists, tenants, lesbians, homosexuals, feminists, pacifists.  
To all human beings without a home, without land, without work, 
without food, without health, without education, without freedom, 
without justice, without independence, without democracy, without 
peace, without tomorrow.  
To all who, with no matter to colors, race or borders, make of hope a 
weapon and a shield.
21 
At least according to the reports of activists and Zapatistas, more than three 
thousand
22 people from forty-three different countries took part in the gathering. The 
involvement of so many people of so many different positions, even as observers, 
ensured that the movement had an immense reach outside the networks it had 
established thus far in Mexico, Canada and the United States. These participants, in 
their turn, spread their accounts of the events and outcomes of the encounter, as well as 
their observations of the communities run by the Zapatistas and their operations, again, 
most effectively via Internet websites, email lists, and newsgroups. 
                                                 
21 I quote this text at such length to demonstrate the pains to which they went to invite a diversity of 
interests (Marcos and Zapatista Army of National Liberation 1996). 
22 The PGA claims a total of six thousand (Peoples' Global Action 2000a) while Andrew Flood, a 
delegate from the Irish Mexico Group, places it at three thousand delegates, with “several thousand 
indigenous people from the local communities” catering or taking part in the ceremonies and 
entertainment” (Flood 1996). Flood also says they required two main sites, or ‘Aguascalientes’, Oventic 
and La Realidad for all delegates, and three other smaller ones, La Garrucha, Morelia and Roberto 
Barrios.   - 201 - 
  The participants were welcomed at the opening of the Encounter by a simply 
worded and extremely eloquent address by the EZLN, reiterating the solidarity between 
them all, and declaring a new ‘beginning’. This address is highly spiritual and 
metaphorical, referring to beliefs of the indigenous population the Zapatista say they 
represent: 
Then we went to the mountains to find ourselves and see if we could 
alleviate our pain in being forgotten stones and weeds.  
Here, in the mountains of Southeastern Mexico, our dead live on. Our 
dead that live in the mountains know many things.  
They speak to us of their death, and we hear them.  
Coffins speak and tell us another story that comes from yesterday and 
points toward tomorrow.  
The mountains spoke to us, the Macehualob, we common and ordinary 
people (General Command of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation 
1996b: n.p.). 
This spiritual quality is combined with a utopian outlook: “Today, thousands of small 
worlds from the five continents are attempting a beginning here, in the mountains of 
Southeastern Mexico, the beginning of the construction of a new and good world, that 
is, a world which admits all these worlds” (General Command of the Zapatista Army of 
National Liberation 1996b: n.p., my emphasis). It is not just common, but almost 
integral to revolutionary discourse to have such a utopian perspective underlying social 
critiques and actions. Therefore, like elsewhere, I am not claiming that this address, and 
other ceremonial performances and contributions that ran throughout the week, 
originated such a mood, but, rather, that they served to explicate and reinforce, were 
necessary to inspire commitment, and constituted a powerful and significant moment to 
send off these meanings. As a result, performances of texts like these have a high 
potential to be a potent memory for the participants. As already stated earlier in this 
chapter, this spiritual and utopian promise is a common seme in global action discourse.   - 202 - 
  Accompanying the utopian promise is the theme of martyrdom. At the closing 
address of the EZLN to the attendees, after a reference to ‘slaves’ who resign themselves 
to the forces of global capital, the topic shifts to the participants and the Zapatistas 
themselves: 
But there are those who do not resign themselves, there are those who 
decide to be uncomfortable, there are those who do not sell themselves, 
there are those who do not surrender themselves. There are, around the 
world, those who resist being annihilated in this war. There are those 
who decide to fight (General Command of the Zapatista Army of 
National Liberation 1996a: n.p.). 
A familiar pattern by the time of the S11 home page analysed earlier, the portrayal of the 
activists as martyrs to a higher cause benefiting humanity is, yet again, a 
solidarity-reinforcing technique. The signified meaning of these passages binds together 
the Zapatistas, the contributors and observers from the ‘five continents,’ who may 
represent different groups, interests, alignments and so forth, but share in common this 
personal commitment and sacrifice to a better future. 
The movement draws upon indigenous and local struggles and frames them 
globally, appealing to a broader humanism to foster solidarity. The common cause is to 
save humanity, and the common enemy of humanity is capital: 
The modern army of financial capital and corrupt governments 
advance[,] conquering in the only way it is capable of: destroying. The 
new distribution of the world destroys humanity (Marcos and Zapatista 
Army of National Liberation 1996). 
The global action philosophy and approach appeals to the people it addresses because it 
combines grassroots globalisation with a cosmopolitan outlook. Not only does it seem 
to demand and draw its strengths from the marginalised, it also reaches out and assails 
in the transnational and global arenas of its adversary. Coupled with this is a 
‘neo-cosmopolitan’ sensibility, an interest in a wider humanity outside the local sphere, 
an interest that is supposed to be the unifying factor that binds the various interest   - 203 - 
groups together. This grand and dramatic scale is necessary to cut across the divides of 
time and place, and the variety of interests that the movement wants to enlist. 
The participants were not passive spectators, but contributed strategies, further 
critiques and analyses, and proposals for action. Their papers and ideas, tabled at the 
gathering, were later made available on the websites and entered the ‘canon’ of 
materials for activists to utilise. One paper, for instance, discussed the challenges posed 
to traditional socialist politics by the changes in capitalism in more recent times, for 
instance, the phenomena of globalisation (Lauesen 1996). Contributions like these 
sharpened the theoretical foundations of the global action discourse, and their 
availability on websites allowed existing and potential activists to quickly educate 
themselves in the discourse, enlist others, as well as provide an armoury against their 
critics. 
  At the end of the first encounter, the EZLN made a few key proposals in their 
closing address (General Command of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation 
1996a). The first of these was the formation of an ‘intercontinental network of 
resistance against neoliberalism and humanity’ which would seek out other resistance 
groups. This supportive network was to be complemented with a communication 
network so that, in their words, “words may travel all the roads that resist,” a striking 
turn of phrase that was, on hindsight, prophetic in describing how the global actions, 
which resulted from these beginnings, adopted so many of the terms and meanings 
already emerging here. Amongst these is the practice of the ‘non-hierarchy’. In 
describing both the network of communication and resistance, they repeat the following: 
this “is not an organising structure; it doesn't have a central head or decision maker; it 
has no central command or hierarchies.” The deliberate intent behind the rhizomorphic 
form of the global action websites and the organisations and groups behind the actions 
is clear from the beginning.   - 204 - 
The  EZLN also proposed and laid out the first steps towards yet another 
intercontinental encounter, the year after in Europe. The declarations made in the 
closing address of the first encounter was to accompany the invitation, and the primary 
objective was to have a “consultation” on the question, “Do you agree to subscribe to 
the Second Declaration of Reality for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism?” Not only 
was the theme already laid out, but the approximate time and place (second half of 1997 
and on the European continent) was suggested, the details of which would be worked 
out by the participants from Europe. The deadline for the ‘realisation’ of this gathering, 
by which I presume they meant the finalisation of dates, places, and other organisational 
details, as well as the issue of calls for participants, was roughly the first two weeks of 
December 1996. Significantly, the second gathering was to be organised along the same 
lines as the first: 
We propose that we organise this consultation in the same way that this 
encounter was organised, that all of us who attended and those who 
couldn't attend but who accompanied us from afar in this encounter, 
organise and carry out the consultation. We propose that we make use of 
all the possible and impossible media in order to consult with the greatest 
number of human beings on the five continents. The intercontinental 
consultation is part of the resistance we are organising and one way of 
making contacts and encounters with other resistance's. Part of a new 
way of doing political work in the world, that is what the intercontinental 
consultation wants to be (General Command of the Zapatista Army of 
National Liberation 1996a). 
Once more, proposals like these establish the modus operandi of the network and their 
subsequent execution. The global actions drew the attention of the public and the 
various media not least because of the huge amount and scale of organization, the 
variety of groups and individuals that were involved, and the speed and variety of 
communication channels used, in particular, the Internet. 
  The Zapatistas transferred these ideas to the groups that organised the next 
encounter, ideas which were often reiterated, word for word, in the invitations and the   - 205 - 
materials for the encounter. While the Zapatistas had delegated the responsibility of 
organising these encounters, their terms and ideas had already become an essential part 
of the discourse that controlled their language and conduct. These meanings began to 
detach themselves from the specific Zapatista context, as part of their expressed intent, 
while the universalisation of these themes and their relaunch in a global activism 
context also ensured the propagation of the Zapatistas’ discourse. An example of this is 
the Second European Gathering held in Prague, 28 to 30 March 1997. As the next 
Intercontinental gathering was to be held in Europe, the European encounters were 
mainly preparatory meetings for the upcoming intercontinental gathering. Participants 
from different organizations decided upon dates, the topical framework, delegation of 
responsibilities, the copy of the invitation and other literature, processes of registration 
and other organisational details. 
The principles of working ‘from the bottom up’ and avoiding of personality (or 
other distinct agents) cults are observable as ideals that they were aiming towards in 
their decisions. For instance, in the minutes, they specify: 
There will be no formal invitations, so that the OC [organising 
committee] will not be those who choose who participates in the 
Encuentro [sic]. There will be an open invitation (model enclosed) to all 
people and collectives in struggle against neoliberalism who agree with 
the Second Declaration of La Realidad and with the Manifesto and 
objectives of Encuentro 2. The invitation must be publicised as far as 
possible, but these organisations must express an interest in going and 
initiate the enrollment [sic] procedure (Cuninghame 1997). 
On an overt level, at least, such decisions are an attempt to conform to the discourse 
already in place, that is, as far as possible, to avoid control of the discussion, issues and 
direction of the encounter. Control of discourse can occur through the limitation of the 
subjects admitted into the discourse (Foucault 1981); even if unconscious and without 
deliberate intent, whatever hierarchies of interest already represented by the participants 
in the process so far might be exacerbated if the process of recruiting more participants   - 206 - 
is not kept as open as possible. On the other hand, if the process of registration (or 
‘inscription’, as they called it) were left completely open, there was a strong likelihood 
that Europeans would numerically dominate the conference. This was not just because 
of general disproportionate power, access, and resources between activist groups 
internationally, but also because the location of the upcoming conference meant that it 
would be easier and cheaper for Europeans to attend the conference, and the organisers 
themselves were mainly from Europe. Thus, the organisers attempted to address this, 
and other concerns, by setting a policy in the event that applications outnumbered the 
number of places available: 
a) preference will be given to applicants from outside Western Europe 
b) among W. European countries, a balance of representation according 
to population size and the special case of Spain because of its key role in 
organisation 
c) Assure the participation of socially excluded groups (Cuninghame 
1997, as in original). 
A certain amount of control was exercised upon how the organising committees were to 
represent themselves, for example, in Item D2 of the minutes: “In all matters to do with 
the organisation and functioning of the Encuentro the OCs are to present themselves as 
such and not as individuals or as determined collectives” (Cuninghame 1997). This 
might be partly to do with the avoidance of personality cults and, more likely, to prevent 
a gradual commandeering of the global movement by a group with narrower interests.
23 
  For, by this stage, the discourse of the movement had adopted a global, 
‘internationalist,’ context, while still maintaining the importance of the grassroots. As 
part of its ‘library’ of ideas, the basis of appeal is the Earth and ‘Humanity’. The logo, 
for example, incorporates a red five-pointed star set within a rectangle:  the five points 
are symbolic of the five continents of the encounter (Plataf. de Solidaridad con Chiapas 
                                                 
23 I address this in my critique.   - 207 - 
de Aragón 1997). The outlines of this logo look like they were hand-drawn, in black 
ink, and this apparent roughness of the 
rendering of the logo stands in contrast to the 
logos of the corporate media-marketing 
apparatuses, which the movement is working 
against. While the encounter, and the global 
actions that will follow, will be riding on new 
technologies, the discourse emphasises the 
connection of the movement with nature, Earth 
and humanity. In this instance, whatever the 
actual processes,
24 the look achieved downplays this technological input, emphasising 
its creation through human effort and creativity. 
  Even the choice of host name reflects these themes. The Second Encounter’s 
website is stored at www.pangea.org, and it is derived from the word, “pangaea”, “the 
hypothetical landmass that existed when all continents were joined, from about 300 to 
200 million years ago” ('Webster's' 2001). As this notion of pangaea and the theory of 
continental drift
25 gained support from other scientists and entered popular discourse, it 
has become part of the semiotic store of ‘globalists’ wishing to emphasise the common 
heritage and destiny of all humans by evoking this image of the single land mass. This 
                                                 
24 The image may have been drafted manually by hand, scanned and developed using digital image 
software or may have been developed wholly through the computer. 
25 The theory of continental drift and the concept of Pangaea had its beginnings thus: 
Though first proposed by American geologist Frank Bursley Taylor in a lecture in 1908, 
the first detailed theory of continental drift was put forth by German meteorologist and 
geophysicist Alfred Wegener in 1912. On the basis of geology, biology, climatology, 
and the alignment of the continental shelf rather than the coastline, he believed that 
during the late Paleozoic and early Mesozoic eras, about 275 to 175 million years ago, 
all the continents were united into a vast supercontinent, which he called Pangaea. 
Later, Pangaea broke into two supercontinental masses-Laurasia to the north, and 
Gondwanaland to the south. The present continents began to split apart in the latter 
Mesozoic era about 100 million years ago, drifting to their present positions ('Columbia' 
2000). 
Figure 2: Logo for the Second 
Intercontinental Encounter (Plataf. de 
Solidaridad con Chiapas de Aragón 
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idea becomes a metaphor for the interconnectedness of humanity with the earth and its 
ecology. 
This discussion of the preparations and organization of the Second Encounter 
illustrates how the movement was able to be controlled, that is, retaining the meanings 
and ideology bestowed upon it in its inception, while minimalising possible 
contradictions and criticism that it was being ‘top’ directed. The movement was able to 
continue to employ the discourse and ideals it began with (for instance, the absence of 
hierarchies), while maximising its spatial and temporal reach and range of participants. 
The discourse was transferred and broadened from one that originated from and was 
specific to the local Zapatista struggle to a global context. 
When the Second Encounter took place between 26 July and 3 August 1997, in 
five locations in Spain, the themes, meanings, and terms had a familiar ring. The 
gathering was organised according to subject areas (‘mesas’) defined in the course of 
the European encounters: 
1. The Neoliberal economy against Humanity. Our lives beyond the 
economy. 
2. Our world and their world.  
3. Struggles for culture, education and information.  
4. The struggle against patriarchy.  
5. Struggles for land and the earth, ecology 
6. Against all forms of marginalisation (Organizing Committee for the 
Second Intercontinental Encounter 1997, as in original). 
The organization of the variety of resistance movements under the above rubrics, 
instead of, for example, under geographical areas, made sense under the logics of the 
discourse so far, with the advantages of solidarity and networking between different 
activists worldwide. It had the effect of framing the presentations with a ‘global’ 
perspective and directed the discussions towards the goal of creating the ‘networks of   - 209 - 
resistances and communications’ outlined by the EZLN at the end of the first Encounter. 
In addition, each venue had a working party drawing up a list of proposals they would 
table during the closing plenary. 
A significant development was the eventual creation of the Peoples’ Global 
Action (PGA). The details of how the PGA’s formation is related to the encounter are 
unclear because “[t]he gatherings were intended not to create a global organization or 
produce a unified strategy, but to discuss how different groups were affected by 
neoliberalism and how movements might coordinate their resistance” (Kauffman 2000). 
While the PGA situates its beginnings in the Second Intercontinental Encounter (Peoples' 
Global Action 2000a), other reports during that time do not mention this as an explicit 
item of discussion in the agenda or in their observations (Flood 1997; Barchiesi 1997; 
'Second intercontinental' 1997). This is speculation, but perhaps the discussion merely 
occurred amongst the Zapatistas and the other organizations that became the convenors 
of the PGA. Another possibility is that the others were party to the discussions that 
eventually led to the formation of the PGA in the months after the encounter, but the 
formation of such an organization was mentioned in passing and in abstract during the 
course of discussions over the logistics of organising global actions and communication 
between organizations. 
In any event, this is perhaps one contradiction in these developments, that, 
despite the emphasis on avoiding centralisation and the formation of an umbrella 
organization that would unite these different groups, the participants in the encounters 
formed the PGA. The Second Encounter, according to the PGA itself, “outlined a firm 
rejection of appeals to those in power for reforms to the present world order. [sic] A 
support for direct action as a means of communities reclaiming control over their lives, 
and an organisational philosophy based on autonomy and decentralisation [sic]”   - 210 - 
(Peoples' Global Action 2000a). Nevertheless, for logistical reasons, the PGA was 
formed shortly after the encounter: 
After the second encuentro, in August 1997, some 50 representatives of 
these varied movements – including indigenous groups from Nigeria and 
Mexico, and farmers' organizations from India, Brazil, Bolivia, and 
Indonesia – sat down to plan worldwide protests against the World Trade 
Organization, the prime symbol and instrument of corporate 
globalization. To facilitate organizing, they created an ongoing network, 
which they called Peoples' Global Action Against "Free" Trade and the 
WTO, or PGA for short (Kauffman 2000). 
As the above quote states, this network planned and issued invitations to protest the 
WTO meetings and oriented itself towards ‘direct action’. 
The PGA announced its first conference in late November, less than six months 
after the Second Intercontinental Encounter. The discussions and networking in the first 
and second Encounters paid off as activists from various organizations and locations 
forwarded the PGA’s first bulletin and call for participation to several email lists, 
newsgroups and other activist forums.
26 One of the goals of the second Encounter was 
to compile a directory “of the various collectives in struggle against neoliberalism;” this 
was done during the registration and preparation stages of the Encounter (Cuninghame 
1997). Thus, when the PGA was ready to issue its invitation, it was able to take 
advantage of the directory and networks of communication built up with the aid of the 
previous encounters. From 23 to 25 February 1998, approximately three delegates from 
seventy-one countries took part in the first Peoples’ Global Action conference in 
Geneva. Again, the movement brought together participants representing diverse 
interests, including Maori rights, Ukrainian radical ecologists, Earth First, and Canadian 
postal workers (Peoples' Global Action 2000a). 
From this point forth, the global action discourse was further refined, 
consolidated, and, debatably, institutionalised. The PGA had, from the beginning, a set 
                                                 
26 A search of newsgroup messages posted during this period revealed many instances of this same 
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of ‘Hallmarks’ to discuss at this conference. These hallmarks were included in many of 
the bulletins sent, being part of the original full-length bulletin issued by the PGA: 
1. A very clear rejection of the WTO and other trade liberalisation 
agreements (like APEC, the EU,  NAFTA, etc.) as active promoters of a 
socially and environmentally destructive globalisation 
2. A confrontational attitude, since we do not think that lobbying can 
have a major impact in such biased and undemocratic organisations, in 
which transnational capital is the only real policy-maker 
3. A call to non-violent civil disobedience and the construction of local 
alternatives by local people, as answers to the action of governments and 
corporations 
4. An organisational philosophy based on decentralisation and autonomy 
(Peoples' Global Action 1997, as in original). 
Many of the ideas and terms above were developed and established during the course of 
events I have already described. 
Post-conference, other “defining documents,” as the PGA puts it, supplemented 
the hallmarks: the ‘Organizational Principles’ and the PGA ‘Manifesto’ (Peoples' Global 
Action 2001c). Even further refinement of the organization’s identity and stance 
occurred in August 1999, after the second conference, when a fifth hallmark was added 
in response to concerns that the movement could be confused with right-wing anti-
globalisation groups: 
This hallmark was introduced due to the fact that the denunciation of 
'free' trade without an analysis on patriarchy, racism and processes of 
homogenisation is a basic element of the discourse of the (extreme) right, 
and perfectly compatible with simplistic explanations of complex 
realities and with the personification of the effects of capitalism (such as 
conspiracy theories, anti-Semitism, etc) that inevitably lead to fascism, 
witch-hunting and oppressive chauvinist traditionalism. With this new 
hallmark, PGA repudiates all reactionary forms of resistance to capitalism 
(Peoples' Global Action 1999). 
Thus, they inserted, as the second hallmark: “We reject all forms and systems of 
domination and discrimination including, but not limited to, patriarchy, racism and 
religious fundamentalism of all creeds. We embrace the full dignity of all human   - 212 - 
beings.” After J-18 that same year, and not long before N-30, the PGA, rather than the 
‘broadening out’ that occurred in the initial stages of the global action genesis, found 
the need to narrow the scope of the global action movement and refine its solidarity.
27 
The hallmarks solidified the principle aspects of the global action discourse in a 
summarised form for posting in newsgroups and email lists and dissemination in 
pamphlets, web sites, and so forth. The ‘PGA Manifesto’, on the other hand, was a 
lengthy treatise on transnational capital and its adverse effects. This text brought 
together various concerns under one umbrella, that is the negative effects of ‘economic 
globalisation’ and global capital: gender oppression, environmental destruction, labour, 
subjugation of indigenous peoples and marginalised ethnic groups, cultural 
commodification and homogenisation, control of technology and knowledge, 
militarisation, exploitation of and discrimination against migrants and 
commercialisation and unequal access to education (Peoples' Global Action 2001c). 
Here, the theoretical foundations of the discourse are laid out in concrete form, 
accessible to potential participants, journalists and other interested parties: as Foucault 
established, theoretical formulations like these are a form of ‘ordering’ (limitation and 
control) of the discourse. The unity of the global action and the continuity of some of 
the main ideas through time and subsequent global actions, can be partly explained in 
the existence and availability of these founding documents so early in its inception. 
  In a similar fashion, the organisational principles of the PGA are a continuation 
of a fundamental stance already made explicit in previous meetings, namely, the global 
action movement’s ‘anti-hierarchy’ and resistance to institutionalisation: 
1.  The PGA is an instrument for co-ordination, not an organisation. 
Its main objectives are: 
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i.  Inspiring the greatest possible number of persons and 
organisations to act against "free" trade through non-violent 
civil disobedience and people-oriented constructive actions 
ii.  Offering an instrument for co-ordination and mutual support 
at global level for those fighting "free" trade 
iii.  Giving more international projection to the struggles against 
"free" trade and the WTO. 
2.  The organisational philosophy of the PGA is based on 
decentralisation and autonomy. Hence, central structures are 
minimal (Peoples' Global Action 2001c, as in original). 
There are about eleven main principles in total, outlining the means by which the PGA 
would achieve the first two aims. For instance, there was to be “no membership” and 
“no juridicial personality.” The annual conferences were to be convened by a 
Convenor’s Committee which were replaced “100%” by vote at each conference, and 
the dates of the conferences were to coincide with the ministerial meeting of the WTO. 
Volunteers “supportive of the aims of the PGA” were to maintain the information tools 
of the PGA, including its regular bulletins and its web site, “in a decentralised and 
rotative manner.” These principles, like the Hallmarks, were changed or refined further 
during the third international conference in Cochabamba, Bolivia, 16 to 23 September 
2001. These organisational principles are part of the global action discourse not only in 
the way they structure decision-making, cultural production and interaction in all 
activities pertinent to the PGA, they also provide a blueprint for other organizations, and 
hence shape the organisational formations of subsequent groups, either directly, or 
indirectly through discursive diffusion. 
A key purpose for this conference was the coordination of global actions in May 
the same year to mark the G8 Meeting in Birmingham and the second ministerial 
meeting of the WTO from 18 to 20 May. The PGA announced a rough schedule and plans 
for this in the bulletin (1) following the first international conference, including existing 
transport arrangements, dates for events like ‘People’s Trade Day,’ marches, a street   - 214 - 
party and arrangements in other cities in Europe and elsewhere, with dates and contact 
information. A seminar was to be held for the Geneva locals and ‘guest activists’ on 17 
May, which would include “practical training on techniques of non-violent resistance to 
police repression.” 
This was the beginning of the process by which global actions were coordinated 
annually, demonstrating how a movement that explicitly disavowed hierarchy and 
centralisation would be able to initiate, plan, and coordinate several international 
actions. The actions to follow included a wide range of activities and activists, carefully 
thought-out routes and strategies, and publicised through sophisticated media 
mechanisms. Through it all, the themes of autonomy, solidarity, anti-globalisation and 
neo-liberalism, and anti-hierarchy, trope through the various global actions that 
followed. 
The above history, from the Zapatista-arranged gatherings in Mexico and Spain, 
to the formation of the Peoples’ Global Action, and the lead-up to the first global action, 
identify the development of discursive tropes within the global action movement from 
its beginnings, and how they are maintained and circulated across time and space. Some 
of these discursive developments may not, individually, at least, be exclusive to this 
global action movement. However, collectively, and with the central theme of anti-
neoliberalism (later re-identified as ‘anti-capitalism’ by the participants, and, popularly, 
as ‘anti-globalisation’), this discourse is novel in its uptake of the relatively new 
technology of the Internet to propagate, sometimes word-for-word, its central meanings 
and concepts, and to organise meetings, decision-making and local and global actions. 
The speed and reach of the Internet is used in conjunction with ‘older’ forms of 
communications and technology, often combining them to maximise reach, for instance, 
the provision of pamphlets as downloadable files in portable document format for 
activists all over the world to print out and distribute, and the reverse, the publishing of   - 215 - 
website and email addresses on print and other media. While preserving (to a debatable 
degree) the autonomy of the affiliate organisations taking part in the meetings and 
global actions, the network built up in the course of this history also holds them together 
through these technologies, the organisational principles and practices, and the 
discourses of solidarity, globalism, humanism and ‘globalisation from below’. The 
culmination of these efforts come during the global actions, where activists further 
strengthen their ties by setting up and participating in these demonstrations in key 
locations in different countries and states. 
 
DATE DESCRIPTION 
27  July  –  3  August  1996  First Intercontinental Gathering/Encounter for Humanity and Against 
Neoliberalism: Zapatista meeting with international activists in Zapatista 
"Aguascalientes", Chiapas, Mexico. 
26 July – 3 August 1997  Second Intercontinental Gathering in Spain. Development of idea of global 
network. 
August 1997  Formation of PGA. 
2 December 1997  PGA’s first bulletin and invitation to conference and global action against 
WTO. 
23 to 25 February 1998  1
st  PGA conference—includes international delegates; organization of 2 
actions. 
16 May 1998  1
st global direct action agitating against the G8 meeting in Birmingham, in 
England, and, in Geneva, the 2nd Ministerial Conference of the WTO. 
Table 1: Establishment of the PGA 
3.3.4 The First Global Actions, 1998 to 1999 
The first global actions initiated by the PGA were also important in the development of 
the discourse. They were the models for organisation, the yardstick by which actions 
were compared. They provided the experience and counter-tactics, and an idea of what 
the activists would face in terms of the media, police, and government. Aside from the 
activists, institutions like the media and police likewise derived much of their 
subsequent reactions and practices from their reading and the experiences of these first 
actions. Sometimes, as with the Seattle events and aftermath, these discursive structures 
were perhaps more rigid than the activists themselves would prefer, locking activists, 
media and police in adverse patterns of behaviour and response. As such, the activists in   - 216 - 
current actions have to take into account the effects of the cultural constructs established 
early in their history. 
3.3.5 May 1998 and Global Street Party/Reclaim the Streets 
In these actions commemorating the Second Ministerial Conference of the WTO and the 
G8 meeting in Birmingham, the basic tropes are already in place: simultaneous action 
planned internationally. The PGA chose the focal locality and time of the actions to 
coincide with that of a meeting of a group or institution identified as an agent 
responsible for allowing or encouraging the interests of globalisation and global 
corporations. This ‘meeting’ is the trigger for the coordination of the action and 
becomes the locus for the international demonstrations in this way. 
The first global action initiated by the PGA did not attract the most media 
attention, or reach the most countries. Possibly, the media attention was not as massive 
as in subsequent actions, although healthy, partly because the actions in the United 
States were smaller scale. According to a veteran of New York direct action campaigns, 
participation in the US was abysmal: “There was barely a blip of participation from the 
United States: The only coordinated events were a radical street party in Berkeley and a 
small forest-preservation action in Arcata, the heart of California's Redwood region” 
(Kauffman 2000). 
This first global action initiated by the PGA did, however, feature some 
impressive figures for that time: 
But in 28 other countries, it was a different story entirely. Five hundred 
thousand people
28 took to the streets of Hyderabad in India, with the 
rallying cry, "We, the people of India, hereby declare that we consider 
the WTO our brutal enemy." In Brazil, an anti-WTO march drew some 
50,000 people, including members of the country's Movement of 
Landless People, who were simultaneously looting supermarkets and 
government food stores as a protest against hunger (Kauffman 2000). 
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Over 10 000 people were in the Geneva demonstrations, with over 65 demonstrations in 
total across the globe. Notably, there were ‘Global Street Parties’ in twenty cities: 
Some 20 cities held Global Street Parties, raucous and celebratory 
takeovers of public space, inspired by Reclaim the Streets (RTS), a 
movement that began in England during the early 1990s from a 
convergence of Earth First! campaigners against road construction and 
ravers fighting criminalization of their underground party scene 
(Kauffman 2000). 
As discussed earlier, the global action campaign worked by harnessing the networks, 
experience and local connections of existing groups, for instance, Reclaim the Streets in 
the above quote, and allowing a breadth of different forms of protest, as well as the 
formation of new affiliate groups. 
The  PGA celebrated the May 1998 action as a triumph, introducing a critical 
perception of organisations like the WTO. There were, though, acknowledgements that 
further refinement in organisation and practices were necessary. For example, a 
significant comment regarding the events in Birmingham prefaced a newspaper article
29 
entitled, ‘Angry Clashes in G8 City’ (Reclaim the Streets 2001a). Located above the 
extract is the Reclaim the Streets’ comment, “WHY WHY WHY – WE NEED BETTER NEWS 
MANAGEMENT.” From subsequent discussions and comments at this website, the 
primary problem with this article was the statement, “The activist movement arrived in 
Birmingham to protest during the G8 summit of top world leaders about what they 
alleged was ‘the cult of the car.’” Additionally, the article quoted a protestor as saying, 
“We came here with the sole intention of having a party and raising the issues relating 
to our environmental agenda.” Both these statements, while certainly reflecting the 
specific agendas of some of the groups and individuals, in the absence of other 
information about the main purpose of the activities in the same article, were misleading 
and suggested that opportunities to effectively publicise the main meaning of the action 
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had been lost. In terms of its practices, this indicated a need for the groups involved in 
(at least) the Birmingham Street Party to develop a more comprehensive media 
campaign. 
  The same newspaper article, as indicated by the title, placed heavy emphasis on 
the violence generated during the action, something that occurred in actions elsewhere. 
The handling of the issue of violence is an example of the inception
30 of a seme 
discussed in my semiotic analysis of the S11 page. The PGA depicts the agents in the 
events in oppositional terms, that is, the police, customs officials, and the various non-
activist or left-wing media, versus the protestors, demonstrators and performers of the 
global action. While they draw attention to the large numbers of police, helicopters and 
so forth throughout the demonstrations, the PGA says that the first incidents of real 
violence occurred towards the tail end of the first day of action, 16 May.  
An excerpt from the PGA site describes the events thus: 
  At around 22h30 the demo came back to the city centre and was 
officially ended. However the sound system was still playing and many 
people were still assembled. Suddenly a small group started breaking all 
the windows in sight and the police charged. The remains of the demo 
retreated towards the park where the caravan was camping. Most of the 
demonstrators gathered around a fire and tried to calm things, but a small 
group (many very young kids from the quarter) continued breaking small 
shops [sic] and affronting the police. Many people got beaten up 
(especially the people from the caravan, who were not taking part in the 
fights) – several were seriously injured, at least one ending up in 
intensive care at the hospital. The police charged with teargas against the 
camp (where there were families with small children sleeping) and 
provoked its dissolution in the middle of the night. The fighting went on 
until 4h30 in the morning as the police helicopter and searchlight 
attracted hundreds of the Saturday night crowd to join the show (Peoples' 
Global Action 1998). 
This account of the PGA downplays the role of the demonstrators in the outbreak of 
violence. First, the PGA establishes that the breaking of windows occurred after the 
‘official ending’ of the demonstrations and was, by implication, not part of the plan. 
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Secondly, the vagueness of ‘a small group’ seems to suggest that the PGA cannot 
indisputably disavow them and, at the same time, avoids naming them as participants of 
the demonstrations either—see next point. Thirdly, regarding the “breaking [into?] 
small shops,” that occurred after the police charge, the PGA is more specific, and 
identifies the culprits as “very young kids from the quarter,” that is, not demonstrators.
 
In contrast, the police are presented as indiscriminating and over-reacting perpetuators 
of violence, inflicting undue force on demonstrators largely portrayed as defenceless. 
As I have already shown in my initial reading of the S11 title page, this seme occurs in 
later global action discourse as well, and complements the trope of global action 
participants being martyrs to a better, utopian, future. 
These portrayals of police and demonstrators recur in other passages and in 
many of the reports in other places, and in subsequent global actions. They are 
maintained in the discourse in planned actions, with demonstrators doing their best to 
convey their vulnerability while highlighting the violence in police actions. On the web 
and in releases to the media, the PGA and the affiliate organisations replicate concepts 
that are now a significant part of the discourse. Activists’ calls to ensuing actions and 
gatherings, in archival and historical reports, reiterate this image of the authorities and 
the protestors. In actions to follow, this, and other themes, feature in the publicity and 
bulletins of the global action affiliate groups. 
3.3.6 J-18 
 “J-18” is the predecessor of “N-30” in Seattle and occurred on 18 June 1999. Continuity 
is preserved in the introduction to the J-18 proposal: 
Around the world, the movement grows - from the forests of Chiapas to 
the streets of London, from the grain farmers of India to the landless in 
Brazil to the unemployed in France. Inspired by the Zapatista struggles in 
Mexico and the Intercontinental Encuentros, and by the global actions 
against the G8 (most powerful) nations and the World Trade Organisation 
in 1998, activists from many countries are planning co-ordinated actions   - 220 - 
around the world to oppose neoliberal capitalism (Peoples' Global Action 
1999). 
Before the event, partly as a lead-up, a line of caravans of five hundred people 
representing the subjugated in the southern hemisphere travelled through Europe, 
presenting information and challenging financial institutions and governments, to finally 
end up in Köln in time for the J-18 action. This was a “carnival against capitalism”, 
coinciding with the meeting of the G8 leaders in Köln, Germany, and indicated the 
breadth of the PGA’s function, a broadening-out reflected in the decision taken during 
the second PGA conference in August in the same year:  
… it was agreed by consensus that the network should in the future work 
as a tool for communication and coordination for all the struggles against 
the effects of the global capitalist regime, not only against the institutions 
and agreements that regulate it… The expectation is that the PGA as a 
process will eventually reach a stage in which it is able to articulate 
grassroots resistance at global level, working as a global movement, 
rooted in the basis of peoples’ movements all over the planet, and playing 
a direct political role from below (despite not being constituted as 
organisation) (Peoples' Global Action 1999). 
This may be a formalisation of an approach already in action, but it is significant that 
this change occurs four months before the Seattle events in November 1999. 
  As part of the action, a relatively new form of protest activity
31 was observable 
that is highly apt in this discussion: there were, apparently, repeated attempts to hack 
into the Futures Exchange ('Judy' 1999). This form of protest, often called ‘hacktivism,’ 
did not see its beginnings from anti-globalisation activism,
32 however, it is now very 
much part of the repertoire, if not overtly acknowledged as anything more central than a 
tactic of groups affiliated with the network. Interestingly, this is a form evolved from 
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32 For instance, on 7 and 9 of August, 1998, people declaring themselves as ethnic Chinese hacked into 
and changed the home page of a couple of Indonesian sites after the riots in Indonesia, protesting violence 
against ethnic Chinese (Zhang and Wen 1998). Attempts are made almost everyday on White House, 
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traditional culture-jamming,
33 where the appropriation of the ‘real estate’ of capital for 
the deconstruction of its messages is transferred from billboards to electronic ‘real 
estate,’ that is, websites, databases and so forth. This is one fitting example of how the 
transnational spaces occupied by global capital can be appropriated by activists. 
Some English campaigners found themselves in a reflective mood before and 
after this action, not surprisingly, considering the PGA was now more than a year old, 
and the organisation prominent in the English campaigns, Reclaim the Streets, had an 
even longer history in England. While it is not possible to say that these issues and 
debates are representative of other actions in other locations, they are an example of the 
kind of reflection and debate that can occur post-action.  
In England, the handling of the media was, apparently, much better than the last 
global action: 
1.  I think the other big success of the events was the media work. 
Although I would normally be one who is suspicious of any 
contact with mainstream media at all, we have shown that by 
careful use of press releases, we can partly influence what is 
written about us. All of the mainstream June 18 news reports that 
I have seen mentioned that the events were happening in many 
countries, were timed to coincide with the G8 summit in Koln 
[sic], and were constituted by an amalgam of many different 
groups. Most importantly, the London events were billed as an 
"anti-capitalist" demonstration. They can't write us off as "anti-
car" protestors any longer ('Keep it up' 1999). 
This reflected, perhaps, a growing sophistication in the media machinery of the global 
action campaigns across the world. While the media reports in England proclaimed that 
the organising for the event was ‘done on the Internet,’ this simplified the 
developments. An activist, in a critical response to the reports, wrote, “We will not 
'connect' with the peoples' of  'the south' through internet-working; regardless of the 
Zapatistas mythical laptop communiqués from the Mexican jungle,” pointing out that 
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these reports ignore the reliance on non-Internet communications (Peoples' Global 
Action 2000b). In London alone, organisers sent “over a thousand action proposal 
letters in several languages through libertarian and anarchist address lists, printed up a 
succession of leaflets in runs of 30,000 or more, held and attended regular meetings, 
conferences and the like.” During the J-18 action, video footage from the demonstrations 
in England were available on the web as ‘live streams’. After the events, people could 
get copies of compiled video material on mail order. 
  As an example of adjustment and reinterpretation of the discursive ‘rules,’ the 
concept of “non-violence” and appropriate activist behaviour is a frequent trope. The 
global actions’ approach of “non-violence” has been contested externally and internally 
from differing positions. Externally, governments, police and various mainstream 
media, focus on potential or actualised violence and portray the participants of the 
action as inciting violence through property damage, attacks on persons and so forth. 
Internally, amongst the global action activists, a range of different interpretations 
abound. Some, as in the PGA report on the Geneva 1998 action, say that, largely, the 
police or opportunists who were not really part of the global action were responsible for 
the violence, and that participants in the action took all pains to demonstrate peacefully. 
Others do not disavow the attacks against property and persons (e.g. a pie thrown at 
Kim Beasley) but, at the same time, discuss how these are valid as part of the tactics of 
global action, and yet in keeping within the strictures of ‘non-violence’. Still some 
others question whether ‘non-violence’ should be part of the discourse, although these 
people are in the minority. There are other interpretations, but, in the main, the 
conclusion of most discussions is that “non-violence” is reaffirmed and redefined, and 
remains part of the PGA’s repertoire of discursive statements (Peoples' Global Action 
2000b; several reports from 'Reflections on J18' 1999).   - 223 - 
Another notable development in the course of this action was the increase in 
United States participation. In contrast to the 1998 action, this time, there were six 
hundred demonstrators in Washington, five hundred in New York, a Reclaim the Streets 
party in Los Angeles, and other protests in Asheville, Boston, Eugene and Olympia 
(Peoples' Global Action 2000b). The networks, energy and experience thus built up in 
the States (as well as in Canada and globally), plus the media coverage in the United 
States, was timely, for the next major global action, a little more than five months later, 
was in Seattle. 
3.3.7 N30: Seattle 
Held to protest the third WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle from 29 November to 3 
December 1999, the N-30 action is one of the most famous for a number of reasons. 
Obviously not the first global action or the first incidence of conflict and violence, it is 
still remembered as the first time most people around the world, at least, those not 
normally attentive to these matters, became even aware of simultaneous large-scale 
global action in practice. The fact it was in the United States, home of media 
conglomerates like CNN, was one major factor in it becoming world news. Then, of 
course, there were the images and accounts of police in heavy riot gear, the use of tear 
gas and rubber pellets on protestors and bystanders alike. The mayor declared the city in 
a state of civil emergency, imposed a seven pm curfew and called in the National 
Guard, amongst other measures to contain the situation. There was also the seme of 
violent or anti-social protestors: the mainstream media made the most of property 
damage (window-breaking and graffiti) and looting. 
The events in Seattle have now acquired a legendary status amongst activists and 
set a notorious precedent for increased planning and security on the part of city officials 
and police expecting similar protests to occur in their vicinity. They are the subject of   - 224 - 
much exhaustive analysis elsewhere, which is why this section will be brief, selective, 
and shall merely illustrate how they extend and continue some of the discursive 
developments described previously. 
Billed by mainstream media as a mass protest arranged through the Internet 
before the commencement of the actions, this has become somewhat of an urban legend 
in the sense that, while not false, it is somewhat exaggerated. As in the previous actions, 
the Seattle protests used a combination of traditional media with the Internet for its 
preparations and organisation, including encrypted emails, walkie-talkies, and pagers in 
the streets. The discourse of solidarity and unification of diverse interests under a 
banner was certainly evident here, and given even greater emphasis as global media 
coverage was more intense. 
An interesting development at this stage is the diminished role of the PGA. This 
is not to say that the PGA was ignored or did not play a part. More precisely, because the 
Direct Action Network (DAN) was instrumental in organising and broadcasting the 
actions in the United States, the PGA did not feature (or, if it did, was less prominent) in 
much of the publicity and lead-up to the event, not as much as the previous actions, 
anyway. The PGA was aware of this development, saying, not long after the Seattle 
action, “Due to its diffuse and fluid nature as well as not having any offices, paid staff, 
funds or bank accounts, the role of PGA and its link between different events has 
remained obscure” (Peoples' Global Action 2000b). On the one hand, this may be 
evidence that its organisational principles (non-hierarchical, decentralised) are working, 
that the global actions are not in its sole grasp. In other words, this is a development in 
keeping with the discourse established in the course of the genealogy of this movement, 
and something that the PGA itself does not wish to recant, rather, wishes to emphasise: 
That is not to say that these events were directly organised by PGA. That 
would be to misunderstand the originality and the force of a process that 
develops as a network, with more and more connected centres of   - 225 - 
initiative that maintain their complete autonomy and define their own 
identity. The initiative for issuing the calls for action and organising the 
central blockades came each time from an autonomous group that was 
connected to the network (Reclaim the Streets in London, Direct Action 
Network in Seattle, Solidarità-INPEG in Prague, etc), calls that were then 
relayed by the convenors and the rest of the network. 
The idea of PGA has not only created a network capable of coordinated 
action. It has also contributed to triggering a much larger movement. 
This year, no institution of global governance (Climate conference, G8, 
ASEAN, the World Economic Forum, NATO,  TABD, etc.) could meet 
anywhere without a coalition of local movements coming together to 
attack them (Peoples' Global Action 2001b: my emphases). 
As the above passage indicates, this looseness of association is something the PGA 
recognises as part of the consequences of their principles, and is even a source of pride.  
At the same time, this association is not something the PGA wants to lose totally. 
Aside from its more obvious and immediate concern that the PGA would thereby lose its 
reason for existing, the ordering of the global action discourse is a crucial form of 
linking together the various groups, networks and actions of the global actions. The 
PGA, although always emphatically described as ‘not an organisation,’ and with 
regulations that limit its development as an institution and encourage its functioning as a 
model of ‘direct democracy,’ is nevertheless a central regulator of the discourse. Its 
hallmarks, organisational principles, bulletins and calls for action, cohere the diverse 
groups that unite and work together to build up the massive direct actions, which can 
halt cities around the world. Paradoxically, the practices and tropes of the discourse 
have contributed to both its continuation (in exponentially expanding the network and 
scale of global action) and its peril (in becoming so large and inclusive that its 
principles and meanings could potentially dissolve). 
The media attention on the violence in the streets, and the violence itself, was 
the subject, yet again, of much discussion. Media and police accounts say that members 
of anarchist groups, which they often present as representative of the entire 
demonstration, initiated the violence through looting, window-breaking, and other acts   - 226 - 
against property. All detailed accounts I have seen of these matters say that the first two 
days, 28 to 29 November, before the WTO meeting on 30 November, were peaceful, 
except, according to one activist, a broken McDonald’s store window (Desyllas 1999). 
The police, in comparison, describe protestors throwing rocks and directing laser 
pointers at them. They describe the McDonald’s incident as, “Several hundred 
demonstrators marched to the McDonald's at 3rd and Pine, broke windows, and spray 
painted graffiti on the building.” There is, predictably enough, a marked difference in 
the language used. Desyllas’ account has no agent, uses a passive sentence construction, 
and implicitly gives the impression there was one McDonald’s store window broken by 
one protestor. The police account is much more active and worded to paint a picture of 
many (“hundreds”) of protestors descending on McDonald’s. 
On the Tuesday
34 of the WTO meeting, the police began to use rubber pellets, 
tear gas and pepper spray, and, according to the accounts of protestors and some 
residents of the city, against not only people who were not conducting destructive acts, 
but also on people who were not actually participating in the protests and blockades. 
The Seattle Police Department’s (hereafter SPD) account of the events in their after 
action report provides an interesting contrast to the protestors’ accounts. The activists’ 
order of business was to ‘shut down the WTO’ through ‘non-violent’ means, and the 
organisers (DAN) asked that all participants agree to the following: 
1) We will use no violence, physical or verbal towards any person 
2) We will carry no weapons 
3) We will not bring or use any alcohol or illegal drugs 
4) We will not destroy property (Direct Action Network 1999, as in 
original). 
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In contrast, police from the SPD noted that property destruction occurred in the midst of 
‘non-violent’ protestors. They surmised that this was a conscious and deliberate strategy 
on the part of the organisers: 
Among other things, WTO commanders were surprised by the high 
degree of coordinated action orchestrated using walkie talkies and cell 
phones; the critical mass achieved with the rapid marshalling of forces 
from all directions nearly simultaneously on the morning of November 
30; the conscious use of hit and run tactics and flanking movements 
through the day and night to follow; and the effective use of peaceful 
demonstrators to mask and shield law violators (Seattle Police 
Department 2000). 
One of the ways the report backs this up is by citing incidents that occurred on the 
Monday before the WTO meeting (and the riots). The report first emphasises that, 
through the day, the demonstrators were gathering and conducting their protests at 
different sites in an impromptu manner, with the aid of mobile phones and walkie 
talkies, also notifying each other of police whereabouts so the activities could take place 
outside controlled areas. One such demonstration occurred outside Niketown, according 
to the police, there was an argument amongst the protestors over whether they should 
take over the store. The report then quotes a protestor, equipped with microphone, 
exhorting them to “Keep it peaceful today. Today is not the day to break windows. Wait 
until tomorrow” (Seattle Police Department 2000). 
Despite the request from DAN, most of the reports from activists, even some of 
the ones who did not take part in the attacks on property, did not view the breaking of 
windows and other acts against property as violent acts because they were not directed 
at people and did not hurt anyone. A few days after the riots, a subgroup from an 
anarchist organisation called ‘Black Bloc,’ claimed responsibility for these activities, 
listing the corporations attacked and the methods and tools used to deface and damage 
storefronts and property, and explaining the meanings behind these acts. They were   - 228 - 
symbolic acts deconstructing the concept of ‘private property’ and reclaiming these for 
the people: 
When we smash a window, we aim to destroy the thin veneer of 
legitimacy that surrounds private property rights. At the same time, we 
exorcize that set of violent and destructive social relationships which has 
been imbued in almost everything around us. By "destroying" private 
property, we convert its limited exchange value into an expanded use 
value. A storefront window becomes a vent to let some fresh air into the 
oppressive atmosphere of a retail outlet … (ACME Collective 1999). 
Perhaps adding to the reluctance of the network to rein them in, the Black Bloc reiterate 
a seme, that is, the black masks (balaclavas or t-shirts tied around their heads) evoke the 
Zapatistas and repeat those meanings of anonymity (although avoiding legal prosecution 
is a main reason). 
Although the main thrust of the events was to blockade the WTO non-violently, 
other activists writing about this issue tend to view property destruction, particularly 
that of corporate giants such as Starbucks and McDonald’s, as being in keeping with the 
semiotic cache of the global action discourse, even if they personally did not want to 
participate ('Reflections on j18' 1999). 
This is not to say there was total agreement and that the SPD accurately assessed 
the situation. The anarchists from Black Bloc say that other protestors physically 
attacked them and that these self-styled ‘peacekeepers’ were sometimes more a threat 
than the police.
35 This dispute is significant in relation to global action discourse, 
because it illustrates one of the paradoxes of bringing together so many different 
interests. The difficulty of such a solidarity and reaching agreement on what constituted 
valid ‘non-violent’ activities and on balancing the individual agendas of the various 
groups with the entire thrust of the global action discourse are indicated in the following 
passage written by members of the Black Bloc: 
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Response to the black bloc has highlighted some of the contradictions 
and internal oppressions of the "nonviolent activist" community. Aside 
from the obvious hypocrisy of those who engaged in violence against 
black-clad and masked people (many of whom were harassed despite the 
fact that they never engaged in property destruction), there is the racism 
of privileged activists who can afford to ignore the violence perpetrated 
against the bulk of society and the natural world in the name of private 
property rights. Window-smashing has engaged and inspired many of the 
most oppressed members of Seattle's community more than any giant 
puppets or sea turtle costumes
36 ever could (not to disparage the 
effectiveness of those tools in other communities) (ACME Collective 
1999). 
At the same time, the global action discourse is flexible and tactically-driven. 
The more positive responses of the other activists to the Black Bloc actions recuperate 
and reintegrate the latter’s actions and ideas into the discourse. The evidence for this 
process is in the fifth bulletin of the PGA, which includes an extract of the above 
‘Communique’ (Peoples' Global Action 2000b). Significantly, this abridged extract 
leaves out the criticism of other activists, for instance, the passage above, and other 
parts that hint at dissension within the ranks. 
  The activists keep alive the cultural memory of N-30 in Seattle, conducting 
anniversary protests against global capital every year, often with skirmishes between the 
police and the protestors. Activists consider N-30 the ‘watershed’ global action in the US, 
and, because of how the ‘world news’ is produced (sourced), by most of the world. 
Along with J-18, it recurs most often as a point of comparison for subsequent 
demonstrations and has given global action a particular stamp in dominant discourse. It 
had lasting impact in how, for instance, the police, media and city officials would 
prepare for and handle current actions. The repeated reference to this event in media 
texts, particularly the abundance of reports and analyses from different perspectives on 
the Internet, ensures its legendary status in history. While I have shown the inception of 
many of the practices and semiotic chains as occurring before N-30, nevertheless, this 
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particular action placed them firmly in the archives of global action discourse, and set 
the scene for the actions that would come after (see Table 2: Global Actions from 1998 
to October 2001, page 215). 
ACTION  LOCATION: EVENT DATE  WEBSITE 
Reclaim the 
Streets 
Birmingham & Worldwide: 16 
May 1998 
http://www.gn.apc.org/rts/global3.htm 
J-18  Köln: 18 June 1999  http://bak.spc.org/j18/site 
N-30  Seattle: 30 November 1999  http://www.seattle99.org/ 
A-16  Washington: 16 April 2000  http://www.a16.org/ 
Mayday 2k  Worldwide: 1 May 2000  http://www.mayday2k.org/ 
S-11  Melbourne: 11 September 2000  http://www.s11.org/s14 
S-26  Prague: 26 September 2000  http://www.x21.org/s26/index.shtml 
0-20  Korea: 20 October 2000  http://antiwto.jinbo.net 
J-27  Davos: 27 January 2001  http://www.bermuda.ch/reitschule/anti-
wto/English 
Anti-WEF  Mexico: February 2001  http://www.d4mx.org/ 
Operation 
Dessert Storm 
April: 2001  http://www.dessertstorm.org 
Stop FTAA  Beunos Aires: 6 April 2001   http://www.noalalca.com/ 
Stop FTAA  Quebec: 18 April 2001  http://www.quebec2001.net/ 
M-1  World-Wide: 1 May 2001  http://www.mayday2001.org 
Asia 
Development 
Bank Meeting 
Hawaii: May 2001  http://groups.yahoo.com/group/stopwto99/
files/ADB_Hawaii/ADB_Hawaii.html 
EU Meeting  Gothenberg: 14 June 2001  http://motkraft.net/gbg2001 
J-25  Barcelona: 25 June 2001 http://www.j25.org 
J-1-3  Salzburg: 1 July 2001  http://www.antiwef.org 
G8  Genoa: 20-22 July 2001  http://www.controg8.org 
S-28  Washington: 28 September 2001  http://www.50years.org/ 
O-3  Melbourne: 3 October 2001  http://www.s11.org/m1/03.html 
CHOGM  Brisbane: 6 October  http://www.stopchogm.org 
Table 2: Global Actions from 1998 to October 2001
37 
4. Critique 
Aside from developing the ideas and strategies for revolution, another function of 
intellectual criticism advocated by Foucault is to make the process of revolution difficult 
and self-aware (1988), in other words, to critique the revolutionary discourse itself. In 
this section, I discuss some of the criticism of global action, some of which originated 
from the activists themselves. This, in itself, is interesting, because so much of the 
material available on the web is self-congratulatory and, if there are problems, the 
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contributors blame the authorities and/or the adversary (for example, global 
corporations or the WTO). Although this is most likely due to a need to maintain and 
attract support and participation, this tendency sometimes makes it difficult to make an 
accurate assessment of the success of the tactics and practices of the actions and the 
discourse in general. It also works against the aforementioned need for revolutionary 
practice to be reflexive and multifarious, to decrease the chances of solidifying into a 
new oppressive practice. At the same time, the existence of critical appraisal, although 
not as popular and widespread, does indicate that a certain degree of critical reflexivity 
is embedded in the discourse. 
  The Zapatistas, as demonstrated, are significant as both the initiator of the chain 
of events that led to the formation of the Peoples’ Global Action and a source of 
inspiration for the organisation and tactics of global action. Most of the websites of 
activists in support of direct action against capitalism do not tend to utter major 
criticism of the Zapatistas, nor, indeed, the PGA and the other organisations that played 
significant roles in the development of global action. Thus, the comments and 
experiences of Jeroen Ten Dam (Ten Dam 1999b), writing on behalf of the Solidarity 
Committee Mexico, are worthy of note for they come from an inside perspective that is 
more openly critical of the EZLN and the encounters than usual. Their comments also 
help to identify a key weakness in the discourse and operations of global action, that is, 
the effort to build a coalition can lead to certain compromises and pacts that, left 
unchecked or unexplored, would be detrimental to the network. They also highlight the 
discursive boundaries of ‘what can be said’ within the network, at least, publicly. 
  Ten Dam says, for instance, that the laudatory treatment of the Zapatistas by 
radical and left-wing groups is a ‘blind spot’ that reflects a general tendency of the left 
to be critical of authoritarianism in extreme right groups, but to ignore or be oblivious to 
the same problem in left-wing groups (Ten Dam 1999a). This, from Ten Dam’s account,   - 232 - 
seems to be partly due to the cult of personality formed around Marcos, the centrality of 
the Zapatistas in providing the catalyst for anti-capitalist direct action, and that criticism 
of the Zapatistas could be counted as support, although unintended, for the Mexican 
government. If this is true, this may undermine the role of the gatherings and encounters 
for creating dialogue and modelling ‘direct democracy.’ Organisational procedures and 
rules may be intended to protect these things, but an emerging culture of uncritical 
reception of select groups or individuals can undercut the effects of these practices, 
while still leaving them, to most eyes, intact and functioning. 
  Ten Dam discusses a number of other problems with the Zapatistas and groups 
involved in the Encounters, which I will list briefly only to suggest the types of 
problems raised in the past. They are important to my work in this chapter because they 
give instances of how the weaknesses of a movement reliant upon the Internet for its 
networking can be obscured. In other words, all the meetings and international 
gatherings not withstanding, there is a greater chance of fissures between ideology and 
actual practice going unobserved or, at the least, not going through the rigors of critical 
analysis. The Zapatistas are described as generally opportunistic, open to making 
alliances with organisations and individuals who have, as Ten Dam argues, doubtful 
ideologies and practices. One example is Ten Dam’s allegation that the EZLN met with 
the major of the city of Montreuil, but refused to see a group of immigrants without 
necessary residence documents who riot police, acting on the said major’s orders, 
violently evicted. Also interesting is the divergent account provided by Ten Dam of the 
treatment and behaviour of the Zapatistas during the intercontinental encounters. He 
describes them as disinterested and uninvolved in their attendance during the first 
encounter, and ‘sealed off’ during the second. 
  Aside from the Zapatistas, there were also, according to Ten Dam, groups 
attempting to monopolise solidarity work in their cities, regions or countries, even   - 233 - 
threatening other groups. For instance, Ten Dam says that Italian Stalinist groups tried 
to take over the central planning and impose locations and times of meetings for a 
European encounter, and refers to other assorted instances where practice fell short of 
the ideal of ‘non-hierarchical’ and democratic decision-making. During the first 
intercontinental encounter, there was also a general reluctance and avoidance of open 
criticism by participants for the sake of the ‘greater good’ both during meetings and 
encounters, and in the reports, despite expressed criticism to the writers. If true, this 
indicates the limits of what counts as truth and on what is sayable within this discourse. 
In addition, these problems underscore how the principles and practices set out earlier 
do not guarantee, that “there are despotic formations of immanence and canalisation 
indigenous to rhizomes” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 46). Just as importantly, Deleuze 
and Guattari also point out that this, in itself, does not render such efforts useless: 
What counts is that the root-tree and the canal rhizome are not opposed 
like two models: the one functions as a transcendent model and tracing; 
the other functions as an immanent process that overturns the model and 
sketches a map, even if it constitutes its own hierarchies, even if it gives 
rise to a despotic canal” (46, emphases added).  
The effort to resist hierarchical tree-based models of organisation and thought, in itself, 
is an act of resistance that actively challenges the dominant discourse in wider society. 
I have discussed the second encounter based upon accounts available on the 
Web; Ten Dam’s account, which is also available on the Web, is more rare, and gives a 
different impression: 
Even with the preparations it became clear that a small group of 
apparatchiks, mainly from Madrid and Zaragoza had imposed their idea 
(which was an almost identical copy of the First Encounter in 1996) of 
how the Encounter should be organised. Groups with a more critical view 
and different ideas were not given any space to venture their opinions, 
but strangely enough most of these critical groups did in the end drop 
their criticisms and participate. This Encounter included the same 
ridiculous show of accreditation and ausweis-like identification papers 
that were compulsory during the first Encounter… Anyone who dared to   - 234 - 
criticise the way things were organised could expect to be treated as if 
they were spies, there to sabotage the Encounter (Ten Dam 1999b). 
The report from the South African delegation has this to add: 
It became in fact apparent that the organization of the mesas and the 
venues responded to preoccupations linked to internal relations between 
groups which took part in the organization… These dynamics negatively 
affected the development of the Encounter. In fact, the fragmentation of 
some mesas and the emphasis on delegated forms of representation in 
contrast with direct participatory democracy were often perceived as 
elements of bureaucratization in substantial discontinuity with the first 
Encounter that was held in 1996 in Chiapas (Barchiesi 1997). 
Without taking a stance on whether they are accurate or not, these are allegations that do 
not appear in the majority of material available on the Internet and other media, 
although, at the most, certain web sites, notably, the PGA’s, do link to the Ten Dam 
articles. Most other reports mention that the encounters were generally disorganised, but 
excuse this problem as inevitable, given the number of diverse interests and groups 
present. Meanwhile, Ten Dam raises another point, in relation to the European network, 
but also worth considering in general, especially in relation to the issue of violence. He 
argues that: “Day by day the European network is becoming an ever more 
bureaucratically organised humanitarian aid organisation, that will do anything in the 
aid of the good cause. It seems to have lost its grip on how things are going in 
Europe…” (Ten Dam 1999b). 
The key here is the phrase “do anything in the aid of the good cause.” As I said 
earlier, the effort to build up a coalition of different groups has sometimes meant 
making changes to accommodate their agendas and tactics. Sometimes, the efforts have 
led to a dilution of the initial goals and demands of direct action: 
In our efforts to build a huge anti-capitalist network we have attracted a 
lot of groups and it sounds impressive but unfortunately too many of 
them are liberal or are open to authoritarian or conservative elements. 
This is partly because of phrases like ‘the longer the list, the better the 
action!’ used in some early leaflets… ('Judy' 1999).   - 235 - 
This problem was recognised in 1999, when the PGA  made an amendment to their 
Hallmarks to rule out right-wing nationalist and protectionist groups (see discussion of 
hallmarks in the section on the PGA). However, this is not to say they have adequately 
addressed the problem. The tension between the desire to expand the networks and 
include all parties interested in the actions and the desire to contain the movement 
within established ideological and tactical limits continues to be an issue, and, as I have 
argued, is actually an element of the discursive framework set in place since the 
intercontinental encounters.  
  One example of the problems the desire to include as many groups as possible 
could pose is the issue of violence. The PGA initially advocated ‘non-violence’ as part of 
its hallmarks; this was removed in 2001 after discussions at the third international 
conference in Cochabamba (Peoples' Global Action 2001a: n.p.). Significantly, the two 
main groups objecting to the inclusion of ‘non-violence’ were the North Americans and 
the Latin Americans. Instead, phrases like ‘maximising respect for life,’ and ‘civil 
disobedience’ were used to include the range of tactics used in different circumstances 
in different parts of the world. There may be validity in the point that ‘non-violence’ 
meant different things in different contexts, could rule out a range of tactics, and, 
moreover, did not respect the histories and circumstances of sections of the movement 
where ‘non-violence’ would be difficult. Unfortunately, ever since J-18 and N-30, the 
threat and incidence of violence always accompanies the global actions in media reports 
and preparations of city officials and police: 
Ever since Seattle, the international media have endlessly decried the 
supposed violence of direct action. The US media invoke this term most 
insistently, despite the fact that after two years of increasingly militant 
protests in the US, it is still impossible to come up with a single example 
of someone physically injured by a protester (Graeber 2001).   - 236 - 
This seme attracts much media attention and publicity, and has entered ‘anti-
globalisation’ and, to a lesser extent, ‘anti-capitalism,’ into popular consciousness. 
Simultaneously, the attention paid to violence, however, distracts from these themes. 
Rather than detailed examinations and critiques of the claims of the protestors, 
mainstream media reports tend to focus on the numbers of wounded demonstrators and 
police, store windows broken and disruption caused to the operations of the urban 
centre, the techniques of the protestors in achieving this disruption and violence, and so 
forth. Despite the training sessions in non-violent action provided prior to direct action 
protests, this seme of violence appears too ingrained in the discourse surrounding direct 
action, particularly in media and security organisations. For some of the activists, 
violence is a component of their practices. In this instance, the movement is in a bind: it 
wants to be inclusive, in line with the drive to achieve solidarity with a wide network, 
attract mainstream attention, and avoid an authoritarian stance on this issue, at the same 
time, the close association with violence draws attention away from the key messages it 
wants to promote.  
  There is one further tragic consequence of this state of affairs: the death of a 
protestor in Genoa, Carlo Giuliani. Carlo Giuliani was shot by a police officer whilst 
participating in a confrontation between protestors and a police vehicle.  By this time, 
July 2001, the movement had alleged numerous problems with demonstrators being 
assaulted and thrown in detention, including a woman who was raped in the custody of 
police in the S-26 Prague protests the previous year. There were discussions during the 
PGA conference and, ironically enough, in Genoa, about the problem with the 
criminalisation of the movement. A detailed discussion of this incident is not within the 
scope of this chapter, except to say that the activists have blamed the police, agent 
provocateurs, and the leadership or organisers of the global action movement. One 
argument is that the smashing of windows, burning of cars and so forth not only   - 237 - 
provides a justification for the police to increase hardline security measures, but also is 
terrifying for the police involved, themselves already schooled in a discourse that 
criminalises the protestors (Newman 2001; Bello 2001). Walden Bello argues that, 
amongst the agent provocateurs are activists belonging to a certain group, which he 
refuses to identify and calls ‘Bs.’ These ‘Bs’ have tactics rather similar to the Black 
Bloc, who were present.  
  What Giuliani’s death highlights in relation to this critique is the increasing 
potential for, and actuality of, violence, especially since Seattle, as a result of escalating 
police anticipation, media attention, and, perhaps, efforts by activists themselves, 
sometimes to protect themselves. This discussion does not intend to place all guilt or 
responsibility on the movement or the individual activists involved: as mentioned, on 
the part of police, city authorities and governments, their discourse has been 
increasingly opposed and stern with regards to direct action, and, as a global action day 
approaches, police are fed a stream of reports, instructions and information that steel 
them for a violent confrontation (Newman 2001). Some activists protect themselves 
with gas masks, helmets, body shields, and protective padding; they use tripods and 
other devices to create effective barriers to, say, WTO meetings, and all manner of 
sophisticated methods of communication and tactics. As indicated in the Seattle Police 
Department report, although these measures might be harmless and do not merit a harsh 
crackdown, the police work in a discursive environment which has already identified 
these activists as potential criminals and their actions as ‘illegal,’ and possibly 
dangerous. On the street, the observation of the tripods being unloaded and used, gas 
masks and body armour donned, the organisation of the protestors, and not least, the 
sheer large numbers they face, all these can heighten police apprehension. 
In this climate, the actions of groups like the Black Bloc can and have triggered 
a brutal confrontation. This, as I have emphasised, does not mean the fault lies solely   - 238 - 
with the Black Bloc or with the activists, merely that their movement, in drawing 
together the diverse groups, the wide range of people of all ages, urgently needs to 
address this issue because of the harm done to the message and to protect the lives of 
the participants. Bello (2001) argues that there needs to be ways of persuading activists 
engaged in dangerous and inflammatory (beyond the bounds of ‘civil disobedience, not 
an easy definition) actions to disengage. Proposals like these sit uneasily in the 
discourse, which emphasises diversity and a non-hierarchical and authoritarian approach 
to organisation, the same dilemma that emerged post-J-18 and Seattle. Here, again, we 
can see another boundary of ‘truth’ within this discourse, of what is acceptable to 
express. 
Another controversy surrounds the debatable involvement of far right groups. 
This issue was first raised publicly by the Dutch organisation, De Fabel van de Illegaal 
(‘The Myth of Illegality’). De Fabel van de Illegaal say that key organisers of the Seattle 
N-30 action, Public Citizen and the International Forum on Globalisation (IFG), 
promoted partnerships with individuals, like Pat Buchanan, and groups in the far right 
(Krebbers and Schoenmaker 1999). Whatever the truth of this matter, the abundance of 
material, linked from the PGA website, indicates that there is at least this threat of 
problematic alliances and a degree of discomfort amongst some of the activists about 
the people with whom they are marching. One writer on this issue describes “the 
decision facing the anti-authoritarian left. Do we trade away long-term control over our 
ability to define the content and goals of our struggles against capitalism, white-
supremacy, patriarchy, ecological destruction and the state in return for short-term 
coalition “victories” over narrowly defined issues” ('Mark S' 2000). 
Relatedly, the anti-capitalist movement tends to be concentrated in the north, 
having less actions and numbers in the southern hemisphere. One chronicler of the   
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PGA’s history explains the south: 
They have very difficult conditions and their own - very full - agendas. 
These don't necessarily put WTO in first place, since the IMF programs 
have often already imposed de facto what WTO wants to perpetuate as 
international law. A big movement in Nigeria, for example, may be 
willing to participate in coordinated demonstrations if it also coincides 
with local deadlines, but it generally won't organise a major 
demonstration just for a far away summit. The very idea of committing 
themselves to some kind of international action and political 
responsibility can be new and difficult ('OdM' 1999). 
In addition, since Seattle, and not least because of the predominance of United States’ 
media corporations, the actions and practices in the United States often receive more 
coverage and attention. 
Further, to add to the problem, in these areas with the highest concentration of 
direct action protests, North America and Europe, participants are predominantly white. 
According to one critic, these issues of race and class are linked: the anti-globalisation 
campaign is not the global proletariat rising against capital. Distinguishing between the 
anti-globalisation “campaign” from the “actual anti-WTO struggle”, this writer says that 
the  campaign has been centred in the north and is largely pro-capitalist while the 
southern  struggle is anti-capitalist (Sakai 2000?). While Sakai’s dichotomy might 
oversimplify the class politics in both hemispheres, it does make a useful connection 
between the following: ethnic composition (the greater participation of white activists); 
the alliances with more liberal and right-wing activists; the emphasis on northern 
campaigns; and the content of some of the campaigns. The participation of liberal, right-
wing and even left-wing groups can dilute the message of the campaign, which 
occasionally, in the United States, seems to be more about saving jobs and protecting 
local industry than about global capital’s exploitation of labour and resources occurring 
in developing countries.   - 240 - 
The predominance of white protestors, and the inclusion of groups to the right of 
the political spectrum, in its turn contributed to the poor participation of people of 
colour (Martinez 2000).  This can add to the oversimplification of the issues: Sakai, for 
instance, cites the case of one aged woman of colour, working for a minimum wage as a 
blue-collar worker in the US, scoffing at the assumptions of a European feminist 
working with third world women. The latter argued that the workers in the more 
affluent north could now find a common cause with the south as things like subsidised 
child care, medical benefits, and so forth, were under threat. Sakai argues that the 
woman of colour
38 did not have these things anyway. This suggests that the ethnic and 
class composition of the campaign leadership—yes, despite the rhetoric of ‘non-
hierarchy’—may still reflect the stratification of power and proceeds of wider society 
and therefore contribute to a blindness or lack of concerted attention to local issues, for 
instance, racial discrimination and the needs of marginalised indigenous or ‘people of 
colour’
39 in general. 
More directly germane, other comments from Martinez indicate that Internet 
access could also have contributed to the disproportionate representation: 
A July 1999 federal survey showed that among Americans earning 
$15,000-$35,000 a year, more than 32 percent of white families owned 
computers but only 19 percent of black and Latino families. In that same 
income range, only 9 percent of African American and Latino homes had 
Internet access compared to 27 percent of white families. So information 
about WTO and all the plans for Seattle did not reach many people of 
color (Martinez 2000). 
Earlier in this chapter, I cited the case of the London J-18 actions, where the organisers 
used a variety of more traditional media extensively, in conjunction with the Internet. 
Without further research, it is unclear whether the Seattle action was more or less reliant 
on the Internet. Certainly, organising meetings and seminars were held ‘offline’—
                                                 
38 Sakai does not state her ethnic classification, except by implication. 
39 My discussion of Martinez’s critique adopts her terms of reference, although ‘people of colour’ is a 
term I use for convenience only, with some discomfort.   - 241 - 
however, as Martinez points out, the predominance of white people in the leadership 
and in attendance at these meetings disconcerted the African-Americans that did attend 
and discouraged some of them from further participation. This widened the gap in 
communication even further. 
5. Peoples’ Global Action at the Time of Writing 
I shall focus on two pivotal moments to describe the direction of the PGA and its 
network in recent times. The first is the PGA’s third annual international conference. In 
the lead up to its third annual international conference, the PGA took note of issues that 
had come up in the regional meetings around the world: 
These meetings discussed the need to go beyond the global days of 
action, which are the form of global action practised so far within the 
PGA space, and explored the idea of sustained global campaigns as a 
possible step forward. Other issues discussed included the question of 
violence; the criminalisation of our movements, the expression of 
solidarity in cases of urgent need; the need to localise more deeply the 
PGA process, etc  (Peoples' Global Action 2001b). 
The notion of sustained global campaigns has been mentioned already and included: 
campaigns against “state militarism and paramilitarism”; “all privatisations”; the 
“construction of alternative models to the capitalist system,” and; “defense and 
recognition of self-determination and land sovereignty of all people.” 
Other changes were made to bring “the theory into line with actual practice and 
experience” ('Olivier' 2001). This was a form of discursive streamlining where the 
activists rewrote its organisational principles and the hallmarks to suit actual practice 
and the knowledge gained from experience. For instance, Indymedia web sites were 
already in use to spread information about global action days. The PGA modelled its 
own web communication on these sites, that is, decentralised, with open publishing, and 
no ‘official’ PGA stamp ('Olivier' 2001). Instead of its annual meetings, caravans would 
tour each continent and, in this way, representatives from each region would gather and   - 242 - 
spread information. There would also be regional meetings, with a point of contact for 
the  PGA, where the convenors, and the frequency and form of meetings would be 
decided within each region. This was to encourage fluidity, spontaneity, and local 
grounding. 
The third meeting was not well-attended by the US delegates, primarily because 
of the airline chaos after the attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on 11 
September 2001, which brings me to the other ‘moment.’ After this event, the 
heightened fear and security in the United States and its allies created an even more 
hostile climate for activists, particularly as the state and some of the public had 
problems making a distinction between protest actions, for instance, culture-jamming 
activities, and ‘terrorism’ (it is arguable there are some activists who also have this 
problem). As a result, the network, at least, in the United States and England, went 
through a period of reappraisal and discussion as activists considered how best to act in 
this environment, and to respond to the attacks as well as the United States’ war efforts. 
Since then, the network has redirected its attention towards anti-war action 
during the so-called ‘War on Terrorism’ that ensued. Although it had its supporters, 
more so than perhaps the anti-globalisation actions, the activists found themselves 
committed to a position that the mainstream (at least in England and the United States) 
did not share. Indeed, some of the reactions were very hostile, and read the activities 
and ideologies of the protestors as a form of terrorism. As one activist-writer puts it: 
Post-September 11, tactics that rely on attacking – even peacefully –
powerful symbols of capitalism find themselves in an utterly transformed 
semiotic landscape. After all, the attacks were acts of very real and 
horrifying terror, but they were also acts of symbolic warfare, and 
instantly understood as such. As Tom Brokaw and so many others put it, 
the towers were not just any buildings, they were ‘symbols of American 
capitalism’ (Klein 2001: n.p., emphases added).   - 243 - 
Aware of this ‘semiotic landscape’, the delicacy of public sentiment, and of the reduced 
‘tolerance’, increased security and force they would face from police, activists scaled 
down their activities, changed their practices to take into account the change in society 
around them. As Klein points out, it was time to shift away from, in her words, a “war 
of symbols,” a need that was already expressed in activist circles prior to 11 September, 
but accentuated by this event and social aftermath. 
As the war in Afghanistan was brought to a close, attention was redirected to the 
upcoming World Economic Forum meeting in New York. This meeting, usually held in 
Davos, Switzerland, was shifted to New York due to fears that the usual disruptions that 
were now a regular annual phenomenon would take place at the customary location. The 
call to action against this meeting was probably correct in assuming that this decision 
was motivated by the fact that this was the site of one of the attacks that occurred on 11 
September (Anti-Capitalist Convergence 2001). For this reason, this was a pivotal 
moment, more so than perhaps the 16 October action (O-16). The various media 
followed the semiotic paths already well-worn by this time, but this time, the rhetoric 
was more unremittingly hostile, with the New York Police Department declaring a 
policy of “zero tolerance” for any violations of the law (Baker 2002). With a huge 
police presence, despite interviews with activists stating that the activities would centre 
more on a ‘street party,’ there was a media build-up to a violent confrontation (Baker 
2002).
40 This did not happen: the reports in the media described the protests as peaceful 
and quiet. 
An article by activist media tells of the cancellation of an ABC Nightline special 
on a group of protestors organising for the occasion, saying that the producer of the 
programme cited insufficient violence as one of the reasons (Skaller 2002). Will the US 
                                                 
40 This was also observed in reports from Reuters, AP, and online news media based in New York. 
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and English anti-capitalist network alter its tactics in the long term? How would this 
affect protests outside the United States and England? In terms of media coverage, 
would interest in the protests die down without the pictures and reports of violence? On 
the other hand, is such media attention to remain a goal of the activists anyway? It is too 
early to tell if this realignment of the discourses surrounding anti-capitalist protests is 
long-term and it is possible that the tactics and modes of operation already defined in 
the past will return. 
6. Conclusion 
As this chapter demonstrates, the technologies of the Internet are not merely a tool of 
global capital, but are also a powerful means of drawing together its adversaries for 
concerted direct action. The Internet is not just a tool: in the course of providing one 
means of pulling together the myriad groups and interests, it contributes discursively to 
the way the movement operates and organises itself and to its vocabulary and direct 
action tactics. The influence of the technology (and its utility) can be seen, for instance, 
in the rhizomorphic form of the activist network: the spread of websites, the 
interconnection of activist groups across space and agendas and the passage of 
information and discussion via this network through time and space. The nature of this 
network allows, with the reservations already expressed in the previous section, the 
potent combination of a form of direct democratic decision-making (or, at least, the 
appearance of such), anti-authoritarian organisational structure, with a comprehensive 
ideological and discursive framework, which provides the identity of the network and 
streamlines its operations. In an organic-like manner, the semiotic codes of the network, 
for instance, codes expressing martyrdom and solidarity, bind the individual groups 
acting together and maintain this identification within a larger backdrop.   - 245 - 
  The experience of the network, at the same time, teaches a few lessons about this 
form of solidarity building and activism. The first surrounds the tension between the 
control and structuring of the discourse (to use Foucault’s terms, the “ordering of the 
discourse”) against the ‘loosening’ of the same: that is, the widening of participation, 
agendas, and tactics. The degree to which the movement veers towards one or the other 
has very real consequences for the way it functions and the reception of its activities, 
witness the issue of violence and the debates over whether particular organisations 
should be included as part of the movement and the roles they should play. 
  The movement’s use of the Internet pushes the technology beyond basic HTML 
pages, which do have their place too. The full range of Internet tools are used: Usenet 
newsgroups, email and email lists, chat, web discussion boards, online newsletters, 
downloadable material in portable document format, and online audio and video 
broadcasts including footage of actions, meetings, interviews. For publicity purposes, 
activists produce ‘flash’ clips, that is, animated clips they can download, forward to 
other people and play on most types of computers. 
Another activist tactic enabled by the Internet is ‘hacktivism’. This is now de 
rigueur, often coinciding with other forms of protests, but, perhaps because of the illegal 
nature of this activity, not officially recognised by the activist groups. During N-30, for 
instance, the website of the organisation sponsoring the WTO meeting in Seattle came 
under continual attack. Despite the heavy assault, the hackers were unable to get into the 
system. In September 2000, during its meeting in Melbourne, the World Economic 
Forum’s website was hacked (Barker 2001). Nike’s website was changed so that, from 
21 to 22 July 2000, people who tried to view the Nike site were instead redirected to the 
S11 site. This latter action resulted in a leap from fifty-seven to a high of sixty-six   - 246 - 
thousand ‘hits’
41 an hour at the S-11 site, leading to a total of eight hundred thousand 
‘hits’ for the nineteen hours the Nike site was directing visitors to S-11 (S-11 2001b). In 
2001, the World Bank decided not to hold its annual development economics 
conference on globalisation, poverty, and wealth in Barcelona as planned to avoid anti-
globalisation protests. Instead, it would hold a virtual conference. This was followed by 
threats by activist groups like Greenpeace that they would likewise focus their activities 
online and shut down the virtual conference through hacking (Riley 2001). 
Beyond the above practices, the Internet also affects how traditional media is 
used. The movement, it seems, best reaches the groups that should be taking part (that 
is, the disenfranchised) when it uses communication methods that are less ‘high tech’ 
and elitist, for instance, hardcopy leaflets, face to face seminars and meetings, fax 
machines and so forth. Where the network excels is when these different technologies 
are combined to meet different communication needs, a lesson learned early in the 
Zapatista model and worth keeping in mind. There are potential problems when 
activism begins to lean too much on one form of communication and neglects others, 
leading to a gap in participation, as, for instance, the disproportionate ethnic 
composition in the Seattle events might arguably demonstrate. 
  The discourse of the anti-capitalist network has entered other cultural channels, 
and the various activists involved have increased popular awareness of the concept of 
‘globalisation,’ notwithstanding that some of these understandings sometimes refer to 
vague notions of large corporations like McDonald’s, cultural homogenisation, and/or 
threats to local labour and businesses. This is not only through the direct action 
campaigns, but also through documentaries, which are also available on order through 
the Internet. These feature, for instance, the events in Seattle, or exposes of ‘sweatshop’ 
                                                 
41 The word, ‘Hits,’ describes visits to a website. These figures are usually collected by programs on the 
server and are available to the site maintainers and includes other information, like the network address 
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working conditions of transnational corporations like Nike, and Gap and are produced 
by non-profit ‘video activist’ groups like Paper Tiger, Whispered Media, Big Noise 
Productions, and Independent Media Center. A well-known example is “Showdown in 
Seattle: Five Days that Shook the WTO” (IMC Video Collective 2000). In Australia, for 
instance, predominantly government-funded stations like the Special Broadcasting 
Service and the Australian Broadcasting Service at least occasionally broadcast these 
productions, if not commercial and mainstream television stations. 
The ‘culture jamming’
42 activities, and other ideas and tactics that accompany 
direct action campaigns, seem to have ‘seeded’ and spread to other areas. At the time of 
writing, the big news item here in Australia surrounds a small group of Melbourne 
activists calling themselves the ‘Dole Army’, who say they tricked the producers of two 
commercial television current affairs programmes into producing stories about how the 
former lived in sewers and lived off food scraps from refuse, which was patently false. 
This ploy, which was to highlight the plight of the unemployed and expose tabloid 
journalism, is culture jamming taken to its logical extreme, and it is not insignificant 
that the website of the Dole Army includes a link to Melbourne ‘Indymedia’ and other 
affiliates of the global direct action network (Dole Army 2002). 
Perhaps these activities addressing unemployment and other persistent social 
issues are part of the ‘sustained campaigns’ that the PGA and the direct global action 
network are now stressing, as opposed to ‘event-driven’ campaigns. Criticism of its 
modes of operation notwithstanding, the PGA works within a discourse that emphasises 
that it is historically-aware and self-reflexive and uses a model of direct democracy in 
decision-making. Since its beginnings, it has gone through a number of changes in 
                                                 
42 The phrase, ‘culture jamming’, describes the tactic of activists to deconstruct and alter media texts in 
order to expose the discourses that structure them. For instance, in the 1960s and 70s, culture jammers 
wrote on advertising billboards and transformed the meaning of their images and written text. Culture 
jamming is, thus, not new, however, it has spread and grown in scale along with the anti-capitalist 
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response to experience and the political climates in which its networks are working. 
While it has problems with obtaining and maintaining involvement with activists in the 
south, this ideological, technical and organisational emphasis on grassroots 
communication and decision-making has allowed the network a great degree of 
flexibility and spontaneity in response to local conditions while bringing together and 
organising a large number and breadth of active participants, using the same spaces 
inhabited by global capital.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I began this dissertation by suggesting that the Internet introduces new modes of power, 
control, and resistance and can extend or limit discourses existing before its advent. I 
then argued that an analysis that takes into account multiple discourses, competing or 
complementary, might help unveil these intersections of power and resistance. In the 
course of researching and writing this dissertation, I also found that a practice of 
constant reflexivity is vital to developing dynamic and relevant forms of resistance, a 
practice that will at least help avoid problems (e.g. of representation) and assumptions 
from coagulating into fixed ‘truths’. My intention was to conduct a flexible examination 
through a cultural studies approach that mediated between the discourses of the Internet, 
and of wider society that affected Internet communication, and demonstrate how they 
were not always opposed, but sometimes complemented or reinforced each other. 
Through the adoption of this approach, this dissertation has been able to uncover a 
variety of ways in which power operates on the Internet, in less explicit ways than 
conceived in early cyberculture studies. 
In the first two chapters, I am most concerned with control over public 
discourses, and with avenues of resistance to this control. In the case of Singapore and 
Internet regulation, I critiqued the proposition that the nation-state was threatened and 
that Internet technology and culture freed the individual from national regulation was 
critiqued. I do not suggest the opposite, that the hold over national culture, behaviour, 
and so forth was still centralised in the state’s hands. Instead, while acknowledging and 
exploring the state’s power to regulate the media, including the Internet, I found that 
there were, necessarily, changes to the nature of the relationship between the state, 
Singaporean public culture, and its citizens. These include the state’s own adjustment to 
globalisation and new technologies and the features of the Internet that allow some form   - 251 - 
of public questioning of the national discourses. While the former may be disputably 
cosmetic, and the latter is still limited in scope, they do suggest that at least some small-
scale change is underway, which may, or may not, eventuate into more explicit political 
and social change. Just as optimistic projections of the liberalising promise of Internet 
technology are in danger of minimising the power of the state and the public discourses 
already set in place, a pessimistic and cynical stance may also overemphasise the 
control of the state and the dominant discourses of society. This latter view ignores the 
less spectacular but still significant smaller changes that are happening. I explored 
examples of these in Chapter One, when I discussed Internet sites that fell outside the 
Singaporean margins of acceptability. In turn, a model of power that does not recognise 
the possibility of resistance can feed into a tendency for a fatalistic apathy that neglects 
to develop these minute changes into something more substantial (for instance, civic 
participation, voting patterns, and so forth). For instance, besides the problems of 
political practice, bureaucratic regulation, and so forth, this sort of apathy and fatalism 
is a major hurdle to progressive social change in Singapore. 
The examination of the flame thread in Chapter Two established the degree to 
which a discussion in an online forum is framed and limited by both the immediate and 
the wider social contexts of the communication. This chapter was concerned with 
aspects of the Internet which affect interaction in online forums, including attributing of 
identity to posters and the use of shared narratives (such as those around race). Again, I 
questioned the degree to which resistance within this framework was still possible, 
albeit many of the messages were still limited by the framing terms and narratives. 
  The third and fourth chapters turn their attention to transnational cultural 
formations, one based on strategic ethnic alliances, the other on a common cause, to 
analyse the promise and peril offered by the Internet in facilitating and encouraging 
these networks and communities. These formations use the Internet to pool their   - 252 - 
resources and energies for addressing problems of equity and justice. Chapter Three 
focussed on the dangers of essentialising and objectification in the representation of 
injustice and violence against ethnic minorities, in this case, ethnic Chinese. Chapter 
Four, on the other hand, discussed the development of anti-capitalist networks in order 
to, firstly, highlight their strengths and learn from them, secondly, to raise interest in the 
development of oppositional narratives and discourses. These concerns include the 
construction of a discourse, practice, and membership that can exclude others from 
participating (including those most disadvantaged by global capital), and the 
contribution of the activists towards their own marginalisation and criminalisation, 
which can work against them achieving their goals. 
  As I did this work, other areas of interest and concern have emerged that I could 
not address within the scope of this work. These are tied to questions of validity and 
generalisability. Firstly, much of this work relies on the analysis of texts available 
online. While I have striven to validate my findings through contacting the 
organisations or individuals involved, quite clearly, future work in this area would 
benefit from other forms of qualitative research, especially direct observation and 
interviewing. This would help in the analysis of the processes of cognition, analysis, 
decision-making, and interaction not easily observable through textual analysis of 
online materials. 
To demonstrate the need for a more direct and lengthy engagement with the 
organisations and individuals studied, I cite the case of Huaren. In Intersections, an 
online journal, I published an article based on work conducted for Chapter Three, which 
was subsequently forwarded to the Huaren forums and was heatedly debated on that 
site. Subsequent to this, members of Huaren engaged in discussion with me and, after a 
lengthy exchange of emails, I was able to put forward my views on the problems in 
representation and practice I had observed, while the Huaren members, in their turn,   - 253 - 
conveyed their position in more detail than observable on the site, forwarding me their 
email discussions. It turned out, for instance, that there was much more disagreement 
than earlier thought over the ethics of representation, that is, the views of some of the 
Indonesian Chinese participants that the organisation should let them speak and act on 
their own behalf rather than speak for them. Through such participant observation, these 
important details become more evident and verifiable, and the possibilities of 
objectifying and over-dismissiveness, on the part of the researcher towards the subject 
of the research, are reduced. 
Another area of interest that I was unable to explore in this dissertation is the 
degree Internet websites and forums influence decision-making. For instance, of interest 
to me is the degree to which political (for instance, voting patterns) and financial (for 
example, share investment) decisions are affected by individual engagement with 
Internet forums and websites. Again, this is an area that would be best analysed through 
observation and interviewing, combining ‘online’ work with ‘face to face’ forms of 
research. While writing Chapter One, for instance, I was conscious of the importance 
several theorists place on effecting change at a civic and political level (Rodan 2002; 
Rodan 1996; Brennan 1997) and the need to include such an analysis in order to analyse 
the dynamics of the Internet regarding power and resistance. 
The work I conducted for this dissertation began during the early stages of the 
entry of the Internet into wider general usage around the world and initially was more 
concerned with analysing the libertarian discourses that were popular at the time. These 
are still very influential, and are the subject of much critical analysis in recent years. 
The dissertation highlights the usefulness of comparing these narratives with other, 
perhaps less optimistic, ones, to begin to analyse the contributions of Internet media 
towards progressive and resistive politics. Questions raised in debates about 
globalisation and cosmopolitanism have also served to emphasise the Internet’s role in   - 254 - 
globalisation processes, developing and facilitating cosmopolitan sensibilities, and the 
benefits and problems thus raised. Finally, the analysis of different contextual 
dimensions, roughly, the national and the transnational (ethnic and cause-based 
solidarity) demonstrated the workings of power and resistance at different levels and in 
different contexts. As in other media (and society at large), when analysing the Internet, 
it is important to understand that power is not only confined to the discourses and agents 
that control and oppress, it is something that can offer resistance and change.   - 255 - 
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